“23rd (Northumbrian) Division”的意思、由来-开放百科全书

The 23rd (Northumbrian) Division was an infantry division of the British Army, which fought briefly during the Battle of France during the Second World War. In March 1939 following the re-emergence of Germany and the subsequent occupation of Czechoslovakia, the British army increased the number of divisions within the Territorial Army by duplicating existing units. The 23rd (Northumbrian) Division was formed in October 1939, as a second-line duplicate of the 50th (Northumbrian) Motor Division. The division was made up of two brigades, unlike regular infantry divisions that were composed of three, with the battalions hailing from the north of England.

It was intended that the division would remain in the United Kingdom to complete training and preparation, before being deployed combat-ready to France within 12-months of the war breaking out. However, the division spent little time training. Instead, the largely untrained soldiers were separated and used to guard strategically important and vulnerable locations across North East England. Guard duty and little preparation for war was seen as a hinderance to morale. In France, the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) was suffering from a manpower shortage among rear line units. In an effort to boost morale, provide additional labour and guards for the main fighting force's rear echelon, and score political points with the French Government and military, the division was deployed to France. The division made the move in April 1940, leaving behind most of it's administration and logistical units as well as heavy weapons and artillery. The men were assigned to aid in the construction and guarding of airfields. Before deployment, Chief of the Imperial General Staff Edmund Ironside secured a promise from the BEF that the division would not be used in combat due to it being untrained and not complete.

When Germany invaded Belgium and the Netherlands, the BEF and French armies moved to meet the German attack leaving behind the 23rd Division to continue its labour duties. However, the main German attack came through the Ardenne forest, and moved to surround the British and French forces in Belgium. With no other reserves, the 23rd Division was ordered onto the frontline to defend the Canal du Nord; the only river obstacle between the main German assault and the English Channel, and the only defendable position to stop the German attempt to encircle the BEF. By the time the division arrived at the canal, it had already been crossed in several places. Having destroyed the bridges in their area, the division was ordered to fall back to new positions to defend the town of Arras. Before the division's 70th Infantry Brigade could take up this new position, it was caught by advancing German armoured forces and mauled. The military situation in France further deteriorated, resulting in the decision to evacuate British forces via Dunkirk. Elements of the division undertook defensive delaying actions and rearguard duties around the shrinking perimeter, before being evacuated on 31 May 1940, having suffered heavy losses. Back in the United Kingdom, the division was caught up in reforms undertaken by the British Army in the wake of the evacuation; the division was disbanded, and its units were transferred to other formations to bring them up to strength.

Background

Throughout the 1930s, tensions built between Germany and the United Kingdom as well as its allies.{{sfn|Bell|1986|pp=3–4}} During late 1937 and throughout 1938, German demands for the annexation of Czechoslovakia's Sudetenland led to an international crisis. In an attempt to avoid war, British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain met with German Chancellor Adolf Hitler in September and brokered the Munich Agreement. The agreement averted immediate war and allowed Germany to annex the Sudetenland.{{sfn|Bell|1986|pp=258–275}} Chamberlain had intended the agreement to lead to further peaceful resolution of issues, but relations between both countries soon deteriorated.{{sfn|Bell|1986|pp=277–278}} On 15 March 1939, Germany breached the terms of the agreement by invading and occupying the remnants of the Czech state.{{sfn|Bell|1986|p=281}}

In response, on 29 March, the British Secretary of State for War Leslie Hore-Belisha announced plans to increase the Territorial Army (TA) from 130,000 men to 340,000 and in so doing double the number of territorial divisions.{{sfn|Gibbs|1976|p=518}}{{efn|The TA was a reserve of the British regular army made up of part-time volunteers. By 1939, its intended role was to be the sole method of expanding the size of the British armed forces (compared to the creation of Kitchener's Army during the First World War). First Line territorial formations would create a Second Line division using a cadre of trained personal and, if needed, a third division would also be created. All TA recruits were required to take the general service obligation meaning that, if the British Government decided, territorial soldiers could be deployed overseas for combat. (This avoided the complications with the First World War Territorial Force, whose members were not required to leave the United Kingdom unless they volunteered for overseas service.){{sfn|Allport|2015|p=323}}{{sfn|French|2001|p=53}}{{sfn|Perry|1988|pp=41–42}}{{sfn|Simkins|2007|pp=43–46}}}} The plan of action was for the existing units to recruit over their allowed establishments (aided by an increase in pay for territorials, the removal of restrictions on promotion that had been a major hindrance to recruiting during the preceding years, the construction of better quality barracks and an increase in supper-time rations) and then form Second Line divisions from small cadres that could be built upon.{{sfn|Gibbs|1976|p=518}}{{sfn|Messenger|1994|p=47}} As a result, the 23rd (Northumbrian) Division was to be created as a Second Line unit, a duplicate of the First Line 50th (Northumbrian) Motor Division.{{sfn|Messenger|1994|p=49}}{{efn|British military doctrine development during the inter-war period resulted in the three kinds of divisions by the end of the 1930s: the infantry division, the mobile division (later called the armoured division), and the motor division. Historian David French wrote "The main role of the infantry ... was to break into the enemy's defensive position." This would then be exploited by the Mobile division, followed by the motor divisions that would "carry out the rapid consolidation of the ground captured by the Mobile divisions" therefore "transform[ing] the 'break-in' into a 'break-through."{{sfn|French|2001|pp=37-41}} As a result, in 1938, the army decided to create six such Motor Divisions from TA units. Only three infantry divisions were converted into motor divisions prior to the war, this included the 55th (West Lancashire) alongside the 1st London and 50th (Northumbrian) divisions.{{sfn|French|2001|p=41}}{{sfn|Joslen|2003|pp=37, 81, 90}} {{sfn|French|2001|p=41}} French wrote that the motor division "matched that of the German army's motorized and light divisions. But there the similarities ended." German motorized divisions contained three brigades and were as fully equipped as a regular infantry division, while the smaller light divisions contained a tank battalion. Whereas the motor division, while being fully motorized and capable of transporting all their infantry, contained no tanks and was "otherwise much weaker than normal infantry divisions" or their German counterparts.{{sfn|French|2001|p=41}}}} In April, limited conscription was introduced. At that time 34,500 militiamen, all aged 20, were conscripted into the regular army, initially to be trained for six months before being deployed to the forming second line units.{{sfn|Messenger|1994|p=49}}{{sfn|French|2001|p=64}} Despite the intention for the army to grow in size, the programme was complicated by a lack of central guidance on the expansion and duplication process and issues regarding the lack of facilities, equipment and instructors.{{sfn|Gibbs|1976|p=518}}{{sfn|Perry|1988|p=48}}

History

Formation

It had been envisioned that the duplicating process and recruiting the required numbers of men would take no more than six months.{{sfn|Perry|1988|p=48}}{{sfn|Levy|2006|p=66}} The 50th (Northumbrian) Motor Division{{sfn|Joslen|2003|p=81}} started this process in March, creating new units based around an initial cade of just 25 officers and men.{{sfn|Ward|2005|p=460}} On the whole, the process varied widely across the TA divisions with some able to complete the process in a matter of weeks and others having made little progress by the time the Second World War began.{{sfn|Perry|1988|p=48}}{{sfn|Levy|2006|p=66}} The 50th Division created the 69th Infantry Brigade as a Second Line duplicate of the 150th Infantry Brigade, and the 70th Infantry Brigade as a Second Line duplicate of the 151st Infantry Brigade. These brigades had been created by the outbreak of the war, and were administered by the 50th Division until the 23rd (Northumbrian) divisional headquarters was formed on 2 October. At this point, they were transferred to the newly formed division, which in turn was assigned to Northern Command.{{sfn|Joslen|2003|pp=62, 299, 301}} Command of the division was given to Major-General William Norman Herbert, who was called out of retirement and had previously commanded the 50th Division.{{sfn|Joslen|2003|p=62}}^[1]^[2]^[3] The 69th Brigade comprised the 5th Battalion, East Yorkshire Regiment, the 6th and 7th Battalions, Green Howards; the 70th Infantry Brigade comprised the 10th, 11th and 12th Battalions, Durham Light Infantry (DLI).{{sfn|Joslen|2003|pp=299, 301}}{{efn|On 31 January 1940, the 12th DLI became the Tyneside Scottish and was transferred to become part of the Black Watch.{{sfn|Ward|2005|p=461}}}}

The 23rd (Northumbrian) Division lacked any official descriptive, being labeled neither a "Motor" division like its first line parent unit, or an "Infantry" division akin to the majority of other British divisions.{{sfn|Joslen|2003|p=62}} The shoulder patch is a source of debate between sources. It has been described as the white rose of Yorkshire, but also as a Tudor rose (an amalgamation of the White Rose of York and the Red Rose of Lancaster). Likewise, sources differ on the background indicating that it was either blue or green.{{sfn|Forty|2013|loc=Appendix I: Infantry}}{{sfn|Chappell|1987|p=19}}{{sfn|Bull|2016|p=143}} Mike Chappell stated that the white rose motif represented the various Yorkshire regiments within the division, and that a green background represented the light infantry lineage of the division's regiment. "Examples of this sign made up for wear on uniform (with the rose stenciled on a felt patch) are in collections, and indicate that the 23rd were probably one of [the few] formations wearing 'illegal' battle insignia in 1940."{{sfn|Chappell|1987|p=19}}

Initial service and transfer to France

Following the outbreak of hostilities, the War Office established nineteen as the age limit for frontline service. This resulted in so-called "immatures" being redeployed from combat units. Overall, across the TA, this resulted in 40,000 men being transferred between units. For the 23rd (Northumbrian) Division, this resulted in the loss of upwards of 10 per cent of the strength of the recruited division.{{sfn|Jones|2016|pp=222-223}} Those who remained were issued with rifles and other basic essentials.{{sfn|Cheall |2011|pp=4-6}}

The war-time deployment of the TA envisioned it being deployed piecemeal, to reinforce the regular army that had already been dispatched to the European mainland, as equipment became available. The plan envisioned the deployment of the whole force in waves, as divisions completed their training, with the final divisions not being transported to France until a year had elapsed from the outbreak of war.{{sfn|Gibbs|1976|pp=455, 507, 514-515}} Rather, the division (along with other Second Line units, in order to free up First Line units for training) was assigned to guarding vulnerable points and other locations across North East England, leaving little time for actual training other than drill parade; a situation that generally impacted morale.{{sfn|Cheall |2011|pp=4-6}}{{sfn|Jones|2016|p=237}}

As 1939 turned into 1940, the division became caught up in an effort to address manpower shortages among the British Expeditionary Force's (BEF) rear-echelon units.{{efn|By the end of April, Lionel Ellis stated that there was "78,864 [men employed on] lines-of-communication duties; 23,545 were in headquarters of various services and missions, hospitals and miscellaneous employment; 9,051 were in drafts en route; 2,515 were not yet allocated and 6,859 were with the Advanced Air Striking Force." Included in these figures, was "upwards of 10,000 men, and other large units [who] were engaged on railway and building construction, at bases and on the long lines of communication."{{sfn|Ellis|1954|pp=19 and 21}}}} Additional men were needed to work along the line of communication, and the Army had estimated that by mid-1940 it would need at least 60,000 pioneers.{{sfn|Perry|1988|p=52}} The lack of such men had taxed the Royal Engineers (RE) and Auxiliary Military Pioneer Corps (AMPC) as well as having impacted frontline units, who had to be diverted from training to aid in the construction of defensive positions along the Franco-Belgian border. In an effort to address this issue, it was decided to deploy untrained territorial units as an unskilled workforce; thereby alleviating the strain on the logistical units, and freeing up regular units to complete training.{{sfn|Ellis|1954|p=19}}{{sfn|Rhodes-Wood|1960|p=29}}{{sfn|Lynch|2015|loc=Chapter 3: The Mobilisation of the Territorial Army, 1939}}{{sfn|Rhodes-Wood|1960|p=228}}{{sfn|Jones|2016|p=29}} As a result, the decision was made to deploy the 12th (Eastern), 23rd (Northumbrian), and the 46th Infantry divisions to France. Each division would leave their heavy equipment and most of their logistical, administrative, and support units behind in the United Kingdom. In total, the elements of the three divisions that were transported to France amounted to 18,347 men.{{sfn|Ellis|1954|p=19}}{{sfn|Lynch|2015|loc=Chapter 3: The Mobilisation of the Territorial Army, 1939}}{{sfn|Joslen|2003|pp=56, 62, and 75}}{{efn|For comparison, the 1939 war-establishment (the on-paper strength) of a three-brigade infantry division was 13,863 men, and a two-brigade motor-division's war-establishment was 10,136 men.{{sfn|Joslen|2003|pp=131 and 133}}}} The divisions were to aid in the construction of airfields and pill-boxes, with the intent that by August their job would be completed and they could return to the United Kingdom to resume training before being redeployed to France as front-line capable soldiers.{{sfn|Collier|1961|p=83}} The Army believed that this diversion from guard duty would also raise morale.{{sfn|Jones|2016|p=228}} Lionel Ellis, the author of the British official history of the BEF in France, wrote that while the divisions "were neither full trained nor equipped for fighting … a balanced programme of training was carried out so far as time permitted."{{sfn|Ellis|1954|p=21}} Historian Alexander David Jones wrote that this was an overly optimistic review of the intent: "at any one time between four-fifths or two-thirds of their personnel would be utilized for construction tasks. As a result they were neither prepared nor equipped to conduct any type of military operations". Of the overall scheme, Jones argued "...the eventual arrival of the Territorial Labour Divisions did little to solve crisis in manpower and did even less to advance the general level of training."{{sfn|Jones|2016|p=228}} Tim Lynch commented that the deployment also had a political dimension, allowing "British politicians to tell their French counterparts that Britain had supplied three more infantry divisions towards the promised nineteen by the end of the year."{{sfn|Lynch|2015|loc=Chapter 3: The Mobilisation of the Territorial Army, 1939}}

General Edmund Ironside, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, was opposed to such a use of these divisions. He reluctantly caved to the political pressure to release the divisions, having been assured by General Gort (commander of the BEF) that the troops would not be used as frontline combat formations.{{sfn|Lynch|2015|loc=Chapter 3: The Mobilisation of the Territorial Army, 1939}}{{sfn|Smalley|2015|p=75}}{{sfn|Murland|2016|loc=Chapter Four: Massacre of the Innocents 19-20 May 1940}} The 23rd left the United Kingdom on April 21 1940, and arrived in France the following day, and was placed under the direct command of the BEF.{{sfn|Joslen|2003|p=62}} As a labour force, the division was deployed to the region around St Pol to build airstrips. It transferred without heavy equipment or Universal Carriers, and impressed a limited amount of civilian transport for mobility. The men took their rifles, although some had still not been trained in their use. Each battalion brought 14 Bren light machine guns (although few had been trained how to use them), at most 10 Boys anti tank rifles, and a few two-inch mortars.{{sfn|Rissik|2004|pp=8-9}}

Battle of France

On 10 May 1940, the Phoney War - the period of inactivity on the Western Front since the start of the conflict - came to an end as the German military invaded Belgium and the Netherlands.{{sfn|Weinberg|1994|p=122}} As a result, the vast majority of the BEF along with the best French armies and their strategic reserve moved forward to assist the Belgian and Dutch armies.{{sfn|Weinberg|1994|pp=123-125}} While these forces attempted to stem the tide of the German advance, the main German assault pushed through the Ardennes Forest and crossed the River Meuse initiating the Battle of Sedan and threatening to split the Allied armies in two, trapping those in Belgium from the rest of the French military along the Franco-German border.{{sfn|Weinberg|1994|pp=126-127}}

The 23rd (Northumbrian) Division, which had not advanced with the rest of the BEF, was still employed in rear echelon duties. The division was spread across the Pas-de-Calais and the Somme, and had now been assigned to guard airfields. Demonstrating the lack of mobility the division had, when the 10th Battalion, DLI was assigned to guard airfields near Abbeville (south of the River Somme) it required all divisional transport and immobilized all other units in order to accomplish this move.{{sfn|Rissik|2004|p=35}}{{sfn|Cheall |2011|loc=Chapter 3: We Join the British Expeditionary Force (BEF)}}

Once the realization that the German crossing of the Meuse had turned into a major breakthrough, the BEF and French armies began a fighting withdrawal from Belgium back to France. On 17 May, the lack of French reserves prompted Général Alphonse Joseph Georges, commander of all Allied forces in North-East France, to order the 23rd Division to be deployed to the new frontline along the Canal du Nord to face the German breakthrough.{{sfn|Ellis|1954|pp=59, and 65}}{{sfn|Sebag-Montefiore|2006|p=179}} The following day, the division was placed under the command of Petreforce; the grouping of the 12th (Eastern), the 23rd Division, and other nearby units under the 12th Division's commander Major-General Roderic Petre.{{sfn|Ellis|1954|p=65}} Over-optimistic, Petre informed his subordinates that the French were resilient on either side of the German breakthrough and only small German units had penetrated deep into French territory, forces Petreforce could handle.{{sfn|Sebag-Montefiore|2006|p=181}}

The 23rd was ordered to occupy a {{convert|16|mi|km|adj=on}} front along the Canal du Nord, around {{convert|6|mi|km|abbr=off}} west of Cambrai and {{convert|10|mi|km|abbr=off}} east of Arras.{{sfn|Ellis|1954|p=76}}{{sfn|Rissik|2004|p=36}}{{sfn|Fraser|1999|p=59}} The canal represented the last major water obstacle between the advancing German force and the English Channel,{{sfn|Dildy|2014|p=72}} with the division being the only British formation standing in the way of the main German assault and the BEF's supply lines. The British official history acknowledged that the division "could do little to stop" the advancing Germans.{{sfn|Ellis|1954|p=77}} The troops, having to make their way through refugee-packed roads, arrived along the canal but were unable to dig-in due to a lack of tools.{{sfn|Rissik|2004|p=36}} 69th Brigade held the northern portion of the division's sector, taking up positions at Arleux and was in contact with the French First Army on their northern flank. The 70th Brigade held the southern flank, to a distance of about {{convert|10|mi|km|abbr=off}} north of Péronne. Additional French troops were supposed to be covering the division's southern flank, but due to the swift nature of the German advance they never arrived along the canal.{{sfn|Fraser|1999|p=59}}{{sfn|Dildy|2014|p=72}}{{sfn|Ellis|1954|pp=76 and 78}}

Hugh Sebag-Montefiore described the state of unfinished canal: "there was no water in it, and the deep ditch that was supposed to hold up the German armour would not have challenged a car in some places, let along a tank."{{sfn|Sebag-Montefiore|2006|p=133}} At this point, a composite battery of 11 field guns and two 4.5 howitzers were assigned to the division, coming from a Royal Artillery (RA) training camp near Arras. However, most lacked the required equipment for indirect fire and could only be fired over open sights; some had no sights at all.{{sfn|Dildy|2014|p=72}}{{sfn|Ellis|1954|p=78}} The division soon encountered the vanguard of the German force, who did not attempt to force the canal in the division's area. With Germans nearby, the order was given to blow the bridges across the canal that included one bridge being destroyed while refugees were still crossing.{{sfn|Rissik|2004|p=36}}{{sfn|Sebag-Montefiore|2006|p=133}} During the day, an alleged spy was brought to the headquarters of the Tyneside Scottish. The individual was briefly interrogated by Lieutenant-Colonel Hugh Swinburne and the battalion's French liaison officer before a summary execution was carried out by Sergeant Dick Chambers.{{sfn|Sebag-Montefiore|2006|p=133}} The division's first casualties were soon suffered, as a result of air attacks.{{sfn|Rissik|2004|p=36}} Unbeknown to the troops, the advanced German troops had already formed a bridgehead over the canal to the south of the division.{{sfn|Ellis|1954|p=78}}

Having been in position for less than 24-hours, the division was ordered to withdraw towards Arras as a result of the German crossings of the canal. The 69th Brigade moved and took up position along the River Scarpe, northeast of the Arras, while the 8th Royal Northumberland Fusiliers entered the town itself to reinforce the garrison.{{sfn|Ellis|1954|p=79}}{{sfn|Takle|2009|p=28}} The 70th Brigade was to take up position southwest of the town along the Arras–Doullens road as far as Saulty.{{sfn|Ellis|1954|p=79}} By daybreak on 20 May, only the headquarters of the Brigade and parts of the 10th and 11 DLI were in position. The rest of the brigade was spread out to the southeast. Some were waiting on the scarce number of trucks in use to ferry them to their intended positions, while others were marching west along the roads in open formation with wide intervals under the watch of the Luftwaffe.{{sfn|Ellis|1954|p=79}}{{sfn|Rissik|2004|p=37}} During this, the brigade was joined by men of the Ordnance Corps and AMPC, who were largely unarmed.{{sfn|Ellis|1954|p=79}}{{sfn|Thompson|2009|p=82}}

What followed, was a series of confused company actions fought by the 70th Brigade in and around the villages of Wancourt, Neuville-Vitasse, Mercatel and Ficheux.{{sfn|Thompson|2009|pp=81-82}} At 08:30 20 May, elements of the German 8th Panzer Division entered Wancourt and overran parts of the 11 DLI who were awaiting transport. Ill-equipped to engage tanks, the men of the battalion were either killed or captured following the engagement that saw hand-to-hand fighting with the German panzergrenadiers.{{sfn|Rissik|2004|pp=37-38}} Between Neuville-Vitasse and Ficheux, the Tyneside Scottish were ambushed by the Germans. The battalion deployed either side of the road, Company Sergeant-Major Baggs described "the boys fighting like hell with tanks all around them simply going over the men." Sustaining casualties from heavy flanking machine gun fire, the battalion were unable to stop two German tanks who moved up within {{convert|20|yd|m|}} of their positions and opened fire with shell and machine gun. Surrounded, the battalion surrendered. Baggs further described the scene: "...our dead comrades lying all over the field on each side of the road. What a sacrifice!" Around 80 of the original 450 men managed to escape.{{sfn|Sebag-Montefiore|2006|p=136}} On the western outskirts of Ficheux, B and C Companies 10 DLI were caught in the open along the road by German tanks and infantry. Both companies took to ground near the road and were engaged by three waves of German attacks, which included 22 tanks. While two tanks were taken out of action, the two companies were eventually overwhelmed. C Company was killed or captured in its entirety, while B Company was reduced to a platoon in strength.{{sfn|Rissik|2004|pp=38-39}} Later in the day, one company of the 11 DLI engaged German tanks and infantry at their old camp at Nuncq, before extracting themselves from the fight and retreating towards Abbeville. Unknown to these troops, the Germans had already captured the town and the retreating British troops were soon captured.{{sfn|Rissik|2004|p=41}} What remained of the brigade retreated west to Houdain, that night it was only able to muster 233 officers and men including engineers picked up earlier in the day.{{sfn|Ellis|1954|p=79}} Stragglers were rounded up by the 20th Brigade, which organized roughly 800 men of the 23rd Division into four rifle companies and turned them over to the 46th Division.{{sfn|Rissik|2004|p=42}}

Ellis wrote that the "12th and 23rd Divisions … had practically ceased to exist" as a result of the fighting that saw the "whole tract of country between the Scarpe and the Somme" fall into German hands, and "the British lines of communication … finally cut; and the way to the Channel ports … open." He continued: "It is a modest estimate of what these two Territorial divisions did to damage and delay the enemy's forces. But it may be perhaps accepted, with this important rider - at this time every single hour's delay was of incalculable service to the rest of the British Forces in France"{{sfn|Ellis|1954|p=81}} David Fraser likewise wrote "...these battalions, ill prepared, under-equipped and unsupported nevertheless on occasion held up the enemy for several hours."{{sfn|Fraser|1999|p=61}} More critically, John Drewienkiewicz argued that despite showing "great tenacity against considerable odds", no "'Second Line' formation managed to … impose any significant delay on the German advance."{{sfn|Jones|2016|pp=240-241}}

Under mortar fire and with German troops on the opposite bank of the Scarpe, the 69th Brigade withdrew towards Farbus and Vimy Ridge, north of Arras. There, the brigade was issued with additional machine guns, anti-tank rifles, and mortars although the level of training on their use was still inadequate. During the withdrawal, the brigade was attacked from the air and witnessed the Luftwaffe strafing refugee columns.{{sfn|Cheall|2011|p=11}} Their stay at Vimy Ridge was short lived due to the ongoing artillery fire, and the brigade moved closer to Arras taking up position at Roclincourt.{{sfn|Cheall|2011|p=13}} The brigade could move no closer due to the heavy fighting ongoing around the town, which was now reinforced by regulars and fully-equipped divisions who subsequently launched a minor counterattack.{{sfn|Fraser|1999|pp=60-63}} The remains of the 70th Brigade retreated to Lattre. Colonel David Marley, of the 10th DLI, would start to collect and direct the remnants of the brigade. In the coming days this force would become to be known as "Marley Force" and essentially replace the destroyed 70th Brigade, with Marley being treated as a brigadier by the division. This force withdrew to Hermaville, then onto Cambligneul by the 21st. Marley, out of contact with the division, drove to Arras to report to Petreforce HQ and was informed the 23rd Division was concentrating on the outskirts of Lille at Seclin. Transport was provided, and Marley Force made their move.{{sfn|Rissik|2004|pp=39-43}}

During the 22nd and 23rd, appreciating the danger that the BEF was now in, Gort issued orders for various units to deploy to form a cordon around the BEF's line of retreat and to cover its rear from a potential strong German attack. The La Bassée Canal and the River Aa were the only defensible positions covering the BEF's southern and western flanks. Two fully equipped divisions were to take up position along this line, with whatever reinforcements Gort could muster.{{sfn|Fraser|1999|pp=63-64}} As part of the latter, Marley Force and the 69th Brigade were to take up positions along the canal with the intent to defend Watten, near St. Omer, and Gravelines on the coast.{{sfn|Cheall|2011|p=13}}{{sfn|Rissik|2004|p=43}} Marley Force departed their camp, escorted by armoured cars and light tanks, but were soon turned around on the orders of Major-General Herbert, with no reason provided.{{sfn|Rissik|2004|p=43}} The 69th Brigade embarked on three ton trucks and began a {{convert|70|mi|km|adj=on}} trek towards their position. Due to ongoing aerial bombardments that blocked the roads and inflicted casualties, only the 6th Green Howards managed to arrive at the brigade's final destination and were cut off from the rest of the brigade for the remainder of the campaign. At Gravelines, around {{convert|10|mi|km|abbr=off}} east of Calais which was now under siege, the battalion was supported by French troops. In this position, the Green Howards fended off several German attacks and knocked out two tanks.{{sfn|Cheall |2011|pp=13-15}} At Calais, the garrison was ordered to deliver rations to Dunkirk. In order to do so, four tanks were sent out to reconnoiter the road to Gravelines to see if it was open and could allow the rest of the garrison to follow.{{sfn|Sebag-Montefiore|2006|pp=218-220}} These tanks were fired on by the Green Howards, without inflicting damage or casualties, before they were recognized as British tanks.{{sfn|Cheall |2011|pp=13-15}} These tanks represented the final elements of the British force in Calais to escape, before the German cordon was complete and the garrison surrendered.{{sfn|Sebag-Montefiore|2006|pp=220-221}} The tanks joined the defense, and the battalion continued to hold the area despite mounting casualties from German artillery and air attacks.{{sfn|Cheall |2011|pp=13-15}}

Over the following days, the Germans established bridgeheads over the river and canal and continued to press the BEF from all sides. On 26 May, with the BEF completely surrounded and the military situation in Flanders further deteriorating, the decision was made to evacuate the BEF from Dunkirk, the only remaining port in British hands.{{sfn|Fraser|1999|pp=65-67}} With the evacuation order given, the remnants of the 23rd Division began withdrawing towards Dunkirk with the men always under the threat of or actual attack from the air.{{sfn|Rissik|2004|pp=43-44}} During this stage of the campaign, the division was assigned to III Corps for a 48-hour period, before being placed under II Corps for the remainder of the campaign.{{sfn|Joslen|2003|p=62}} A detachment of 100 men formed a rearguard to defend bridges over the La Bassée Canal, resulting in their eventual death or capture.{{sfn|Rissik|2004|p=44}} On the 28th, the division reached Killem Lynde, with Marley Force having conducted additional rearguard duties before being relieved by other British forces. Here, all remaining transport and unnecessary baggage was destroyed. On 30 May, the division entered the final Dunkirk perimeter and moved into a defensive position behind the 50th (Northumberland) Motor Division. Marley Force surrendered all their Bren guns to the 50th Division, and around 100 men from the 11 DLI went into the frontline to reinforce their sister battalion, the 8th DLI.{{sfn|Rissik|2004|p=44}} Meanwhile, the 6th Green Howards had continued to fend off German attacks at Gravelines until ordered to withdraw to Bergues.{{sfn|Cheall |2011|pp=13-17}} From Bergues, the battalion was sent to Haeghe-Muelen, {{convert|8|mi|km}} southeast of Dunkirk, to bolster the garrison composed of Irish and Welsh Guards protecting the right flank of the main withdrawal corridor to the port. Scavenging abandoned small arms, anti-tank rifles, and ammunition, the battalion held their position for a further 48-hours, suffering casualties and fending off German attacks. On 29 May, the battalion was ordered to hand over their Bren guns and ammunition to the Welsh Guards and retire to Dunkirk.{{sfn|Cheall |2011|p=17}}

What was left of the division assembled on the beaches during the morning of 31 May.{{sfn|Cheall |2011|p=xi}} While some troops were picked up on the beaches of Dunkirk, the majority of the men were evacuated via the harbour's Mole during the day.{{sfn|Rissik|2004|p=45}}{{sfn|Cheall |2011|p=xii}} During the course of the campaign, the division suffered around 1,900 casualties.^[4]

Disbandment

As soon as the troops returned from France, the British Army began implementing lessons learned from the campaign. This involved the decision for the basic division to be based around three brigades. This process involved the break up of four second-line territorial divisions to reinforce depleted formations and aid in transforming the Army's five motor divisions (made up of two brigades) into infantry divisions (made up of three brigades). This included the disbanding of the 23rd Division, which occurred on 30 June, with its units being dispersed.{{sfn|Joslen|2003|p=62}}{{sfn|French|2001|pp=189-191}}{{sfn|Perry|1988|p=54}}{{efn|The 12th (Eastern) was disbanded on 11 July 1940, with its brigades dispersed to the following motor divisions as part of their transition to infantry formations: 1st London and 2nd London divisions. Its 37th Infantry Brigade became an independent brigade under II Corps.{{sfn|Joslen|2003|pp=56, 282-286}} The 66th Infantry Division was disbanded on 23 June, with its brigades dispersed to the following motor divisions as part of their transition to infantry formations: 1st London, 55th (West Lancashire), and the 59th (Staffordshire) Motor Divisions.{{sfn|Joslen|2003|pp=62, 361-363}} On 7 August, the 51st (Highland) Infantry Division was re-created by the re-designation of its second-line duplicate, the 9th (Highland) Infantry Division.{{sfn|Joslen|2003|p=55}}}}

Specifically, the 69th Infantry Brigade (along with the 233rd Field Company, RE, and the 124th Field Regiment, RA) was transferred to the division's first line counterpart, the (50th (Northumberland) Motor Division to finalize its re-organization into an infantry division. These units, as part of the 50th (Northumberland) Infantry Division, would go on to fight in the North African Campaign, the allied invasion of Sicily, and the North West Europe Campaign including Operation Overlord.{{sfn|Joslen|2003|pp=81-82}} The 70th Brigade was used to reinforce "Alabaster Force", the British force sent to occupy Iceland. This force was based around the 49th (West Riding) Infantry Division, which had been reduced to two brigades prior to its deployment. On 18 May 1942, the 70th Brigade officially became part of that division and subsequently fought in Normandy.{{sfn|Joslen|2003|pp=79-80, 301}} The 8th Royal Northumberland Fusiliers became the 3rd Reconnaissance Regiment, Reconnaissance Corps and served in the 3rd Infantry Division until the end of the war, fighting in North West Europe.{{sfn|Joslen|2003|pp=43, 617}} The 507th Field Company, RE were assigned to the 148th Independent Brigade Group;{{sfn|Joslen|2003|p=333}} an element of the post-Dunkirk reforms, which saw the Army move away from the "division" being the basic tactical unit, and restructuring divisions around three flexible "brigade groups" that would see each brigade include all required supporting arms including machine guns, artillery, and an entire engineer field company.{{sfn|French|2001|pp=190-191}}

General officers commanding

Order of battle

Background

History

Formation

Initial service and transfer to France

Battle of France

Disbandment

General officers commanding

Order of battle

See also

Footnotes

Citations

References

External links