1. ^Commonwealth War Graves Commission Annual Report 2013–2014 {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20151104004037/http://www.cwgc.org/learning-and-resources/publications/annual-report.aspx |date=2015-11-04 }}, page 48. Figures include identified burials and those commemorated by name on memorials.
2. ^¹ Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies, Vol 15, Nr 4, 1985, pp. 46-48. Accessed January 24, 2016.
3. ^Bendix, S. (2001) Industrial Relations in South Africa. Claremont: Juta. p. 59
4. ^See Air operations during the Greek Civil War#South African Air Force
5. ^[https://web.archive.org/web/20130120040603/http://www.imhc.mil.kr/imhcroot/data/korea_view.jsp?seq=4&page=1 "Casualties of Korean War"] (in Korean). Ministry of National Defense of Republic of Korea. Archived from the original on 2013-01-20. Retrieved 14 February 2007.
6. ^South Africa agreed to withdraw its support for RENAMO in 1984. However, South Africa only withdrew from the Mozambican Civil War in 1985. For more information, see [https://books.google.com/books?id=zEQ-Km_KShAC&pg=PA103&lpg=PA103&dq=SADF+mozambique&source=bl&ots=qPIK69UBDv&sig=xOo_MnWlttFIUm3n_Bu0mDwoxmo&hl=no&sa=X&ei=rJrFUozrH6jnygPIzICwBw&ved=0CE8Q6AEwAw#v=onepage&q=SADF%20mozambique&f=false War and Society: The Militarisation of South Africa], edited by Jacklyn Cock and Laurie Nathan, pp.104-115
7. ^Note: South Africa was already involved in combating SWAPO insurgents in 1966, but intervention in Angola started in 1975 with Operation Savannah.
8. ^{{cite web|url=http://www.justdone.co.za/roh/main.php?page=List_Wars |title=SA Roll of Honour: List of Wars |publisher=Justdone.co.za |date= |accessdate=15 January 2013}}
9. ^¹ Taylor, Rupert. "Justice denied: political violence in Kwazulu‐Natal after 1994." African Affairs 101, no. 405 (2002): 473-508.
10. ^{{cite web|url=https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2015-07-03-a-fractious-lot-anatomy-of-another-coup-in-lesotho/#.WUP0Dr2wrqA|title=‘A fractious lot’: Anatomy of (another) coup in Lesotho|date=3 July 2015|publisher=Daily Maverick}}
11. ^References*McGregor, Andrew. "South African military disaster in the Central African Republic." Terrorism Monitor, April 4, 2013. "Zuma’s decision to send a force of 400 men to ostensibly guard a group of 25 military trainers who could have easily been otherwise withdrawn can only be interpreted as an effort to bolster the CAR regime".*Wallerstein, Immanuel Maurice, Christopher K. Chase-Dunn, and Christian Suter. [https://books.google.com/books?id=AhfvCgAAQBAJ&lpg=PT75&ots=xV9tCEGpRU&dq=SANDF%20Bangui&lr&hl=no&pg=PT88#v=snippet&q=Bangui&f=false Overcoming Global Inequalities] Paradigm Publishers, 1. jun. 2014, Chapter 6*KAH, Henry Kam. "Central African Republic. Understanding the Séléka Insurrection of March 24 2013." Conflict Studies Quarterly Issue 5, University of Buea, Cameroon, October 2013: pp 47-66. "The presence of South African troops and those of member countries of the Central African union did not deter the Séléka from advancing towards Bangui. In fact, in an attempt to stop the group from advancing on to the capital, South African forces were killed in the process."
12. ^Heitman, Helmoed Römer. "The Hard Lessons Learnt in CAR" IOL. March 24, 2015. Accessed February 27, 2016.
13. ^{{cite news|url=https://www.enca.com/south-africa/car-sandf-death-toll-rises|title=CAR battle claims another SANDF soldier| location=South Africa| work=Enca}}