| 词条 | Perso-Roman Peace Treaty of 363 |
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The Peace Treaty of 363 between the Eastern Roman Empire and the Sassanid Persian Empire was the consequent treaty from the catastrophic Roman defeat in the war of 363 in which a large Roman army led by the emperor, Julian the Apostate, was trapped and forced into signing a humiliating treaty by which numerous territorial and diplomatic concessions were given to the Persians.[1][2] BackgroundJulian's preparationsAfter his accession to the Roman throne in A.D. 361 upon the death of his cousin Constantius II., Julian resolved to continue the war which his predecessor had maintained against Sassanid Persia under her aggressive monarch, Shapur II., from 337 to 350 A.D., and again 359-61.[3] These had terminated indecisively, though Shapur had won some notable victories, notably at Singara (A.D. 348)[4][5], and in the siege of Amida (A.D. 359)[6][7]. Though Shapur, awed by Julian's reputation acquired during the Gallic wars, was disposed to peace, Julian disdained negotiation, and set in motion his extensive preparations.[8] Over the winter of 362-63 Julian established his quarters in Antioch, and as soon as spring arrived he was ready to take the field.[9] Shapur was entirely unprepared for the rapidity and strength of Julian's invasion, the latter having successfully concealed his motions from the enemy. Within a month of his departure from Antioch, a force of 95,000 had been assembled at Carrhae, and Shapur was made to expect their march from Nisibis and the valley of the Tigris. But in fact the major part of the army (over 60,000 men) turned suddenly to join the Euphrates at Callinicum, where a massive fleet (1,100) vessels) had been prepared, to facilitate the transport of the baggage and the passage of the rivers. This army under Julian himself marched swiftly south-east along the river on the route to Ctesiphon, the enemy capital. The remainder, which with the aid of the Christian king of Armenia Arshak II would reach a strength of over 50,000, was ordered to effect a junction with the emperor before the walls of Ctesiphon, marching by way of Nisibis and along the Tigris.[10] It was the largest invading force ever set in motion against the east.[11] Progress of the warThe southern arm of the expedition met with some initial success, Assyria succumbing to the overwhelming might and surprise of the invasion; Anah and Macepracta fell; the canals which the natives had destroyed, to swamp the country as a last expedient to halt the Roman advance, were efficiently repaired by the army engineers; and two cities which resisted, Pirisabora and Maiozamalcha, were leveled with the ground;[12] the Tigris was crossed, and the Persian army which contested its passage was defeated and penned up in Ctesiphon.[13] However, Arshak II failed to rise to the aid of the pagan Julian. The northern army failed to join the siege of the city, whose defenses Julian found impregnable.[14] After a vain attempt to penetrate further east to Susa and beyond, in the course of which Julian was forced to abandon his fleet and most of his provisions, Julian was at length convinced that no option remained to him but a retreat, hopefully to rejoin the northern army in Corduene, and resume the contest in the following year.[15] Shapur was quick to sense the weakness of the enemy, and endeavored to destroy him on the march.[16] Although he was twice repulsed, at Maranga and again at Samarra, and sustained considerable losses in men and elephants, his efforts bore fruit in the latter battle when Julian was mortally wounded by a well-aimed or lucky dart, which struck him in the side and pierced his unarmored body to the quick. His death that night, and the subsequent election by the troops of the feckless Jovian as his successor, seemed to secure the ruin of the army.[17] however, the Roman legions continued a fierce defense in four successive days of marching and repulsing the enemies' attacks, at the end of which they arrived at Dura. Although their provisions were almost exhausted, and their attempts to cross the Tigris were easily baffled by the Persians posted on the western as well as eastern bank of the river, Shapur still feared their last recourse of desperate valor, and dispatched emmisiaries of peace into the Roman camp, declaring his willingness to reprieve the embayed emperor with his war-worn army.[18] Terms of the treatySuch was the avarice and mean ambition of Jovian, according to his pagan detractor, the sophist Libanius, and the terrible state of the army, that had Shapur demanded all the provinces of the east as the price of their release, his conditions would have been met by the pusillanimous emperor, rather than risk his life and purple in the cause of the empire.[19] In fact Shapur's terms were more moderate:
No relief was offered by the Persians for the immediate distresses of the army, which was left to fend for itself as it best could until it should arrive unhindered in Corduene, whither it directed its march. There Jovian at length rejoined the northern army, commanded by Sebastian and Procopius, and endured personally the reproaches of the abandoned people of the provinces of the east.[23] In the aftermath, the treaty contributed materially to the weakening of the empire, and Rome's relation to Sassanian Persia would never again be the same, after the shameful terms which the latter had extorted from her captive army and emperor.[24] See also
References1. ^Beate Dignas & Engelbert Winter, Rome & Persia in Late Antiquity; Neighbours & Rivals, (Cambridge University Press, English edition, 2007), p131. 2. ^Potter, David S., The Roman Empire at Bay, AD 180-395, Routledge, (Taylor & Francis Group, 2004), p520 & p527 3. ^Edward Gibbon, The Decline And Fall Of The Roman Empire, (The Modern Library, 1932), chapter XXIV., p. 799 4. ^Gibbon, chap. XVIII., p. 584 5. ^Encyclopedia Of World History, (Houghton Mifflin Company Boston, 1952) chapter II., Ancient History, p. 125 6. ^Ibid. 7. ^Gibbon, chap. XIX., pp. 617-21 (It was something of a pyrrhic victory) 8. ^Gibbon, chap. XXIV.,p. 799 9. ^Gibbon, p. 804 10. ^Gibbon, pp. 806-08 11. ^Gibbon, p. 807 12. ^Gibbon, p. 813. The single fortress of Thilutha remained untaken in Julian's rear. 13. ^Gibbon, pp. 817-20 14. ^Gibbon, p. 820, 821 15. ^Gibbon, pp. 821-24 16. ^Ibid. p. 825 17. ^Gibbon, pp. 825-31 18. ^Gibbon, pp. 831-33 19. ^Gibbon, p. 834 20. ^Gibbon, p. 833 21. ^Gibbon, p. 838 22. ^Gibbon, p. 833 23. ^Gibbon, pp. 836-38 24. ^Gibbon, p. 838. Sources
5 : Roman–Sasanian Wars|4th-century treaties|Julian (emperor)|Shapur II|Julian's Persian War |
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