“Foreign policy of the Richard Nixon administration”的意思、由来-开放百科全书

The Foreign policy of the Richard Nixon administration focuses on his presidential years, 1969-1974, and some of the preliminary and follow up developments.

Leadership

Richard Nixon and his top aide Henry Kissinger focused on the Soviet Union, China, Vietnam, the Middle East, Pakistan, and major arms limitation agreements. Unless a crisis erupted on other matters, they let the State Department handle it with secretary William P. Rogers in charge. He was an old friend of Nixon--a good administrator with little diplomatic experience and less interest in geopolitical dynamics.^[1]^[2]

Kissinger

The relationship between Nixon and Kissinger was unusually close, and has been compared to the relaitonships of Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House, or Franklin D. Roosevelt and Harry Hopkins.^[3] In all three cases, State Department was relegated to a backseat role in developing foreign-policy.^[4] Historian David Rothkopf has compared the personalities of Nixon and Kissinger:

The Nixon Doctrine

The Nixon Doctrine shifted the main responsibility for the defense of an ally, to the ally itself, especially regarding combat. The United States would work on the diplomacy, provide financial help and munitions, and help train the allied army. Specifically:

The Doctrine was exemplified by the Vietnamization process regarding South Vietnam and the Vietnam War.^[7] It also came into play elsewhere in Asia including Iran,^[8] Taiwan,^[9] Cambodia^[10] and South Korea.^[11] The doctrine was an explicit rejection of the practice that sent 500,000 American soldiers to Vietnam, even though there was no treaty obligation to that country. A major long-term goal was to reduce the tension between the United States and the Soviet Union and China, so as to better enable the détente process to work.^[12]

Detente and Arms Control, 1969-1979

Nixon and Kissinger were both committed to a realism that focused on American economic advantages and jettisoned moralism in foreign policy, seeking détente with Communism and confrontation with old allies who now had become economic adversaries. Everyone assumed, mistakenly, that Nixon's anticommunist reputation at home indicated a hard-line cold warrior. But as early as 1959 (in his "kitchen debate" with Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev) he was moving away from containment. Nixon concluded that containment (which he saw as a Truman policy) had failed. As a realist in foreign policy it was time to emphasize economic goals in foreign policy, and to de-emphasize expensive ideological or peripheral commitments. Furthermore, having rich allies meant the American economy no longer could dominate or control the world economy. By the mid-1960s China and the USSR had become bitter enemies. Their armies growled at one another across a long border; the risk of war was serious.^[13]

Both Moscow and Beijing realized it would be wise to de-escalate tensions with the US, but Lyndon Johnson ignored them both. Sensing fresh opportunity, Nixon played the two Communist giants one against the other.^[14] Nixon's utterly unexpected trip to China in 1972 was set up by Kinnssinger's negotiations using Pakistan as an intermediary. The trip in effect ended the cold war with that nation and ushered in an era of friendship that was still unfolding a half-century.^[15] Moscow rushed to catch favor, and Nixon's summit meetings with Brezhnev produced major arms agreements--especially a treaty banning anti-missile defenses in space. (It was thought that the balance of terror, with each side having thousands of nuclear missiles, guaranteed peace, and that a successful defense against missiles would dangerously destabilize this equilibrium.)^[16]

Arms race US vs USSR

SALT I Agreements, 1969-72

The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) led to START I and START II, which were Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties with the USSR. The goal was to limit multiple-warhead capacities and impose other restrictions on each side's number of nuclear weapons. Thanks to negotiations in Helsinki, Finland, in November 1969, SALT I produced an Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and an interim agreement between the two countries. The agreement expired on December 31, 1985 and was not renewed. START never was ratified. A successor to START I, New START, was proposed and was eventually ratified in February 2011.^[17]

Nixon and Kissinger achieved breakthrough agreements with Moscow on the limitation of Anti Ballistic Missiles and the Interim Agreement on Strategic Missiles. Nixon Was proud that he achieved an agreement that his predecessors were unable to reach, thanks to his diplomatic skills. Nixon and Kissinger planned to link arms control to détente. and to the resolution of other urgent problems regarding Vietnam, the Mideast, and Berlin. Through the employment of linkage. The linkages never worked out because of flawed assumptions about Soviet plans.^[18]

Helsinki Final Act, 1975

China

China vs USSR

Rapprochement with China, 1971-1972

Vietnam

Vietnamization

1971

During the quiet year 1971 that saw the removal of nearly all American ground forces, Hanoi was building up forces for a full-scale invasion of the South. In late March 1972, the PAVN launched a major cross-border conventional surprise attack on the South. They expected the peasants to rise up and overthrow the government; they did not. They expected the South's army to collapse; instead the ARVN fought very well indeed. They did not expect heavy US bombing, which disrupted their plans and forced a retreat.

In 1971 Nixon sent massive quantities of hardware to the ARVN, and gave Thieu a personal pledge to send air power if Hanoi invaded. The NLF and Viet Cong had largely disappeared. They controlled a few remote villages, and contested a few more, but the Pentagon estimated that 93% of the South's population now lived under secure GVN control. The guerrilla war had been decisively won by GVN. The year 1971 was eerily quiet, with no large campaigns, apart from a brief ARVN foray into Laos to which was routed by the PAVN.

1972: LINEBACKER I

Giap decided that since the American forces had left he could invade in conventional fashion and defeat Saigon's demoralized army, the ARVN. His assumption that Vietnamization had failed was soon proven wrong. Saigon had started to exert itself; new draft laws produced over one million well-armed regular soldiers, and another four million in part-time, lightly armed self-defense militia.^[19]

In March-April, 1972 Hanoi invaded at three points from north and west with PAVN regulars spearheaded by tanks. On March 30, 30,000 PAVN troops, supported by regiments of tanks and artillery, rolled southward across the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) that separated the two Vietnams. A second PAVN force of 20,000 crossed the border from their sanctuaries in Cambodia into areas north of Saigon. A third PAVN invasion moved in from eastern Laos. This was conventional old- fashioned warfare, reminiscent of North Korea's invasion in 1950.^[20]

The outcome was quite different however. Nixon ordered LINEBACKER I, with 42,000 bombing sorties over North Vietnam. Hanoi was evacuated. Nixon also ordered the mining of North Vietnam's harbors, a stroke LBJ had always vetoed for fear of Soviet or Chinese involvement, But thanks to détente the Soviets and Chinese held quiet. The ARVN, its morale stiffened by American resolve, rose to the occasion. With massive tactical air support from the US, it held the line.^[21] As in Tet, the peasants refused to rise up against the GVN. "By God, the South Vietnamese can hack it!" exclaimed a pleasantly surprised General Abrams.^[22] Since the PAVN's conventional forces required continuous resupply in large quantities, the air campaign broke the back of the invasion and the PAVN forces retreated north. However they did retain control of a slice of territory south of the DMZ. There the NLF, renamed the "Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam" (PRG) was established; it welcomed diplomats from the Communist world, including Fidel Castro, and served as one of the launch points of the 1975 invasion.^[23]

After the failed Easter Offensive the Thieu government made a fatal strategic mistake. Overconfident of its military prowess, it adopted a policy of static defense that made its units vulnerable; worse, it failed to use the breathing space to reorganize and rebuilt its faulty command structure. The departure of American forces and American money lowered morale in both military and civilian South Vietnam. Desertions rose as military performance indicators sank, and no longer was the US looking over the shoulder demanding improvement. Politics, not military need, still ruled the South Vietnamese Army. On other side, the PAVN had been badly mauled--the difference was that it knew it and it was determined to rebuild. Discarding guerrilla tactics, Giap three years to rebuild his forces into a strong conventional army. Without constant American bombing it was possible to solve the logistics problem by modernizing the Ho Chi Minh trail with 12,000 more miles or roads. Brazenly, he even constructed a pipeline along the Trail to bring in gasoline for the next invasion.^[24]

LINEBACKER II 1972

Late in 1972 election peace negotiations bogged down; Thieu demanded concrete evidence of Nixon's promises to Saignon. Nixon thereupon unleashed the full fury of air power to force Hanoi to come to terms. Operation LINEBACKER II, in 12 days smashed many targets in North Vietnam cities that had always been sacrosanct. 59 railroad yards, warehouses, radar stations, electric power plants, and airfields were blasted with laser- guided "smart bombs." US policy was to try to avoid residential areas; the Politburo had already evacuated civilians not engaged in essential war work. The Soviets had sold Hanoi 1,200 SAM surface-to-air missiles that proved effective against the B-52s for the first three days. In a remarkable display of flexibility, the Air Force radically changed its bomber formations overnight--and Hanoi ran out of SAMs. An American negotiator in Paris observed that:

Prior to LINEBACKER II, the North Vietnamese were intransigent. After LINEBACKER II, they were shaken, demoralized, and anxious to talk about anything. Beijing and Moscow advised Hanoi to agree to the peace accords;they did so on January, 23, 1973. The Air Force interpreted the quick settlement as proof unrestricted bombing of the sort they had wanted to do for eight years had finally broken Hanoi's will to fight; other analysts said Hanoi had not changed at all.^[25]

Bombing of Cambodia, 1969

Bombing of Laos, 1971

Ending the Vietnam War, 1973-1975

South Asia

India Pakistan, Bangladesh, 1971

A war for independence broke out in East Pakistan in 1971 with the Bangladeshi and India against Pakistan--an American ally. Nixon sent the a carrier group to the Bay of Bengal to weigh in on Pakistan's side but without any combat action. Nixon and Kissinger saw India as a threat to U.S. interests, they were constrained by their belief that the American public would not accept hostilities against a fellow democracy. ^[26] Pakistan was needed to facilitate secret talks underway with China that led to a revolutionary rapprochement turning China from enemy to friend. feared that an Indian invasion of West Pakistan would risk total Soviet domination of the region, and that it would seriously undermine the global position of the United States and the regional position of America's new tacit ally, China. To demonstrate to China the bona fides of the United States as an ally, and in direct violation of the US Congress-imposed sanctions on Pakistan, Nixon sent military supplies to Pakistan and routed them through Jordan and Iran, while also encouraging China to increase its arms supplies to Pakistan. In the end Pakistan lost and Bangladesh became independent, but the USSR did not expand its control. India resented the American role for decades.^[27]

Africa

Nigeria and Biafra, 1967-1970

Nigeria experienced a devastating six-year civil war during the 1960s and early 1960s. It defeated the breakaway attempt by Biafra, the richest province. US-Nigerian relations were strained under Nixon, who seemed to favor Biafra but in the end formally supported the national government. The two nations began friendly trade and political ties beginning in 1977 starting with a visit by President Carter.^[28]

Angola, 1974-75

Middle East

Egypt

Sadat asked Moscow for help, and Washington responded by offering more favorable of armys financial aid and technology to Anwar Sadat of Egypt; as a result the Soviets were forced out of Egypt in 1971. The advantages included Egypt's expulsion of 20,000 Soviet advisors and the reopening of the Suez Canal, and were seen by Nixon and Kissinger as "an investment in peace."^[29]^[30] Also in the region Saudi Arabia and the United States had a common interest in weakening the radical Arab states of Libya, Iraq, and South Yemen, and the militant PLO (Palestinian Liberation Organization). The effect was to reduce Soviet influence in the region, generally. ^[31]

Arab-Israeli (Yom Kippur) War, 1973

In October 1973, Syria and Egypt attacks Israel in order to regain the territories they had lost in the Six-Day War of 1967. It was a complete surprise to Israel and the U.S. Kissinger rushed to Moscow restrain the Soviets. U.S. begins airlift of $ 2 billion in military supplies to Israel. Israel scores quick victory. US helps arrange an uneasy cease-fire.^[32]

Arab Oil Embargo, 1973-1974

As the Yom Kippur war ended in defeat the oil-producing Arab nations. organized as Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries embargoed oil shipments to US and Israel's supporters. It caused a worldwide energy crisis and severe damage to world economy as fuel was much more expensive and in short supply. By 1970 the United States economy was heavily dependent on oil for cars, trucks and heating; domestic production had fallen and more and more was imported.. Fuel efficiency and new supplies were urgently needed so Congress approved an pipeline to reach the oil fields in far northern Alaska. It imposed a national speed limit of 55 mph. ^[33]

Kissinger's"Shuttle Diplomacy" 1973-74

Iran and the Shah

A major development was the overthrow of the Shah of Iran in 1978-79 and the emergence of the Islamic Republic of Iran as an anti-American regime. Historians have long debated whether Nixon and Kissinger, actively recruited the Shah as an American puppet and proxy. Yes says James Bill and others.^[35] However, Richard Alvandi argues that it worked the other war around, with the Shah taking the initiative. President Nixon, who had first met the Shah in 1953, regarded him as a modernizing anticommunist statesman who deserved American support now that the British were withdrawing from the region. They met in 1972 and the Shah agreed to buy large quantities of expensive American military hardware and took responsibility for ensuring political stability and fighting off Soviet subversion throughout the region.^[36]

Latin America

Cuba

Chile

Chile moved sharply to the left, after 1970, seizing American copper mining companies and aligning itself with Castro's Cuba. In Chile in 1971 the military executed a putsch that overthrew the socialist government of Salvador Allende, and killed him.^[37] Nixon and Kissinger set policy to strongly oppose the Allende regime while avoiding visible intervention. Economic pressure was used to boycott Chilean copper and thereby damage the Chilean economy and retaliate for nationalizing American copper interests without compensation. The CIA convinced the Chilean generals that Allende was plotting against the army. The result of the coup was long term authoritarian control of Chile by General Augusto Pinochet who supported American interests and brutally crushed the left wing opposition.^[38]

For decades historians have heatedly debated the role of the United States, focusing on four main issues: (1) Did the US attempt to spark a military coup to prevent Allende taking office in 1970? (There was no coup that year.) (2) The commander in chief of the Chilean army, General Rene Schneider blocked coup efforts; he was murdered--was the US involved? (3) Chile's economy went into free fall as copper revenues plunged and food prices soared; was the US responsible? (4) Was the US involved in the plotting and execution of the successful 1973 coup? The Clinton Administration in 1999-2000 released a massive cache of 23,000 secret documents, allowing for the first time an in-depth look at American involvement. Historian working through the documents continue to be bitterly divided, with one group insisting that American involvement at all stages was minimal, and the opposition insisting that the Kissinger was deeply guilty.^[39]

See also

Notes

1. ^Melvin Small, The Presidency of Richard Nixon (1999) p 46.
2. ^ See United States Foreign Policy 1969-1970: A report of the Secretary of State (1971), [https://catalog.hathitrust.org/Record/001755720 online] and subsequent annual volumes for the details of lesser issues.
3. ^{{cite book|author=Robert S. Litwak|title=Détente and the Nixon Doctrine: American Foreign Policy and the Pursuit of Stability, 1969-1976|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=-Sw7AAAAIAAJ&pg=PA48|year=1986|publisher=Cambridge UP|page=48|isbn=9780521338349}}
4. ^Geoffrey Warner, "Nixon, Kissinger and the breakup of Pakistan, 1971." International Affairs 81.5 (2005): 1097-1118.
5. ^David Rothkopf, Running the world: the inside story of the National Security Council and the architects of American foreign policy (2004), pp. 111–12.
6. ^ Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (1994) p 708.
7. ^John G. Keilers, "Nixon Doctrine and Vietnamization" (U.S. Army Military History Institute, June 29, 2007) [https://www.army.mil/article/3867/nixon_doctrine_and_vietnamization online]
8. ^Stephen McGlinchey, "Richard Nixon’s Road to Tehran: The Making of the US–Iran Arms Agreement of May 1972." Diplomatic History 37.4 (2013): 841-860.
9. ^Earl C. Ravenal, "The Nixon Doctrine and Our Asian Commitments." Foreign Affairs 49.2 (1971): 201-217.
10. ^Laura Summers, "Cambodia: Model of the Nixon doctrine." Current History (Dec 1973) pp. 252-56.
11. ^Joo-Hong Nam, and Chu-Hong Nam. America's commitment to South Korea: the first decade of the Nixon doctrine (1986).
12. ^Robert S. Litwak, Détente and the Nixon doctrine: American foreign policy and the pursuit of stability, 1969-1976 (1986).
13. ^ Jeremi Suri, Henry Kissinger and the American century (2007), pp 179-86.
14. ^Evelyn Goh, "Nixon, Kissinger, and the “Soviet card” in the US opening to China, 1971–1974." Diplomatic history 29.3 (2005): 475-502.
15. ^Margaret MacMillan, Nixon and Mao: The Week That Changed the World (2008)
16. ^Allen S. Whiting, "Sino-American Détente." China Quarterly 82 (1980): 334-341.
17. ^Raymond L. Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan (2nd 1994), pgs. 146-223.
18. ^Tal, David. "“Absolutes” and “Stages” in the Making and Application of Nixon’s SALT Policy." Diplomatic History 37.5 (2013): 1090-1116.
19. ^Dale Andradé, Trial by Fire: The 1972 Easter Offensive, America's Last Vietnam Battle (1995)
20. ^ A.J.C. Lavalle, ed. Airpower and the 1972 Spring Offensive (Air University Press, 1976), pp 1-7.
21. ^Robert A. Pape, "Coercive air power in the Vietnam War." International Security 15.2 (1990): 103-146.
22. ^{{cite book|author=Anthony James Joes|title=Why South Vietnam Fell|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=mTAvBQAAQBAJ&pg=PA126|year=2014|publisher=Lexington Books|pages=124–27|isbn=9781498503907}}
23. ^ Lewis Sorley, "Courage and Blood: South Vietnam's Repulse of the 1972 Easter Invasion," Parameters Summer 1999, pp. 38-56.
24. ^Phillip B. Davidson, Vietnam at War: The History: 1946-1975 (1991) pp. 738-59.
25. ^Mark Clodfelter, The Limits of Air Power: The American Bombing of North Vietnam (2006) pp 197-202.
26. ^Jarrod Hayes, "Securitization, social identity, and democratic security: Nixon, India, and the ties that bind." International Organization 66.1 (2012): 63-93. [https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Jarrod_Hayes/publication/241754960_Securitization_Social_Identity_and_Democratic_Security_Nixon_India_and_the_Ties_That_Bind/links/55a50fd008ae00cf99c94313.pdf online]
27. ^Geoffrey Warner, "Nixon, Kissinger and the breakup of Pakistan, 1971." International Affairs 81.5 (2005): 1097-1118.
28. ^Levi A. Nwachuku, "The United States and Nigeria—1960 to 1987: Anatomy of a Pragmatic Relationship." Journal of Black Studies 28.5 (1998): 575-593. [https://www.jstor.org/stable/2784795 online]
29. ^Craig A. Daigle, "The Russians are going: Sadat, Nixon and the Soviet presence in Egypt." Middle East 8.1 (2004): 1.
30. ^{{cite book|author=Moshe Gat|title=In Search of a Peace Settlement: Egypt and Israel Between the Wars, 1967-1973|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=bTN_rtvvcIEC&pg=PA256|year=2012|publisher=Palgrave Macmillan|pages=256–58|isbn=9780230375000}}
31. ^Roland Dannreuther, The Soviet Union and the PLO (Springer, 2016).
32. ^Abraham Rabinovich, The Yom Kippur War: the epic encounter that transformed the Middle East (2007.
33. ^Rüdiger Graf, "Making Use of the “Oil Weapon”: Western Industrialized Countries and Arab Petropolitics in 1973–1974." Diplomatic History 36.1 (2012): 185-208. [https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1467-7709.2011.01014.x online]
34. ^Amos Perlmutter, Crisis Management: Kissinger's Middle East Negotiations (October 1973-June 1974)." International Studies Quarterly 19.3 (1975): 316-343. [https://www.jstor.org/stable/2600314 online]
35. ^James A. Bill, The eagle and the lion: The tragedy of American-Iranian relations (1989).
36. ^Roham Alvandi, Nixon, Kissinger, and the Shah: The United States and Iran in the Cold War (2014)
37. ^Jonathan Haslam, Nixon Administration and the Death of Allende's Chile: A Case of Assisted Suicide (2005).
38. ^Tanya Harmer, Allende's Chile and the Inter-American Cold War (2011) [https://www.questia.com/library/120077274/allende-s-chile-and-the-inter-american-cold-war online]
39. ^For a review of the historiography see Zakia Shiraz, "CIA Intervention in Chile and the Fall of the Allende Government in 1973." Journal of American Studies (2011) 45#3 pp 603-613. [https://www.jstor.org/stable/23016792 online]