| 词条 | Q-principle |
| 释义 |
In the Neo-Gricean approach to semantics and pragmatics championed by Yale linguist Laurence Horn, the Q-Principle ("Q" for "Quantity") is a reformulation of Paul Grice's maxim of Quantity (see Gricean maxims) combined with the first two sub-maxims of Manner.[1] The Q-principle states: "Say as much as you can (given R)." As such it interacts with the R-Principle, which states: "Say no more than you must (given Q)." [2] [3] The Q-Principle leads to the implication that if the speaker did not make a stronger statement (or say more), then its denial is (implied to be) true. For instance, the inference from "He entered a house" to "He did not enter his own house" is Q-based inference, i.e. deriving from the Q-Principle. [2] References1. ^{{cite book|last1=Horn |first1=Laurence |title=A Natural History of Negation |date=1989|publisher=The University of Chicago press |location=Chicago, IL |pages=193–203}} 2. ^1 "Implicature" in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy . 3. ^ "The Gricean Model" in the Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science. 2 : Semantics|Pragmatics |
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