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词条 Bioconservatism
释义

  1. Philosophical arguments for bioconservatism

     Michael Sandel's arguments  Humility  Responsibility  Solidarity  Leon Kass' arguments  The problematic attitude of biotechnological enhancement  'Unnatural' means of biotechnological enhancement  'Dubious' ends of biotechnological enhancement 

  2. Criticism

      Nick Bostrom on posthuman dignity  

  3. Notable bioconservatives

  4. See also

  5. References

  6. External links

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Bioconservatism (a portmanteau of "biology" and "conservatism") is a stance of hesitancy and skepticism regarding radical technological advances, especially those that seek to modify or enhance the human condition. Bioconservatism is characterized by a belief that technological trends in today's society risk compromising human dignity, and by opposition to movements and technologies including transhumanism, human genetic modification, "strong" artificial intelligence, and the technological singularity. Many bioconservatives also oppose the use of technologies such as life extension and preimplantation genetic screening.

Bioconservatives range in political perspective from right-leaning religious and cultural conservatives to left-leaning environmentalists and technology critics. What unifies bioconservatives is skepticism about medical and other biotechnological transformations of the living world.[1][2][3][4] Typically less sweeping as a critique of technological society than bioluddism, the bioconservative perspective is characterized by its defense of the natural, deployed as a moral category.[5][6]

Philosophical arguments for bioconservatism

The philosophical underpinnings of bioconservative thought are diverse, ranging from religious to secular, and from left-wing to conservative. Nick Bostrom, a noted transhumanist and opponent of bioconservatism, identifies three major strains of thought that might lead to concerns about radical technological change. Two of these strains of thought are secular: first, that human augmentation is innately degrading and therefore harmful, and secondly that the existence of augmented humans poses a threat to "ordinary humans". The third strain is derived "from religious or crypto-religious sentiments"[7]- - that human augmentation shows a lack of acknowledgement that "not every- thing in the world is open to any use we may desire or devise".[8]

Michael Sandel's arguments

Michael J. Sandel is an American political philosopher and a prominent bioconservative. His article and subsequent book, both titled "The Case Against Perfection",[9][10] concern the moral permissibility of genetic engineering or genome editing. He insists that consequentialist arguments overlook the principle issue of whether bioenhancement should be aspired to at all. He is attributed with the view that human augmentation should be avoided as it expresses an excessive desire to change oneself and 'become masters of our nature'.[11] For example, the fear that inequality of access to enhancement technologies might create two classes of humans should not be on the grounds that the poor would be denied such benefits, but that the enhanced affluent would somehow be dehumanised. Similarly, he has argued that the ethical problem with genetic engineering is not that it undermines the child's autonomy, as this claim "wrongly implies that absent a designing parent, children are free to choose their characteristics for themselves"[9]. Rather, he sees enhancement as hubristic, and children as gifts from nature.[12] Sandel also criticises the argument that a genetically engineered athlete would have an unfair advantage over his unenhanced competitors, suggesting that it has always been the case that some athletes are better endowed genetically than others.[9]

Sandel argues that the real ethical problems with genetic engineering concern its effects on humility, responsibility and solidarity.[9]

Humility

Sandel argues that humility is a moral virtue that will be undermined by genetic engineering. Sandel holds that a good parent is one who is "open to the unbidden" and has a sense of humility regarding their own genetic endowment and that of their children. Sandel's concern is that, through genetic engineering, the relationship between parent and child is "disfigured":

The problem lies in the hubris of the designing parents, in their drive to master the mystery of birth. Even if this disposition did not make parents tyrants to their children, it would disfigure the relation between parent and child, and deprive the parent of the humility and enlarged human sympathies that an openness to the unbidden can cultivate.[9]

Responsibility

Sandel argues that genetic engineering increases parental responsibility as "parents become responsible for choosing, or failing to choose, the right traits for their children"[9], as genes become a matter of choice rather than a matter of chance. Sandel illustrates this argument through the lens of sports: in athletics, undesirable outcomes are often attributed to extrinsic values such as lack of preparation or lapse in discipline. With the introduction of genetic engineering athletes will bear additional responsibility, as Sandel believes they will be blamed for failing to acquire the intrinsic traits necessary for success. Sandel believes this can be extrapolated to society as a whole: individuals will be forced to shoulder more responsibility for deficiencies in the face of increased genetic choice.[9]

Solidarity

Sandel points out that without genetic engineering, a genetic lottery exists. For example, we do not have knowledge of whether we will remain healthy or not. Insurance markets allow a pooling of risk for the benefit of all: those who turn out to be healthy subsidise those who are not. This could be phrased more generally as: individual success is not fully determined by that individual or their parents, as genetic traits are to some extent randomly assigned from a collective pool. Sandel argues that, because we all face the same risks, social insurance schemes that rely on a sense of solidarity are possible. However, genetic enhancement gives individuals perfect genetic knowledge and increased resistance to some diseases. Enhanced individuals would not opt into such a system, because it would involve guaranteed losses for them. They would feel no debt to their community, and social solidarity (shared support in the face of uncertainty) would disappear.[9]

Leon Kass' arguments

In the paper “Ageless Bodies, Happy Souls: Biotechnology and the Pursuit of Perfection”[13] , Leon Kass argues for bioconservatism. It was first delivered as a lecture at the Washington D.C. Ethics and Public Policy Center and later published as an article in The Atlantic. Although it was written during the time when Kass chaired the President's Council on Bioethics, the views expressed are his own, and not those of the Council.[14]

In brief, he argues that for three main reasons there is something wrong with biotechnological enhancement. Kass calls them the arguments of “the attitude of mastery”, “‘unnatural’ means” and “dubious ends”.

Before he turns to these arguments, he focuses on the distinction between "therapy" and "enhancement". While therapy has the aim of (re-)establishing the state of what could be considered as "normal" (e.g. abortion, replacement of organs), enhancement gives people an advantage over the "normal workings" of the human body (e.g. immortality). On the basis of this distinction, Kass argues, most people would support therapy, but remain sceptical towards enhancement. However, he believes this distinction is not clear, since it is hard to tell where therapy stops and enhancement begins. One reason he gives is that the "normal workings" of the human body cannot be unambiguously defined: Someone may be born with perfect pitch, another deaf.

Bostrom and Roache reply directly to this by giving a counterargument, which basically suggests that if one tries to extend a life, they are essentially saving it. Hence, one would believe it is morally permissible to save lives, given no harm is caused as a result of their actions. [15] [16]

The problematic attitude of biotechnological enhancement

One of Leon Kass' main arguments on this matter concerns the attitude of 'mastery'. With this, Kass implies that although the means are present to modify human nature (both body and mind), the ends remain unknown, filled with unintended consequences.

"The human body and mind, highly complex and delicately

balanced as a result of eons of gradual and exacting evolution, are almost certainly

at risk from any ill-considered attempt at 'improvement'."[17]

Due to the unawareness of the goodness of potential ends, Kass claims this not to be mastery at all. Instead, we are acting on the momentary whims that nature exposes us to, effectively making it impossible for humanity to escape from the "grip of our own nature".[17]

Kass builds on Sandel's (2009) [18] argument that transhumanists fail to properly recognise the 'giftedness' of the world. He agrees that this idea is useful in that it should teach us an attitude of modesty, restraint and humility but believes it will not by itself sufficiently indicate which things can be manipulated and which should be left untouched. Therefore, Kass additionally proposes that we must also respect the 'givenness' of species-specified natures - 'given' in the sense of something fixed and specified.

'Unnatural' means of biotechnological enhancement

Kass argues that biotechnological enhancement is cheating or ‘cheap’[19], because it undermines the feeling of having worked hard to achieve something. He writes, “The naturalness of means matters. It lies not in the fact that the assisting drugs and devices are artifacts, but in the danger of violating or deforming the deep structure of natural human activity.”[20] By nature, there is “an experiential and intelligible connection between means and ends.”[21]

The struggles one has to go through to achieve excellence "is not only the source of our deeds, but also their product."[22] In other words, it builds character. However, using biotechnology as a shortcut does not build character but instead, erodes self-control. This can be seen in how confronting fearful things might eventually enable us to cope with our fears, unlike a pill which merely prevents us from experiencing fear and thereby doesn’t help us overcome it. As Kass writes, "people who take pills to block out from memory the painful or hateful aspects of new experience will not learn how to deal with suffering or sorrow. A drug to induce fearlessness does not produce courage."[22] He contends that there is a necessity in having limited biotechnological enhancement for humans as it recognises giftedness and forges humility.

Kass notes that while there are biological interventions that may assist in the pursuit of excellence without cheapening its attainment, "partly because many of life's excellences have nothing to do with competition or adversity," (e.g. "drugs to decrease drowsiness or increase alertness... may actually help people in their natural pursuits of learning or painting or performing their civic duty,"[23]) "the point is less the exertions of good character against hardship, but the manifestation of an alert and self-experiencing agent making his deeds flow intentionally from his willing, knowing, and embodied soul."[24] Kass argues that we need to have an "intelligible connection" between means and ends in order to call our bodies, minds, and transformations genuinely ours.

'Dubious' ends of biotechnological enhancement

The case for ageless bodies is that the prevention of decay, decline, and disability, the avoidance of blindness, deafness, and debility, the elimination of feebleness, frailty, and fatigue, are conducive to living fully as a human being at the top of one’s powers, and a “good quality of life” from beginning to end.

However, Kass argues that human limitation is what gives the opportunity for happiness. Firstly, he argues that "a concern with one's own improving agelessness is finally incompatible with accepting the need for procreation and human renewal."[25] This creates a world "hostile to children," and arguably "increasingly dominated by anxiety over health and the fear of death."[26] This is because the existence of decline and decay is precisely what allows us to accept mortality. The hostility towards children is resultant of the redundancy of new generations to the progression of the human species, given infinite lifespan; progression and evolution of the human race would no longer arise from procreation and succession, but from the engineered enhancement of existing generations. Secondly, He explains that one needs to grieve in order to love, and that one must feel lack to be capable of aspiration.

"[...] human fulfillment depends on our being creatures of need and finitude and hence of longings and attachment." [27]

Finally, Kass warns, "the engaged and energetic being-at-work of what uniquely gave to us is what we need to treasure and defend. All other perfection is at best a passing illusion, at worst a Faustian bargain that will cost us our full and flourishing humanity."[28]

Criticism

The transhumanist Institute for Ethics and Emerging Technologies criticizes bioconservatism as a form of "human racism" (more commonly known as speciesism), and as being motivated by a "yuck factor" that ignores individual freedoms.[29]

Nick Bostrom on posthuman dignity

Nick Bostrom argues that bioconservative concerns as to how transhumanism might threaten posthuman dignity are unsubstantiated. Bostrom himself identifies with forms of posthuman dignity, and in his article In Defence of Posthuman Dignity, argues that such does not run in contradiction with the ideals of transhumanism.

Bostrom argues in the article that Francis Fukuyama's concerns about the threats transhumanism pose to dignity as moral status, that transhumanism might strip away humanity's inalienable right of respect, is lacking empirical evidence. He states that the proportion of people given full moral respect in Western societies has actually increased through history. This increase includes such populations as non-whites, women and non-property owners. Following this logic, it will similarly be feasible to incorporate future posthumans without compensating the dignities of the rest of the population.[30]

Bostrom then went on to discuss dignity in the sense of moral worthiness, which differs between individuals. He suggests that posthumans can similarly possess dignity in this sense. Further, he suggests, it is possible that posthumans, being genetically enhanced, may come to possess even higher levels of moral excellence than contemporary human beings. While he considered that certain posthumans may deliberately transform themselves to live more degraded lives, he also notes that many people contemporarily are not living worthy lives either. He has found this regrettable and suggests that countermeasures as education and cultural reform can be helpful in curtailing such practices. Having said that, Bostrom maintains the morphological and reproductive freedoms of human beings, suggesting that ultimately, leading whatever life one aspires should be an unalienable right.[30]

Reproductive freedom means that parents should be free to choose the technological enhancements they want when having a child. According to Bostrom, there is no reason to prefer the random processes of nature over human design (instantiated by the parents). He dismisses claims that see this kind of operations as 'tiranny' of the parents over the children-to-be. In his opinion, the tiranny of nature is no different. In fact, he claims that "Had Mother Nature been a real parent, she would have been in jail for child abuse and murder" [31]

Earlier in the paper, Bostrom also replies to Leon Kass with the claim that, in his words, 'nature's gifts are sometimes poisoned and should not always be accepted'. He makes the point that nature cannot be relied upon for normative standards. Instead, he suggests that transhumanism can, over time, allow for the technical improvement of 'human nature', consistent with our widely held societal morals.[32]

According to Bostrom, the way that bioconservatives justify banning certain human enhancements while not others, reveal the double standard that is present in this line of thought. For him, this is the consequences of a misleading conception of human dignity, rooted in the view of human nature as an intrinsic, unmodifiable set of properties. This problem, he argues, is overcome when human nature is conceived as 'dynamic, partially human-made, and improvable'. If we acknowledge that social and technological factors influence our nature, then dignity 'consists in what we are and what we have the potential to become, not in our pedigree or social origin'.[31] It can be seen, then, than improved capabilities does not affect moral status, and that we should sustain an inclusive view that recognize our enhanced descendants as possessors of dignity. For transhumanists 'there is no need to behave as if there were deep moral difference between technological and other means of enhancing human lives'[31].

Distinguishing between types of enhacement

Bostrom discusses a criticism levelled against transhumanists by bioconservatives, that children who are biologically enhanced by certain kinds of technologies will face psychological anguish because of the enhancement.[31]

  1. Prenatal enhancements may create expectations for the individual’s future traits or behaviour.
  2. If the individual learns of these enhancements, this is likely to cause them psychological anguish stemming from pressure to fulfil such expectations.
  3. Actions which are likely to cause individuals psychological anguish are undesirable to the point of being morally reprehensible.
  4. Therefore, prenatal enhancements are morally reprehensible.

Bostrom finds that bioconservatives rely on a false dichotomy between technological enhancements that are harmful and those that are not, thus challenging premise two.[31] Bostrom argues that children whose mothers played Mozart to them in the womb would not face psychological anguish upon discovering that their musical talents had been “prenatally programmed by her parents”.[33] However, he finds that bioconservative writers often employ analogous arguments to the contrary demonstrating that technological enhancements, rather than playing mozart in the womb, could potentially disturb children.

Notable bioconservatives

  • George Annas
  • Dale Carrico
  • Francis Fukuyama
  • Leon Kass
  • Bill McKibben
  • Oliver O'Donovan
  • Jeremy Rifkin
  • Wesley Smith

See also

  • Bioluddism
  • Posthumanization
  • Techno-progressivism
  • Transhumanism

References

1. ^Huesemann, Michael H., and Joyce A. Huesemann (2011). Technofix: Why Technology Won’t Save Us or the Environment, New Society Publishers, Gabriola Island, British Columbia, Canada, {{ISBN|0865717044}}, 464 pp.
2. ^Mander, Jerry (1991). ‘’In the Absence of the Sacred: The Failure of Technology and the Survival of the Indian Nations,’’, Sierra Club Books, San Francisco, California.
3. ^Rifkin, Jeremy (1998). ‘’The Biotech Century: Harnessing the Gene and Remaking the World,’’ Jeremy P. Tarcher/Putnam, New York, New York.
4. ^Shiva, Vandana (2000). ‘’Stolen Harvest: The Hijacking of the Global Food Supply,’’ South End Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
5. ^{{cite journal| author = Carrico, Dale| title = The Trouble with "Transhumanism": Part Two| date = 2004 | url = http://ieet.org/index.php/IEET/more/carrico20041222/| accessdate=2007-01-28| authorlink = Dale Carrico}}
6. ^{{cite journal| author = Carrico, Dale| title = Technoprogressivism Beyond Technophilia and Technophobia| date = 2005 | url = http://ieet.org/index.php/IEET/more/carrico20060812/| accessdate=2007-01-28}}
7. ^{{Cite journal|first1=Nick|last1=Bostrom|date=June 1, 2005|title=In defense of posthuman dignity|journal=Bioethics|volume=19|issue=3|pages=202–214|doi=10.1111/j.1467-8519.2005.00437.x}}
8. ^{{Cite journal|last=Kass|first=Leon|date=Spring 2003|title=Ageless Bodies, Happy Souls: Biotechnology and the Pursuit of Perfection|url=|journal=The New Atlantis|volume=|pages=19|via=LSE Moodle}}
9. ^1 2 3 4 5 6 7 {{Cite web|url=https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2004/04/the-case-against-perfection/302927/|title=The Case Against Perfection|first=Michael J.|last=Sandel|date=April 1, 2004|website=The Atlantic}}
10. ^{{Cite book|url=https://books.google.co.uk/books?hl=en&lr=&id=rz5LlQxMoO0C&oi=fnd&pg=PA1&ots=BQElNv8eH2&sig=tdz9LrzkoV8TaVCO5KocN4rETnA&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q&f=false|title=The Case against Perfection|last=Sandel|first=Michael J.|date=2009-06-30|publisher=Harvard University Press|isbn=9780674043060|language=en}}
11. ^{{Cite journal|last=Douglas|first=Thomas|date=2008|title=Moral Enhancement|url=https://philpapers.org/rec/DOUME|journal=Journal of Applied Philosophy|volume=25|issue=3|pages=228–245}}
12. ^{{Cite journal|last=Savulescu|first=Julian|last2=Kahane|first2=Guy|date=2009|title=The Moral Obligation to Create Children with the Best Chance of the Best Life|url=https://philpapers.org/rec/SAVTMO|journal=Bioethics|volume=23|issue=5|pages=274–290}}
13. ^{{Cite web|url=https://www.thenewatlantis.com/publications/ageless-bodies-happy-souls|title=Ageless Bodies, Happy Souls: Biotechnology and the Pursuit of Perfection|first=Leon|last=Kass|date=Spring 2003|website=The Atlantic}}
14. ^{{Cite journal|last=Kass|first=Leon|date=Spring 2003|title=Ageless Bodies, Happy Souls: Biotechnology and the Pursuit of Perfection|url=|journal=The New Atlantis|volume=|pages=9|via=}}
15. ^{{cite book |last1=Bostrom |first1=Nick |title=In Defense of Posthuman Dignity |date=2005 |publisher=Blackwell Publishing |location=9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK |pages=202-214}}
16. ^{{cite book |last1=Bostrom and Roache |first1=Nick and Rebecca |title=Ethical issues in human enhancement |date=2008 |page=120-152}}
17. ^1 {{cite journal |last1=Kass |first1=Leon |title=Ageless Bodies, Happy Souls: Biotechnology and the Pursuit of Perfection |journal=The New Atlantis - A Journal of Technology & Society |date=2003 |volume=9}}
18. ^{{cite book |last1=Sandel |first1=Michael |title=The Case against Perfection: Ethics in the Age of Genetic Engineering |date=2009 |publisher=Belknap Press |pages=26-27 |edition=1st}}
19. ^{{Cite journal|last=Kass|first=Leon|date=Spring 2003|title=Ageless Bodies, Happy Souls: Biotechnology and the Pursuit of Perfection|url=|journal=The New Atlantis|volume=|pages=23|via=LSE Moodle}}
20. ^{{cite journal |last1=Kass |first1=Leon |title=Ageless Bodies, Happy Souls: Biotechnology and the Pursuit of Perfection |journal=The New Atlantis |date=2003 |page=22}
21. ^{{cite journal |last1=Kass |first1=Leon |title=Ageless Bodies, Happy Souls: Biotechnology and the Pursuit of Perfection |journal=The New Atlantis |date=2003 |page=22}
22. ^1 {{Cite journal|last=Kass|first=Leon|date=Spring 2003|title=Ageless Bodies, Happy Souls: Biotechnology and the Pursuit of Perfection|url=|journal=The New Atlantis|volume=|pages=21|via=}}
23. ^{{Cite journal|last=Kass|first=Leon|date=Spring 2003|title=Ageless Bodies, Happy Souls: Biotechnology and the Pursuit of Perfection|url=|journal=The New Atlantis|volume=|pages=21|via=}}
24. ^{{Cite journal|last=Kass|first=Leon|date=Spring 2003|title=Ageless Bodies, Happy Souls: Biotechnology and the Pursuit of Perfection|url=|journal=The New Atlantis|volume=|pages=23|via=}}
25. ^{{Cite journal|last=Kass|first=Leon|date=Spring 2003|title=Ageless Bodies, Happy Souls: Biotechnology and the Pursuit of Perfection|url=|journal=The New Atlantis|volume=|pages=25|via=}}
26. ^{{Cite journal|last=Kass|first=Leon|date=Spring 2003|title=Ageless Bodies, Happy Souls: Biotechnology and the Pursuit of Perfection|url=|journal=The New Atlantis|volume=|pages=26|via=}}
27. ^{{Cite journal|last=Kass|first=Leon|date=Spring 2003|title=Ageless Bodies, Happy Souls: Biotechnology and the Pursuit of Perfection|url=|journal=The New Atlantis|volume=|pages=27|via=}}
28. ^{{Cite journal|last=Kass|first=Leon|date=Spring 2003|title=Ageless Bodies, Happy Souls: Biotechnology and the Pursuit of Perfection|url=|journal=The New Atlantis|volume=|pages=28|via=}}
29. ^{{cite web|url=https://ieet.org/index.php/tpwiki/Bioconservative/|title=Bioconservative|publisher=Institute for Ethics and Emerging Technologies|access-date=August 25, 2017}}
30. ^1 {{Cite journal|last=Bostrom|first=Nick|date=2005|title=In defense of posthuman dignity|url=https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/16167401|journal=Bioethics|volume=19|issue=3|pages=202–214|issn=0269-9702|pmid=16167401|via=}}
31. ^1 2 3 4 Bostrom, Nick. "In defense of posthuman dignity." Bioethics 19.3 (2005): 202-214.
32. ^{{cite journal|first=Nick |last=Bostrom|author-mask=— |date=2005 |journal=Bioethics |title=In Defense of Posthuman Dignity}}
33. ^{{Cite journal|last=Bostrom|first=Nick|date=|title=In Defence of Posthuman Dignity|url=|journal=Blackwell Publishing|volume=19|pages=212|via=LSE Moodle}}

External links

  • [https://nickbostrom.com/ethics/dignity.html Nick Bostrom, "In defense of posthuman dignity", full text]

2 : Political ideologies|Transhumanism
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