“Operation Gearbox II”的意思、由来-开放百科全书

Operation Gearbox II (17 September 1942 – 7 September 1943) was a Norwegian and British operation during the Second World War on the Arctic island of Spitzbergen in the Svalbard Archipelago. Operation Fritham, the first attempt to establish a base had been defeated when the two ships carrying the force were sunk by Luftwaffe bombers on 14 May.

In Operation Gearbox (30 June – 17 September 1942), 57 Norwegian reinforcements with {{convert|116|LT|t|0|abbr=on}} of supplies had arrived by cruiser on 2 July. The reinforcements consolidated the Barentsburg defences and made preparations for Gearbox II, another reinforcement of the Norwegians and part of the plan for Convoy PQ 18, to prevent a repeat of Convoy PQ 17 (27 June – 10 July 1942) in which 24 of the 35 freighters had been sunk.

The fleet oilers {{RFAux|Blue Ranger||6}} and {{RFAux|Oligarch||6}} and four destroyer escorts, Force P (the Spitzbergen Fuelling Force) sailed from Scapa Flow on 3 September and anchored in Lowe Sound several days later. From 9 to 13 September, relays of destroyers were detached from PQ 18 to refuel, before the convoy passed Bear Island, into range of the Luftwaffe bombers and torpedo-bombers based in north Norway.

After another German weather party was chased off the island in June 1943 by the Norwegians, a German flotilla, including {{Ship|German battleship|Tirpitz||2}} raided Spitzbergen in Operation Zitronella on 7 September, took 31 prisoners and destroyed much of the infrastructure and equipment of Gearbox II. On 19 October, the cruiser {{USS|Tuscaloosa|CA-37|6}} and four destroyers delivered more Norwegian troops.

Background

Svalbard

The Svalbard Archipelago is in the Arctic Ocean {{convert|650|mi|km|abbr=on}} from the North Pole. The islands are mountainous, with permanently snow-covered peaks, some glaciated; there are occasional river terraces at the bottom of steep valleys and some coastal plains. In winter, the islands are covered in snow and the bays ice over. Spitzbergen Island has several large fiords along its west coast and Isfjorden is up to {{convert|10|mi|km|abbr=on}} wide. The Gulf Stream warms the waters and the sea is ice-free during the summer. Settlements were established at Longyearbyen and Barentsburg in inlets along the south shore of Isfjorden, in Kings Bay (Quade Hock) further north along the coast and in Van Mijenfiord to the south.{{sfn|Schofield|Nesbit|2005|pp=61–62}} The settlements attracted colonists of different nationalities and the treaty of 1920 neutralised the islands and recognised the mineral and fishing rights of the participating countries. Before 1939, the population consisted of about 3,000, mostly Norwegian and Russian people, who worked in the mining industry. Drift mines were linked to the shore by overhead cable tracks or rails and coal dumped over the winter was collected by ship after the summer thaw. By 1939 production was about {{convert|500000|LT|t|0|abbr=on}} a year, split between Norway and Russia.{{sfn|Schofield|Nesbit|2005|pp=61–62}}

Signals intelligence

The British Government Code and Cypher School (GC&CS) based at Bletchley Park housed a small industry of code-breakers and traffic analysts. By June 1941, the German Enigma machine Home Waters (Heimish) settings used by surface ships and U-boats could quickly be read. On 1 February 1942, the Enigma machines used in U-boats in the Atlantic and Mediterranean were changed but German ships and the U-boats in Arctic waters continued with the older Heimish (Hyrda from 1942, Dolphin to the British). By mid-1941, British Y-stations were able to receive and read Luftwaffe W/T transmissions and give advance warning of Luftwaffe operations. In 1941, interception parties code-named Headaches were embarked on warships and from May 1942, computers sailed with the cruiser admirals in command of convoy escorts, to read Luftwaffe W/T signals which could not be intercepted by land stations in Britain. The Admiralty sent details of Luftwaffe wireless frequencies, call signs and the daily local codes to the computers. Combined with their knowledge of Luftwaffe procedures, the computers could give fairly accurate details of German reconnaissance sorties and sometimes predicted attacks twenty minutes before they were detected by radar.{{sfn|Hinsley|1994|pp=141, 145–146}} In February 1942, the German Beobachtungsdienst (B-Dienst, Observation Service) of the Kriegsmarine Marinenachrichtendienst (MND, Naval Intelligence Service) broke Naval Cypher No 3 and was able to read it until January 1943.{{sfn|Hinsley|1994|pp=126, 135}}

Naval operations, 1940–1942

The Germans left the Svalbard islands alone during the invasion of Norway in 1940 and apart from a few Norwegians taking passage on Allied ships, little changed; wireless stations on the islands continued to broadcast weather reports in clear, which were useful to both sides.{{sfn|Schofield|Nesbit|2005|p=62}} From 25 July to 9 August 1940, the Admiral Hipper sailed from Trondheim to search the area from Tromsø to Bear Island and Svalbard, to intercept British ships returning from Petsamo but found only a Finnish freighter.{{sfn|Roskill|1957|p=260}} On 12 July 1941, the Admiralty was ordered to assemble a force of ships, to operate in the Arctic in co-operation with the USSR, despite objections from Admiral John (Jack) Tovey, commander of the Home Fleet, who preferred to operate further south where there were more targets and better air cover.{{sfn|Woodman|2004|pp=10–11}}

Rear-Admirals Philip Vian and Geoffrey Miles flew to Polyarnoe and Miles established a British military mission in Moscow.{{sfn|Woodman|2004|pp=10–11}} Vian reported that Murmansk was close to German held territory, that its air defences were inadequate and that the prospects of offensive operations on German shipping were poor. Vian was sent to look at the west coast of Spitzbergen, the main island of Svalbard, which was mostly ice-free and {{convert|450|mi|km|abbr=on}} from northern Norway, to assess its potential as a base. The cruisers {{HMS|Nigeria|60|6}}, {{HMS|Aurora|12|6}} and two destroyers departed Iceland on 27 July but Vian judged the apparent advantages of Spitzbergen as a base to be mistaken.{{sfn|Roskill|1957|p=488}} The force closed on the Norwegian coast twice and each time was discovered by Luftwaffe reconnaissance aircraft.{{sfn|Woodman|2004|pp=10–11, 35–36}}

Operation Gauntlet

As Operation Dervish, the first Arctic convoy, was assembling in Iceland, Vian sailed with Force A for Svalbard on 19 August 1942 in Operation Gauntlet. Norwegian and Russian civilians were to be evacuated using the same two cruisers, with five destroyer escorts, an oiler and {{RMS|Empress of Canada|1920|6}}, a troop transport carrying 645 men, mainly Canadian infantry.{{efn|Commander: Brigadier Arthur Potts, 527 Canadians, 25 Norwegians (Captain Aubert), 93 British including 57 Royal Engineers.{{sfn|Stacey|1956|p=304}}}} The expedition landed at Barentsburg to sabotage the coal industry, evacuate the Norwegian and Soviet civilians and commandeer any shipping that could be found. About 2,000 Russians were taken to Archangelsk in Empress of Canada, escorted by one of the cruisers and the three destroyers, which rendezvoused with the rest of Force A off Barentsburg on 1 September.{{sfn|Woodman|2004|pp=10–11, 35–36}} Normal business was kept up at the Barentsburg wireless station by the Norwegian Military Governor Designate, Lieutenant Ragnvald Tamber; three colliers sent from the mainland were hijacked along with a seal ship {{MS|Selis||6}}, the ice-breaker {{SS|Isbjørn|1894|6}}, a tug and two fishing boats. The Canadian landing parties re-embarked on 2 September and the force sailed for home on 3 September, with 800 Norwegian civilians and the prizes.{{sfn|Roskill|1957|p=489}} The two cruisers diverted towards the Norwegian coast to hunt for German ships and in stormy weather and poor visibility early on 7 September, found a German convoy off Porshanger near the North Cape. The cruisers sank the training ship Bremse but two troop transports, with 1,500 men aboard, escaped. Nigeria was damaged, thought to have hit a wreck but the naval force reached Scapa Flow on 10 September.{{sfn|Woodman|2004|pp=35–36}}{{sfn|Roskill|1957|p=489}}{{efn|After the war it was surmised that Nigeria had hit a mine.{{sfn|Woodman|2004|p=36}}}}

German bases, 1941–1942

After Operation Gauntlet (25 August – 3 September 1941) the British had expected the Germans to occupy Svalbard as a base for attacks on Arctic convoys. The Germans were more interested in meteorological data, the Arctic being the origin of much of the weather over western Europe. By August 1941, the Allies had eliminated German weather stations on Greenland, Jan Mayen Island, Bear Island (Bjørnøya) and the civil weather reports from Spitzbergen. The Germans used weather reports from U-boats, reconnaissance aircraft, trawlers and other ships but these were too vulnerable to attack. The Kriegsmarine and the Luftwaffe surveyed land sites for weather stations in the range of sea and air supply, some to be manned and others automatic. Wettererkundungsstaffel 5 (Wekusta 5) part of Luftflotte 5, was based at Banak in northern Norway, once it was ready. The He 111s and Ju 88s of Wekusta 5 ranged over the Arctic Ocean, past Spitzbergen and Jan Mayen, towards Greenland; the experience gained made the unit capable of the transport and supply of manned and automatic weather stations.{{sfn|Schofield|Nesbit|2005|pp=63–64}}

After the wireless on Spitzbergen had mysteriously ceased transmission in early September, German reconnaissance flights from Banak discovered the Canadian demolitions, burning coal dumps and saw one man, a conscientious objector who had refused to leave, waving to them. Dr Erich Etienne, a former Polar explorer, commanded an operation to install a manned station on the islands but with winter imminent, time was short. Advent Bay (Adventfjorden) was chosen for its broad valley, making a safer approach for aircraft; its subsoil of alluvial gravel was acceptable for a landing ground. The south-eastern orientation of the high ground did not impede wireless communication with Banak and the settlement of Longyearbyen (Longyear Town) was close by. A north-west to south-east airstrip about {{convert|1800|by|250|yd|m|abbr=on}} was marked out, which was firm when dry and hard when frozen but liable to become boggy after rain and the spring thaw. The Germans used the Hans Lund Hut as a control room and wireless station, the Inner Hjorthamn Hut to the south-east being prepared as a substitute. The site received the code-name Bansö (from Banak and Spitzbergen Öya) and ferry flights of men, equipment and supplies began on 25 September. He 111, Ju 88 and Ju 52 pilots gained experience of landing on soft ground, cut with ruts and boulders.{{sfn|Schofield|Nesbit|2005|pp=64–67, 95}}

The British followed events from Bletchley Park through Ultra, made easier by German willingness to make routine use of radio communication. Four British minesweepers en route from Archangelsk were diverted to investigate and reached Isfjorden on 19 October. A Wekusta 5 aircraft crew spotted the ships as they prepared to land and the thirty men at Bansö were flown to safety by the aircraft and two Ju 52 transport aircraft in something of a rush. Bansö was deserted when the British arrived but some code books were recovered; when the ships left, the Germans returned. After 38 supply flights, Dr Albrecht Moll and three men arrived to spend the winter of 1941–1942 transmitting weather reports. On 29 October 1941, Hans Knoespel and five weathermen were installed by the Kriegsmarine at Lilliehöökfjorden, a branch of Krossfjord in the north-western Spitzbergen.{{sfn|Schofield|Nesbit|2005|p=67}}{{efn|On 24 August 1942, the Knoespel group was repatriated by {{GS|U-435||2}}, after being attacked by a party from Operation Gearbox.{{sfn|Schofield|Nesbit|2005|p=95}}}} Landing aircraft was riskier in winter, when the landing ground or an ice-covered bay was frozen solid, because soft snow on top could pile up in front of the wheels of the aircraft and jerk it to a stop or prevent it from reaching take-off speed when departing. The blanket of snow could also cover holes, into which a wheel could fall, potentially to damage the undercarriage or propeller.{{sfn|Schofield|Nesbit|2005|pp=95–96}}

The Moll party at Bansö called for aircraft when the weather was adequate and after making low and slow passes, to check the landing ground for obstructions, the pilot decided whether to land.{{sfn|Schofield|Nesbit|2005|pp=95–96}} On 2 May 1942, the apparatus for an automatic weather station, a thermometer, barometer, transmitter and batteries arrived at Banak, in a box named Kröte (toad) by the aircrew. As soon as weather permitted, it was to be flown to Bansö and the Moll party brought back. It took until 12 May for a favourable weather report to reach Banak and a He 111 and a Ju 88 were sent with supplies and the technicians to install the Kröte. The aircraft reached Bansö at {{nowrap|5:45 a.m.}} and after a careful examination of the ground, the Heinkel pilot eventually landed, keeping its tail well up out of the snow. The main wheels quickly accumulated a drift of packed snow in front of them and the aircraft almost nosed over. The ten crew and passengers joined the ground party, who welcomed them having been alone for six months; the Ju 88 pilot was warned off by a flare and returned to Banak.{{sfn|Schofield|Nesbit|2005|pp=96–99}}

Operation Fritham

On 30 April 1942, Isbjørn and Selis (Lieutenant H. Øi Royal Norwegian Navy) and about twenty crewmen sailed from Greenock with a Norwegian landing party of 60 men, accompanied by three British liaison officers.{{sfn|Schofield|Nesbit|2005|pp=63, 94–95}} Each ship carried a 20 mm Oerlikon anti-aircraft gun but none of the party had been trained in their use. Major Amherst Whatman, a Polar explorer and signals specialist, repaired and operated the wireless set but it broke down on the journey to Iceland and was not reliable for the rest of the voyage. The ships hugged the Polar ice, with little risk of being seen by Luftwaffe aircraft, once north-east of Jan Mayen.{{sfn|Schofield|Nesbit|2005|pp=94–95}} The ships reached Svalbard on 13 May and entered Isfjorden at {{nowrap|8:00 p.m.}} Grønfjorden (Green Fjord or Green Harbour to the British) was covered in ice up to {{convert|4|ft|m|abbr=on}} thick. The ice breaking was delayed until after midnight on 14 May and parties were sent to scout Barentsburg on the east shore and the Finneset peninsula.{{sfn|Schofield|Nesbit|2005|pp=105–106}} The scouting parties found no-one but took until {{nowrap|5:00 p.m.}} to get back, by when Isbjørn had cut a long channel in the ice but was still well short of Finneset. A Ju 88 flew along Isfiorden, also at {{nowrap|5:00 p.m.}} but Sverdrup insisted on making for the landing stage at Barentsburg to unload quicker.{{sfn|Schofield|Nesbit|2005|pp=105–106}}

At {{nowrap|8:30 p.m.,}} four FW 200 Condor long-range reconnaissance bombers appeared; the valley sides were so high that the bombers arrived without warning and the third bomber hit Isbjørn which sank immediately and Selis was soon set on fire.{{sfn|Schofield|Nesbit|2005|pp=105–110}} Thirteen men were killed, including Sverdrup and Godfrey, nine men were wounded, two mortally. The equipment in Isbjørn, arms, ammunition, food, clothes and the wireless had been lost. Barentsburg was only a few hundred yards across the ice and plenty of food was found because it was the Svalbard custom to stock up before winter. The local swine herd has been slaughtered during Gauntlet and the arctic cold had preserved the meat; wild duck could be plundered for eggs and an infirmary was also found, still stocked with dressings for the wounded. Ju 88 and He 111 bombers returned on 15 May but the survivors took cover in mine shafts.{{sfn|Schofield|Nesbit|2005|pp=105–110}} The fitter men at Barentsburg tended the wounded and lay low when the Luftwaffe was around. Lieutenant Ove Roll Lund sent parties south to Sveagruva (Swedish Mine) in Van Mijenfjord and to reconnoitre the Germans in Advent Bay around the airstrip at Bansö.{{sfn|Schofield|Nesbit|2005|pp=110–112}}

Prelude

Luftwaffe, 14 June – 3 July 1942

The Germans at Bansö had reported the British flight of 26 May and on 12 June, reported that the landing ground was dry enough for a landing attempt. A Ju 88 flew to the island and landed but damaged its propellers as it taxied, increasing the German party to 18 men. Luftwaffe aircraft flew to Spitzbergen each day but until 26 June, had to be warned off each time with red flares. The flight next day was also sent back and the Germans thought about using floatplanes but the east end of Isfjorden and Advent Bay were too full of drifting ice. In the midnight sun (20 April – 22 August) as mid-summer approached, the ice further west near the Allied positions cleared faster than at the German (eastern) end of the fiord.{{sfn|Schofield|Nesbit|2005|pp=134–135}} The Germans reported the Catalina attack on the Ju 88 on 27 June, which left it a write-off and claimed to have damaged the British aircraft with return fire. On 30 June, the party sent a message that the airstrip was dry enough for Junkers Ju 52 aircraft and supply flights resumed. The aircraft were watched by a Norwegian party which had gone on an abortive expedition to destroy the German wireless at the Hans Lund Hut in Advent Bay. On clear days the German pilots flew direct over the mountains and on cloudy and misty days, when heavily laden, took the coast route past Barentsburg. A Kröte was installed on the north side of Advent Bay at Hjorthamn.{{sfn|Schofield|Nesbit|2005|pp=166–167}}

Operation Gearbox

The remainder of Fritham Force at Barentsburg was consolidated by the reinforcements of Operation Gearbox and its sequels, a weather station was set up and wireless contact with the Admiralty regained. Ullring reported the oversight with the Colt machine-guns, arranged for Catalina supply flights, provided weather and sighting reports, protected Wharman and his apparatus for research into the ionosphere and prepared to attack German weather stations wherever they could be found.{{sfn|Hutson|2012|p=125}} Once Gearbox began, the personnel on Spitzbegen could do more than subsist and dodge attacks by German aircraft. Catalina N-Nuts flew to Spitzbergen on 13 July with the Colt parts and other supplies, thence to north Russia to search for PQ 17 survivors and informed the British naval authorities in Murmansk that the Barents Sea was free of ice. Many survivors including about forty men seen on the flight to north Russia, were rescued and ships reported sheltering at Novaya Zemlya were escorted safely to port.{{sfn|Schofield|Nesbit|2005|pp=166–173}}

The survivors of Operation Fritham provided excellent local knowledge and once the Colt parts had been delivered, Ullring had one mounted in a cutter. On 15 July, Ullring set off in the midnight sun with ten men to attack the Germans at Lonyearbyen in Advent Bay. The party found that the last Germans on Spitzbergen, including the weather-reporting party resident since late 1941, had been flown back to Norway on 9 July. The Germans had gone but the Ju 88 shot up on 1 July was still there, the wireless transmitter and other equipment were operational, stores were plentiful and the buildings used by the party were in good condition, suggesting that the German departure was not intended to be permanent. The Kröte near the shore at Hjorthamn was found, dismantled and returned to Barentsburg for shipment to Britain. At the beginning of August, Ullring took a party of nine men north along the coast and to Kongsfjorden (Kingsfjord) in the cutter, to look for another German weather station but found only a footprint. On 20 August, a U-boat entered Isfjorden and bombarded shore installations, in Green Harbour and Advent Bay, with its deck gun. At Barentsburg, the Norwegians returned fire from the cutter which had been armed with a Colt machine-gun, moored at the pier and with a {{nowrap|20 mm Oerlikon}} emplaced on the rise beyond the village, forcing the U-boat to fire from longer range; the Norwegians again suffered no casualties.{{sfn|Schofield|Nesbit|2005|pp=166–173, 190}}

Plan

After an abortive attempt to reach Spitzbergen on 26 July, Catalina P-Peter took off at {{nowrap|9;00 a.m.}} on 29 July, with Tetanus anti-toxin and other items for Operation Gearbox. Glen and some of the German equipment were picked up from Barentsburg and flown back to Sullom Voe though thick fog but with breaks in the high cloud enabling the crew to take astro shots; a new Air Position Indicator was also used. Glen was satisfied that Norwegian control of Isfjorden and Green Harbour was satisfactory and the area was suitable for use as a seaplane base. Glen was flown from Sullom Voe to Southampton on the south coast by Catalina, to visit the Admiralty for discussions about the forthcoming Convoy PQ 18.{{sfn|Schofield|Nesbit|2005|pp=174–176}}

To avoid another convoy disaster like PQ 17, the Admiralty was planning to provide far more support for PQ 18, which included the party on Spitzbergen. Glen was to be the British liaison officer with the Norwegians and Operation Gearbox II was to begin by using the convoy as cover. Bonham-Carter with the cruisers {{HMS|Cumberland|57|6}} and {{HMS|Sheffield|C24|6}} escorted by {{HMS|Eclipse|H08|6}} and four more destroyers, was to carry the Gearbox II party and about {{convert|200|LT|t|0|abbr=on}} of stores. The delivery included forty Husky sled dogs, three Bofors 40 mm anti-aircraft guns, two tractors, boats, more wireless equipment, including direction finding apparatus and supplies for the winter.{{sfn|Schofield|Nesbit|2005|pp=176–177}}

After the calamity of Convoy PQ 17, The chief of RAF Coastal Command, Philip Joubert, revived a proposal to base a force of torpedo-bombers in north Russia, which took place as Operation Orator. Two Hampden torpedo-bomber squadrons, a detachment of ten Catalinas from 210 Squadron and four very-long-range Spitfire reconnaissance aircraft made the long and risky flight from Scotland to north Russia in early September and formed the Search & Strike Wing.{{sfn|Richards|Saunders|1975|pp=80–81}} Force P, the fleet oilers {{RFAux|Blue Ranger||6}} and {{RFAux|Oligarch||6}} escorted by four destroyers was to sail for Spitzbergen on 3 September and anchor in Lowe Sound, along Van Mijenfjorden, as an temporary, advanced refuelling base.{{sfn|Roskill|1962|pp=280–283}}

Operation Gearbox II

September 1942 – 7 June 1943

Cumberland, Eclipse and four more destroyers arrived on 17 September, with {{convert|130|LT|t|abbr=on}} of supplies and a party of Norwegian troops (Lieutenant-Colonel Albert Tornerud, also the successor of Ullring as Military Governor). The heavier items were moved ashore on a raft made from {{convert|50|impgal|l|0|abbr=on}} oil drums. Ullring went on board Cumberland to report on the last six weeks of operations. Sheffield arrived on 18 September with another {{convert|110|LT|t|abbr=on}} of stores. When Ullring reported to Captain A. W. Clarke on Sheffield, Clarke donated two depth charges to Gearbox and included in his report that Ullring had "...attacked a U-boat from a rowing boat armed with a tin opener". The ships repeated the practice of keeping their engines running with the crews closed up for anti-aircraft action and both cruisers managed to unload and depart in six hours. Glen began to prepare the local aspects of Gearbox II and Ullring prepared to relinquish command to Tornerud; Whatman remained the British Liaison Officer and stayed over the winter of 1942–1943, before being relieved.{{sfn|Schofield|Nesbit|2005|pp=177, 189–190}}

The short range of some of the escorting destroyers involved in PQ 18, led to the dispatch of the Spitzbergen Fuelling Force (also Force P) the fleet oilers Blue Ranger and Oligarch and four destroyer escorts. The ships sailed with PQ 18 on 3 September and turned north for Spitzbergen on 9 September, to form a temporary advanced refuelling base in the {{convert|52|mi|km|abbr=on}}-long Van Mijenfjorden (formerly Lowe Sound). The fiord is separated from Bellsund by the islands of Akseløya and Mariaholmen. Sveagruva, on the north bank was still garrisoned by a party of the original Fritham Force, which had been rearmed during a visit from Ullring and Gearbox II, in July. On 11 September, the cruiser {{HMS|Scylla|98|6}} led five destroyers of the 3rd Destroyer Flotilla from PQ 18 and arrived at Bellsund on the evening of 12 September and sailed past the destroyer {{HMS|Windsor|D42|6}} acting as guard ship, to rendezvous with the two oilers and their four destroyer escorts in Axelfiord, to refuel before the most dangerous part of the journey, east of Bear Island. The flotilla sailed again at {{nowrap|4:00 a.m.}} on 13 September, reaching the convoy at {{nowrap|2:30 p.m.}} The oilers and escorts departed on 21 September.{{sfn|Roskill|1962|pp=280–283}}{{sfn|Woodman|2004|pp=265, 267}}

Healy and P-Peter took part in Orator and left Grasnaya on 25 September to Svalbard, to pick up Glen and return to Scotland. Bad weather forced a return to Murmansk and at {{nowrap|1:29 p.m.,}} about {{convert|70|nmi|mi km|abbr=on}} out from the coast, a Ju 88 attacked and passed towards the front of the Catalina and was hit as it went past. Return fire from the Ju 88 hit the cockpit of the Catalina and Healy was killed.{{sfn|Richards|Saunders|1975|pp=84–85}} After the war, the surviving crew members found that a Ju 88 of 1 Staffel, Fernaufklärungsgeschwader 22 (Long-Range Reconnaissance Group 22) from Banak in north Norway, had crashed off Tamsöy Island that day, attributed to an engagement with a "Russian flying boat".{{sfn|Schofield|Nesbit|2005|pp=210–212}} On 19 October, {{HMS|Argonaut|61|6}} and two destroyers delivered supplies and a Norwegian vessel made the voyage in November.{{sfn|Roskill|1962|p=287}}{{sfn|Hutson|2012|pp=126–127}} On 7 June 1943, the cruisers Cumberland, {{HMS|Bermuda|C52|2}} and two destroyers sailed from Iceland covered by the Home Fleet, landing reinforcements and supplies for Gearbox II on 10 July.{{sfn|Roskill|1960|p=59}}

SS Chulmleigh

Operation FB was an attempt to use the winter months of October to December 1942 to pass single ships with volunteer crews to north Russia. In November, SS Chulmleigh was routed north of Jan Mayen, then south of Svalbard to turn south towards the White Sea, on a voyage of {{convert|2500|nmi|mi km|abbr=on}}. The captain was briefed to make haste to avoid interception and because Polar ice was accumulating anc covering more of the Arctic Ocean. The captain was prevented from celestial navigation by unbroken cloud and snowfalls. Only dead reckoning was available to time the turn off Jan Mayen at midnight on 3 November 1942. A quick star shot through a break in clouds revealed that the magnetic compass was 8° out. During the night, the radio officer reported distress signals from other ships making passage and early on 5 November, the Admiralty ordered the ship north beyond 77° North, before heading for Svalbard. The captain delayed changing course for four hours in the hope of another star shot; around noon the clouds broke and to everyone's dismay, a Blohm & Voss BV 138 (BV 138) appeared.{{sfn|Woodman|2004|pp=300–301}}

The ship was turned south-east and in the snow and afternoon dark, the captain feared that they might not pass Svalbard. At midnight the master felt that they were clear of the South Cape of Spitzbergen Island and turned east. There had been a dead reckoning error of {{convert|20|nmi|mi km|abbr=on}} north and on 6 November, at {{nowrap|12:30 a.m.,}} Chulmleigh ran onto a reef off the South Cape and grounded at the stern, the bow floating in deeper water beyond. The confidential books were jettisoned and the crew abandoned ship in haste but one of the four lifeboats was damaged and two men fell into the sea; one of the men was rescued but the other died of exposure. Two officers remained on board and after a couple of hours some of the crew re-boarded to try to manoeuvre the ship off the reef but the attempt failed. As the three boats reached open water, five {{nowrap|Ju 88s}} bombed the ship and set it on fire; U-625 torpedoed the wreck later.{{sfn|Woodman|2004|pp=301–302, 305}}{{efn|The remains of the ship were still visible in 2004.{{sfn|Woodman|2004|p=305}}}}

At {{nowrap|4:00 a.m.}} a distress call was transmitted and the crew waited in the lifeboats for twilight, the lightest conditions that occurred at that time of year, to negotiate the reefs around the ship. The boats made sail along the west coast of Spitzbergen for Barentsburg in Isfjorden {{convert|150|nmi|mi km|abbr=on}} to the north. The smallest boat was soon abandoned as unseaworthy and the occupants crammed aboard the remaining two boats, 28 men in one and 29 in the other. The boats became separated in the dark but continued north during 7 November. A storm blew up on 8 November and the crews began to succumb to hypothermia. On 10 November, a member of the crew died of the cold; in better visibility, the coast was sighted again and at {{nowrap|3:00 a.m.}} on 12 November, one boat crew got ashore in Isfjorden. Several attempts to find help failed in the winter blizzards and the crew were only discovered by two Norwegian ski troops from Gearbox II on 2 January 1943. Barentsburg was only {{convert|12|mi|km|abbr=on}} from the landfall; only the captain and eight members of the crew survived to be repatriated to Thurso in Scotland on 15 June 1943.{{sfn|Woodman|2004|pp=302–305}}

German bases 1942–1943

Nussbaum, another Kriegsmarine meteorological party, commanded by Dr Franz Nusser, departed Norway in {{GS|U-377||2}} to return to Svalbard and re-occupy the Knospe base at Signehamna that had spent the winter of 1941–1942 gathering weather data. Two journeys to Svalbard were made and Nussbaum became operational in November 1942. During the winter of 1942–1943, Nussbaum needed no air supply but in May, Nussbaum required spare parts for its motor and hydrogen generators. The supplies were dropped by a Fw 200 of KG 40 which flew from Vaernes on 6, 8 and 18 May, collecting weather data en route. On 20 June 1943 Nussbaum was surprised by Norwegian commandos patrol, commanded by Kaptein E. Ullring with Fenrik Augensen, surveying Kongs Fjord and Kross Fjord in a gunboat. Five of the six Germans escaped to the coast of the Mitra peninsula but Heinz Kohler, who was closer to the water was killed by the Norwegians near Signehamna. The weather party had managed to send a distress call before they fled and {{GS|U-302||2}} (Kapitănleutnant Herbert Sickel), cruising off Svalbard, embarked the party on 22 June. The Nussbaum party had seen a {{nowrap|Fw 200}} overhead but had not been spotted. On 26 June, U-302 rendezvoused with {{GS|U-625||2}} (Kapitănleutnant Hans Benker) to transfer the party, which arrived at Narvik on 28 June.{{sfn|Kington|Selinger|2006|pp=170–171, 208}}

Operation Zitronella

On 20 June 1943, another German weather reporting party had been forced off Spitzbergen by the Norwegians and evacuated to Norway by U-boat. The party reported that the Norwegians had their own weather station in Isfjorden and on 6 September 1943, {{Ship|German battleship|Tirpitz||2}}, {{Ship|German battleship|Scharnhorst||2}} and ten destroyers sailed from Altafjord in Unternehmen Zitronella (also Unternehmen Sizilien, Operation Sicily) and reached Spitzbergen undetected.{{sfn|Morison|1956|p=231}} On 7 September, supported by a shore bombardment, the only occasion that Tirpitz fired its main battery horizontally in anger, a battalion of infantry landed and captured the installations at Barentsburg; after destroying the coal depots and other facilities, the German force withdrew. Captain Morten Bredsdorff and 30 Norwegians were taken prisoner but rest of the party escaped inland until the coast was clear, then returned to clear up the damage.{{sfn|Schiøtz|2007|p=202}}{{sfn|Morison|1956|p=232}} The Admiralty was alerted on 8 September and the Home Fleet sailed but returned once it was clear that the German squadron was out of reach.{{sfn|Roskill|1960|pp=59, 63}} On 22 September, a Catalina delivered new wireless equipment to restore communications and on 19 October, {{USS|Tuscaloosa|CA-37|6}}, escorted by one US and three British destroyers, delivered more Norwegian troops to Barentsburg. Members of Gearbox II were picked up from various points on the islands and delivered to Iceland and Scotland.{{sfn|Morison|1956|p=231}}{{efn|Tuscaloosa{{'}}s war diarist claimed that the ship had gone the farthest north of any US ship during the war (78° 18' 30" N).{{sfn|Morison|1956|p=231}}}}

Aftermath

Analysis

After the disaster of Operation Fritham, the base at Barentsburg was consolidated by the reinforcements of Operation Gearbox. The reinforcements and equipment of Gearbox II, with Operation Orator, provided a measure of protection for PQ 18, which lost thirteen ships compared to the 24 sunk during PQ 17. The exceptionally large number of destroyer escorts was maintained by detaching relays (9–13 September) to refuel from the two fleet oilers anchored in Lowe Sound in southern Spitzbergen.{{sfn|Schofield|Nesbit|2005|pp=168–171}}{{sfn|Roskill|1962|pp=282–283}} Operation Zitronella was a successful raid but the re-establishment of a German base on Svalbard was out of the question, given Allied naval and air superiority. In 1956, the US naval official historian Samuel Eliot Morison called it "overstuffed"; the attack had been magnified by German propaganda, despite being an enterprise needing little more than a destroyer to accomplish. More Norwegian troops were shipped to Spitzbergen and the base rebuilt; the Norwegian presence was maintained until the end of the war.{{sfn|Morison|1956|pp=230–231}}