请输入您要查询的百科知识：

　

词条 Cognitive bias
释义

  1. Overview

  2. Types

     List 

  3. Practical significance

  4. Reducing

  5. Common theoretical causes of some cognitive biases

  6. Individual differences in decision making biases

  7. Criticisms

  8. References

  9. Further reading

  10. External links

{{See also | List of cognitive biases | Cognitive bias in animals}}{{merge from|Cognitive bias mitigation|discuss=Talk:Cognitive bias#Proposed merge with Cognitive bias mitigation|date=December 2018}}{{psychology sidebar}}

A cognitive bias is a systematic pattern of deviation from norm or rationality in judgment.[1] Individuals create their own "subjective social reality" from their perception of the input. An individual's construction of social reality, not the objective input, may dictate their behaviour in the social world.[2] Thus, cognitive biases may sometimes lead to perceptual distortion, inaccurate judgment, illogical interpretation, or what is broadly called irrationality.[3][4][5]

Some cognitive biases are presumably adaptive. Cognitive biases may lead to more effective actions in a given context.[6] Furthermore, allowing cognitive biases enable faster decisions which can be desirable when timeliness is more valuable than accuracy, as illustrated in heuristics.[7] Other cognitive biases are a "by-product" of human processing limitations,[8] resulting from a lack of appropriate mental mechanisms (bounded rationality), or simply from a limited capacity for information processing.[9][10]

A continually evolving list of cognitive biases has been identified over the last six decades of research on human judgment and decision-making in cognitive science, social psychology, and behavioral economics. Kahneman and Tversky (1996) argue that cognitive biases have efficient practical implications for areas including clinical judgment, entrepreneurship, finance, and management.[11][12]

Overview

Bias arises from various processes that are sometimes difficult to distinguish. These include

  • information-processing shortcuts (heuristics)[13]
  • noisy information processing (distortions in the process of storage in and retrieval from memory)[14]
  • the brain's limited information processing capacity[14]
  • emotional and moral motivations[15]
  • social influence[16]

The notion of cognitive biases was introduced by Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman in 1972[17] and grew out of their experience of people's innumeracy, or inability to reason intuitively with the greater orders of magnitude. Tversky, Kahneman and colleagues demonstrated several replicable ways in which human judgments and decisions differ from rational choice theory. Tversky and Kahneman explained human differences in judgement and decision making in terms of heuristics. Heuristics involve mental shortcuts which provide swift estimates about the possibility of uncertain occurrences.[19] Heuristics are simple for the brain to compute but sometimes introduce "severe and systematic errors."[7]

For example, the representativeness heuristic is defined as the tendency to "judge the frequency or likelihood" of an occurrence by the extent of which the event "resembles the typical case".[18] The "Linda Problem" illustrates the representativeness heuristic (Tversky & Kahneman, 1983[19]). Participants were given a description of "Linda" that suggests Linda might well be a feminist (e.g., she is said to be concerned about discrimination and social justice issues). They were then asked whether they thought Linda was more likely to be a "(a) bank teller" or a "(b) bank teller and active in the feminist movement". A majority chose answer (b). This error (mathematically, answer (b) cannot be more likely than answer (a)) is an example of the "conjunction fallacy"; Tversky and Kahneman argued that respondents chose (b) because it seemed more "representative" or typical of persons who might fit the description of Linda. The representativeness heuristic may lead to errors such as activating stereotypes and inaccurate judgments of others (Haselton et al., 2005, p. 726).

Alternatively, critics of Kahneman and Tversky such as Gerd Gigerenzer argue that heuristics should not lead us to conceive of human thinking as riddled with irrational cognitive biases, but rather to conceive rationality as an adaptive tool that is not identical to the rules of formal logic or the probability calculus.[20] Nevertheless, experiments such as the "Linda problem" grew into heuristics and biases research programs, which spread beyond academic psychology into other disciplines including medicine and political science.

Types

Biases can be distinguished on a number of dimensions.

For example,

  • there are biases specific to groups (such as the risky shift) as well as biases at the individual level.
  • Some biases affect decision-making, where the desirability of options has to be considered (e.g., sunk costs fallacy).
  • Others such as illusory correlation affect judgment of how likely something is, or of whether one thing is the cause of another.
  • A distinctive class of biases affect memory,[21] such as consistency bias (remembering one's past attitudes and behavior as more similar to one's present attitudes).

Some biases reflect a subject's motivation,[22] for example, the desire for a positive self-image leading to egocentric bias and the avoidance of unpleasant cognitive dissonance.[23] Other biases are due to the particular way the brain perceives, forms memories and makes judgments. This distinction is sometimes described as "hot cognition" versus "cold cognition", as motivated reasoning can involve a state of arousal.

Among the "cold" biases,

  • some are due to ignoring relevant information (e.g., neglect of probability).
  • some involve a decision or judgement being affected by irrelevant information (for example the framing effect where the same problem receives different responses depending on how it is described; or the distinction bias where choices presented together have different outcomes than those presented separately).
  • others give excessive weight to an unimportant but salient feature of the problem (e.g., anchoring).

The fact that some biases reflect motivation, and in particular the motivation to have positive attitudes to oneself[23] accounts for the fact that many biases are self-serving or self-directed (e.g., illusion of asymmetric insight, self-serving bias). There are also biases in how subjects evaluate in-groups or out-groups; evaluating in-groups as more diverse and "better" in many respects, even when those groups are arbitrarily-defined (ingroup bias, outgroup homogeneity bias).

Some cognitive biases belong to the subgroup of attentional biases which refer to the paying of increased attention to certain stimuli. It has been shown, for example, that people addicted to alcohol and other drugs pay more attention to drug-related stimuli. Common psychological tests to measure those biases are the Stroop task[24][25] and the dot probe task.

Individuals' susceptibility to some types of cognitive biases can be measured by the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) developed by Frederick (2005).[26][27]

List

{{main|List of cognitive biases}}

The following is a list of the more commonly studied cognitive biases:

Name Description
Fundamental attribution error (FAE) Also known as the correspondence bias [32] is the tendency for people to over-emphasize personality-based explanations for behaviours observed in others. At the same time, individuals under-emphasize the role and power of situational influences on the same behaviour. Jones and Harris' (1967)[28] classic study illustrates the FAE. Despite being made aware that the target's speech direction (pro-Castro/anti-Castro) was assigned to the writer, participants ignored the situational pressures and attributed pro-Castro attitudes to the writer when the speech represented such attitudes.
Priming biasThe tendency to be influenced by what someone else has said to create preconceived idea.
Confirmation bias The tendency to search for or interpret information in a way that confirms one's preconceptions. In addition, individuals may discredit information that does not support their views.[29] The confirmation bias is related to the concept of cognitive dissonance. Whereby, individuals may reduce inconsistency by searching for information which re-confirms their views (Jermias, 2001, p. 146).[30]
Affinity biasThe tendency to be biased toward people like ourselves
Self-serving bias The tendency to claim more responsibility for successes than failures. It may also manifest itself as a tendency for people to evaluate ambiguous information in a way beneficial to their interests.
Belief bias When one's evaluation of the logical strength of an argument is biased by their belief in the truth or falsity of the conclusion.
Framing Using a too-narrow approach and description of the situation or issue.
Hindsight bias Sometimes called the "I-knew-it-all-along" effect, is the inclination to see past events as being predictable.

A 2012 Psychological Bulletin article suggests that at least 8 seemingly unrelated biases can be produced by the same information-theoretic generative mechanism.[14] It is shown that noisy deviations in the memory-based information processes that convert objective evidence (observations) into subjective estimates (decisions) can produce regressive conservatism, the belief revision (Bayesian conservatism), illusory correlations, illusory superiority (better-than-average effect) and worse-than-average effect, subadditivity effect, exaggerated expectation, overconfidence, and the hard–easy effect.

Practical significance

{{further|Confirmation bias#Consequences}}

Many social institutions rely on individuals to make rational judgments.

The securities regulation regime largely assumes that all investors act as perfectly rational persons. In truth, actual investors face cognitive limitations from biases, heuristics, and framing effects.

A fair jury trial, for example, requires that the jury ignore irrelevant features of the case, weigh the relevant features appropriately, consider different possibilities open-mindedly and resist fallacies such as appeal to emotion. The various biases demonstrated in these psychological experiments suggest that people will frequently fail to do all these things.[31] However, they fail to do so in systematic, directional ways that are predictable.[5]

Cognitive biases are also related to the persistence of superstition, to large social issues such as prejudice, and they also work as a hindrance in the acceptance of scientific non-intuitive knowledge by the public.[32]

However, in some academic disciplines, the study of bias is very popular. For instance, bias is a wide spread phenomenon and well studied, because most decisions that concern the minds and hearts of entrepreneurs are computationally intractable[12]

Reducing

{{main|Cognitive bias mitigation| Cognitive bias modification}}

Because they cause systematic errors, cognitive biases cannot be compensated for using a wisdom of the crowd technique of averaging answers from several people.[33] Debiasing is the reduction of biases in judgment and decision making through incentives, nudges, and training. Cognitive bias mitigation and cognitive bias modification are forms of debiasing specifically applicable to cognitive biases and their effects. Reference class forecasting is a method for systematically debiasing estimates and decisions, based on what Daniel Kahneman has dubbed the outside view.

Similar to Gigerenzer (1996),[34] Haselton et al. (2005) state the content and direction of cognitive biases are not "arbitrary" (p. 730).[8] Moreover, cognitive biases can be controlled. One debiasing technique aims to decrease biases by encouraging individuals to use controlled processing compared to automatic processing.[35] In relation to reducing the FAE, monetary incentives[36] and informing participants they will be held accountable for their attributions[37] have been linked to the increase of accurate attributions. Training has also shown to reduce cognitive bias. Morewedge and colleagues (2015) found that research participants exposed to one-shot training interventions, such as educational videos and debiasing games that taught mitigating strategies, exhibited significant reductions in their commission of six cognitive biases immediately and up to 3 months later.[38]

Cognitive bias modification refers to the process of modifying cognitive biases in healthy people and also refers to a growing area of psychological (non-pharmaceutical) therapies for anxiety, depression and addiction called cognitive bias modification therapy (CBMT). CBMT is sub-group of therapies within a growing area of psychological therapies based on modifying cognitive processes with or without accompanying medication and talk therapy, sometimes referred to as applied cognitive processing therapies (ACPT). Although cognitive bias modification can refer to modifying cognitive processes in healthy individuals, CBMT is a growing area of evidence-based psychological therapy, in which cognitive processes are modified to relieve suffering[39][40] from serious depression,[41] anxiety,[42] and addiction.[43] CBMT techniques are technology assisted therapies that are delivered via a computer with or without clinician support. CBM combines evidence and theory from the cognitive model of anxiety,[44] cognitive neuroscience,[45] and attentional models.[46]

Common theoretical causes of some cognitive biases

  • Bounded rationality – limits on optimization and rationality
    • Prospect theory
    • Mental accounting
    • Adaptive bias – basing decisions on limited information and biasing them based on the costs of being wrong
  • Attribute substitution – making a complex, difficult judgment by unconsciously substituting it by an easier judgment[47]
  • Attribution theory
    • Salience
    • Naïve realism
  • Cognitive dissonance, and related:
    • Impression management
    • Self-perception theory
  • Heuristics in judgment and decision making, including:
    • Availability heuristic – estimating what is more likely by what is more available in memory, which is biased toward vivid, unusual, or emotionally charged examples[57]
    • Representativeness heuristic – judging probabilities on the basis of resemblance[48]
    • Affect heuristic – basing a decision on an emotional reaction rather than a calculation of risks and benefits[49]
  • Some theories of emotion such as:
    • Two-factor theory of emotion
    • Somatic markers hypothesis
  • Introspection illusion
  • Misinterpretations or misuse of statistics; innumeracy.

A 2012 Psychological Bulletin article suggested that at least eight seemingly unrelated biases can be produced by the same information-theoretic generative mechanism that assumes noisy information processing during storage and retrieval of information in human memory.[50]

Individual differences in decision making biases

People do appear to have stable individual differences in their susceptibility to decision biases such as overconfidence, temporal discounting, and bias blind spot.[51] That said, these stable levels of bias within individuals are possible to change. Participants in experiments who watched training videos and played debiasing games showed medium to large reductions both immediately and up to three months later in the extent to which they exhibited susceptibility to six cognitive biases: anchoring, bias blind spot, confirmation bias, fundamental attribution error, projection bias, and representativeness.[52]

Criticisms

There are criticisms against theories of cognitive biases based on the fact that both sides in a debate often claim each other's thoughts to be in human nature and the result of cognitive bias, while claiming their own viewpoint as being the correct way to "overcome" cognitive bias. This is not due simply to debate misconduct but is a more fundamental problem that stems from psychology's making up of multiple opposed cognitive bias theories that can be non-falsifiably used to explain away any viewpoint.[53]{{page needed|date=April 2017}}{{verify source|date=April 2017}}[54]{{page needed|date=April 2017}}{{verify source|date=April 2017}}

==See also==

{{Portal|Psychology|Thinking}}{{Div col|colwidth=15em}}
  • Cognitive bias mitigation
  • Cognitive bias modification
  • Cognitive dissonance
  • Cognitive distortion
  • Cognitive psychology
  • Cognitive traps for intelligence analysis
  • Critical thinking
  • Cultural cognition
  • Emotional bias
  • Evolutionary psychology
  • Expectation bias
  • Fallacy
  • False consensus effect
  • Implicit stereotype
  • Jumping to conclusions
  • List of cognitive biases
  • Magical thinking
  • Prejudice
  • Presumption of guilt
  • Rationality
  • Systemic bias
  • Theory-ladenness
{{Div col end}}

References

1. ^{{cite book|author1=Haselton, M. G. |author2=Nettle, D. |author3=Andrews, P. W. |last-author-amp=yes |title=The evolution of cognitive bias.|year=2005|publisher=Hoboken, NJ, US: John Wiley & Sons Inc|location=In D. M. Buss (Ed.), The Handbook of Evolutionary Psychology|pages=724–746| url=http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/comm/haselton/papers/downloads/handbookevpsych.pdf}}
2. ^{{cite book|author1=Bless, H. |author2=Fiedler, K. |author3=Strack, F. |last-author-amp=yes |title=Social cognition: How individuals construct social reality|year=2004|publisher=Hove and New York: Psychology Press}}
3. ^{{cite journal |last=Kahneman |first=D. |last2=Tversky |first2=A. |year=1972 |title=Subjective probability: A judgment of representativeness |journal=Cognitive Psychology |volume=3 |issue=3 |pages=430–454 |doi=10.1016/0010-0285(72)90016-3| url=http://datacolada.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/Kahneman-Tversky-1972.pdf}}
4. ^Baron, J. (2007). Thinking and Deciding (4th ed.). New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
5. ^1 {{cite book| last=Ariely |first=Dan |authorlink=Dan Ariely| year=2008| title=Predictably Irrational: The Hidden Forces That Shape Our Decisions| location=New York, NY| publisher=HarperCollins |isbn=978-0-06-135323-9|title-link=Predictably Irrational }}
6. ^For instance: {{cite journal|author1=Gigerenzer, G. |author2=Goldstein, D. G.|title=Reasoning the fast and frugal way: Models of bounded rationality.|journal=Psychological Review|year=1996|volume=103|pages=650–669|doi=10.1037/0033-295X.103.4.650|pmid=8888650|issue=4|url=http://library.mpib-berlin.mpg.de/ft/gg/gg_reasoning_1996.pdf|citeseerx=10.1.1.174.4404}}
7. ^1 {{cite journal|author1=Tversky, A. |author2=Kahneman, D. |last-author-amp=yes |title=Judgement under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases|journal=Science|year=1974|volume=185|pages=1124–1131|doi=10.1126/science.185.4157.1124|pmid=17835457|issue=4157|bibcode=1974Sci...185.1124T }}
8. ^1 {{cite book|author1=Haselton, M. G. |author2=Nettle, D. |author3=Andrews, P. W. |last-author-amp=yes |title=The evolution of cognitive bias|year=2005|publisher=Hoboken, NJ, US: John Wiley & Sons Inc.|location=In D. M. Buss (Ed.), The Handbook of Evolutionary Psychology|pages=724–746}}
9. ^{{cite book|author1=Bless, H. |author2=Fiedler, K. |author3=Strack, F. |last-author-amp=yes |title=Social cognition: How individuals construct social reality.|year=2004|publisher=Hove and New York: Psychology Press.}}
10. ^{{Cite journal|title = Associative processes in intuitive judgment|journal = Trends in Cognitive Sciences|date = 2010-01-10|issn = 1364-6613|pmid = 20696611|pages = 435–440|volume = 14|issue = 10|doi = 10.1016/j.tics.2010.07.004|first = Carey K.|last = Morewedge|first2 = Daniel|last2 = Kahneman|pmc = 5378157}}
11. ^{{cite journal|author1=Kahneman, D. |author2=Tversky, A. |last-author-amp=yes |title=On the reality of cognitive illusions|journal=Psychological Review|year=1996|volume=103|issue=3|pages=582–591|doi=10.1037/0033-295X.103.3.582|pmid=8759048|url=http://psy.ucsd.edu/%7Emckenzie/KahnemanTversky1996PsychRev.pdf|citeseerx=10.1.1.174.5117 }}
12. ^1 {{cite journal |author1=S.X. Zhang |author2=J. Cueto |title=The Study of Bias in Entrepreneurship |journal= Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice |volume=41 |issue=3 |pages=419–454 |doi= 10.1111/etap.12212 |year=2015 }}
13. ^Kahneman, D., Slovic, P., & Tversky, A. (1982). Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases (1st ed.). Cambridge University Press.
14. ^{{cite journal | last1 = Simon | first1 = H. A. | year = 1955 | title = A behavioral model of rational choice | url = | journal = The Quarterly Journal of Economics | volume = 69 | issue = 1| pages = 99–118 | doi = 10.2307/1884852 | jstor = 1884852 }}
15. ^{{cite journal | last1 = Pfister | first1 = H.-R. | last2 = Böhm | first2 = G. | year = 2008 | title = The multiplicity of emotions: A framework of emotional functions in decision making | url = | journal = Judgment and Decision Making | volume = 3 | issue = | pages = 5–17 }}
16. ^{{cite journal | last1 = Wang | first1 = X. T. | last2 = Simons | first2 = F. | last3 = Brédart | first3 = S. | year = 2001 | title = Social cues and verbal framing in risky choice | url = | journal = Journal of Behavioral Decision Making | volume = 14 | issue = 1| pages = 1–15 | doi = 10.1002/1099-0771(200101)14:1<1::AID-BDM361>3.0.CO;2-N }}
17. ^{{cite book |last=Kahneman |first=Daniel |author2=Shane Frederick |title=Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment |editor=Thomas Gilovich |editor2=Dale Griffin |editor3=Daniel Kahneman |publisher=Cambridge University Press |location=Cambridge |year=2002 |pages=51–52 |chapter=Representativeness Revisited: Attribute Substitution in Intuitive Judgment |isbn=978-0-521-79679-8}}
18. ^1 {{cite book|author1=Baumeister, R. F. |author2=Bushman, B. J.|title=Social psychology and human nature: International Edition|year=2010|publisher=Wadsworth|location=Belmont, USA|pages=141}}
19. ^{{cite journal|author1=Tversky, A. |author2=Kahneman, D. |last-author-amp=yes |title=Extensional versus intuitive reasoning: The conjunction fallacy in probability judgement|journal=Psychological Review|year=1983|volume=90|issue=4 |pages=293–315|doi=10.1037/0033-295X.90.4.293|url=http://psy.ucsd.edu/%7Emckenzie/TverskyKahneman1983PsychRev.pdf}}
20. ^{{cite book |last=Gigerenzer |first=G. |chapter=Bounded and Rational |editor-first=R. J. |editor-last=Stainton |title=Contemporary Debates in Cognitive Science |location= |publisher=Blackwell |year=2006 |page=129 |isbn=978-1-4051-1304-5 }}
21. ^{{Cite journal |author=Schacter, D.L. |year=1999 |title=The Seven Sins of Memory: Insights From Psychology and Cognitive Neuroscience |journal=American Psychologist |volume=54 |issue=3 |pages=182–203 |doi=10.1037/0003-066X.54.3.182 |pmid=10199218 |postscript=}}
22. ^{{Cite journal |author=Kunda, Z. |year=1990 |title=The Case for Motivated Reasoning |journal=Psychological Bulletin |volume=108 |issue=3 |pages= 480–498 |doi=10.1037/0033-2909.108.3.480 |pmid=2270237 |postscript=|url=http://synapse.princeton.edu/~sam/kunda90_psychol_bulletin_the-case-for-motivated-reasoning.pdf }}
23. ^1 {{Cite book |author=Hoorens, V. |year=1993 |contribution=Self-enhancement and Superiority Biases in Social Comparison |title=European Review of Social Psychology 4 |editor=Stroebe, W. |editor2=Hewstone, Miles |publisher=Wiley |postscript=}}
24. ^{{cite journal |vauthors=Jensen AR, Rohwer WD |title=The Stroop color-word test: a review |journal=Acta Psychologica |volume=25 |issue=1 |pages=36–93 |year=1966 |pmid=5328883 |doi=10.1016/0001-6918(66)90004-7}}
25. ^{{cite journal |author=MacLeod CM |title=Half a century of research on the Stroop effect: an integrative review |journal=Psychological Bulletin |volume=109 |issue=2 |pages=163–203 |date=March 1991 |pmid=2034749 |url=http://content.apa.org/journals/bul/109/2/163 |doi=10.1037/0033-2909.109.2.163|citeseerx=10.1.1.475.2563 }}
26. ^{{Cite journal|last=Frederick|first=Shane|date=2005|title=Cognitive Reflection and Decision Making|journal=Journal of Economic Perspectives|language=en|volume=19|issue=4|pages=25–42|doi=10.1257/089533005775196732|issn=0895-3309}}
27. ^{{Cite journal|last=Oechssler|first=Jörg|last2=Roider|first2=Andreas|last3=Schmitz|first3=Patrick W.|date=2009|title=Cognitive abilities and behavioral biases|journal=Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization|volume=72|issue=1|pages=147–152|doi=10.1016/j.jebo.2009.04.018|issn=0167-2681|url=https://epub.uni-regensburg.de/21701/2/roder2.pdf}}
28. ^{{cite journal|author1=Jones, E. E. |author2=Harris, V. A |last-author-amp=yes |title=The attribution of attitudes|journal=Journal of Experimental Social Psychology|year=1967|volume=3|pages=1–24|doi=10.1016/0022-1031(67)90034-0}}
29. ^{{cite journal|last=Mahoney, M. J.|title=Publication prejudices: An experimental study of confirmatory bias in the peer review system|journal=Cognitive Therapy and Research|year=1977|volume=1|issue=2|pages=161–175|doi=10.1007/bf01173636}}
30. ^{{cite journal|last=Jermias, J.|title=Cognitive dissonance and resistance to change: The influence of commitment confirmation and feedback on judgement usefulness of accounting systems|journal=Accounting, Organizations and Society|year=2001|volume=26|issue=2|pages=141–160|doi=10.1016/s0361-3682(00)00008-8}}
31. ^Sutherland, Stuart (2007) Irrationality: The Enemy Within Second Edition (First Edition 1994) Pinter & Martin. {{ISBN|978-1-905177-07-3}}
32. ^{{cite book|title=Motivation in language: studies in honor of Günter Radden|url=https://books.google.com/?id=qzhJ3KpLpQUC&pg=PA275&cd=3&q=essentialism%20definition|author1=Günter Radden |author2=H. Cuyckens |publisher=John Benjamins|year=2003|page=275 | isbn=978-1-58811-426-6}}
33. ^{{cite news |url=https://hbr.org/2019/03/the-feedback-fallacy |title=The Feedback Fallacy |author1=Marcus Buckingham |author2=Ashley Goodall |issue=March-April 2019 |publisher=Harvard Business Review}}
34. ^{{cite journal|last=Gigerenzer, G.|title=On narrow norms and vague heuristics: A reply to Kahneman and Tversky (1996)|journal=Psychological Review|year=1996|volume=103|issue=3|pages=592–596|doi=10.1037/0033-295x.103.3.592|citeseerx=10.1.1.314.996}}
35. ^1 {{cite book|author1=Baumeister, R. F. |author2=Bushman, B. J.|title=Social psychology and human nature: International Edition|year=2010|publisher=Belmont, USA: Wadsworth.}}
36. ^{{cite journal|last=Vonk, R.|title=Effects of outcome dependency on correspondence bias|journal=Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin|year=1999|volume=25|issue=3|pages=382–389|doi=10.1177/0146167299025003009}}
37. ^{{cite journal|last=Tetlock, P. E.|title=Accountability: A social check on the fundamental attribution error|journal=Social Psychology Quarterly|year=1985|volume=48|issue=3|pages=227–236|doi=10.2307/3033683|jstor=3033683}}
38. ^{{Cite journal|title = Debiasing Decisions Improved Decision Making With a Single Training Intervention|url = http://bbs.sagepub.com/content/early/2015/08/12/2372732215600886|journal = Policy Insights from the Behavioral and Brain Sciences|date = 2015-08-13|issn = 2372-7322|pages = 129–140|doi = 10.1177/2372732215600886|first = Carey K.|last = Morewedge|first2 = Haewon|last2 = Yoon|first3 = Irene|last3 = Scopelliti|first4 = Carl W.|last4 = Symborski|first5 = James H.|last5 = Korris|first6 = Karim S.|last6 = Kassam|volume=2}}
39. ^{{cite journal | last1 = MacLeod | first1 = C. | last2 = Mathews | first2 = A. | last3 = Tata | first3 = P. | year = 1986 | title = Attentional Bias in Emotional Disorders | url = | journal = Journal of Abnormal Psychology | volume = 95 | issue = 1| pages = 15–20 | doi=10.1037/0021-843x.95.1.15 | pmid=3700842}}
40. ^{{cite journal | last1 = Bar-Haim | first1 = Y. | last2 = Lamy | first2 = D. | last3 = Pergamin | first3 = L. | last4 = Bakermans-Kranenburg | first4 = M. J. | year = 2007 | title = Threat-related attentional bias in anxious and nonanxious individuals: a meta-analytic study | url = | journal = Psychol Bull | volume = 133 | issue = 1| pages = 1–24 | doi = 10.1037/0033-2909.133.1.1 | pmid=17201568| citeseerx = 10.1.1.324.4312 }}
41. ^{{cite journal | last1 = Holmes | first1 = E. A. | last2 = Lang | first2 = T. J. | last3 = Shah | first3 = D. M. | year = 2009 | title = Developing interpretation bias modification as a "cognitive vaccine" for depressed mood: imagining positive events makes you feel better than thinking about them verbally | url = | journal = J Abnorm Psychol | volume = 118 | issue = 1| pages = 76–88 | doi = 10.1037/a0012590 | pmid = 19222316 }}
42. ^{{cite journal | last1 = Hakamata | first1 = Y. | last2 = Lissek | first2 = S. | last3 = Bar-Haim | first3 = Y. | last4 = Britton | first4 = J. C. | last5 = Fox | first5 = N. A. | last6 = Leibenluft | first6 = E. | last7 = Pine | first7 = D. S. | year = 2010 | title = Attention bias modification treatment: a meta-analysis toward the establishment of novel treatment for anxiety | url = | journal = Biol Psychiatry | volume = 68 | issue = 11| pages = 982–990 | doi = 10.1016/j.biopsych.2010.07.021 | pmid = 20887977 | pmc = 3296778 }}
43. ^{{cite journal | last1 = Eberl | first1 = C. | last2 = Wiers | first2 = R. W. | last3 = Pawelczack | first3 = S. | last4 = Rinck | first4 = M. | last5 = Becker | first5 = E. S. | last6 = Lindenmeyer | first6 = J. | year = 2013 | title = Approach bias modification in alcohol dependence: Do clinical effects replicate and for whom does it work best? | url = | journal = Developmental Cognitive Neuroscience | volume = 4 | pages = 38–51 | doi = 10.1016/j.dcn.2012.11.002 | pmid = 23218805 }}
44. ^Clark, D. A., & Beck, A. T. (2009). Cognitive Therapy of Anxiety Disorders: Science and Practice. London: Guildford.
45. ^{{cite journal | last1 = Browning | first1 = M. | last2 = Holmes | first2 = E. A. | last3 = Murphy | first3 = S. E. | last4 = Goodwin | first4 = G. M. | last5 = Harmer | first5 = C. J. | year = 2010 | title = Lateral prefrontal cortex mediates the cognitive modification of attentional bias | url = | journal = Biol Psychiatry | volume = 67 | issue = 10| pages = 919–925 | doi = 10.1016/j.biopsych.2009.10.031 | pmid=20034617 | pmc=2866253}}
46. ^{{cite journal | last1 = Eysenck | first1 = M. W. | last2 = Derakshan | first2 = N. | last3 = Santos | first3 = R. | last4 = Calvo | first4 = M. G. | year = 2007 | title = Anxiety and cognitive performance: Attentional control theory | url = | journal = Emotion | volume = 7 | issue = 2| pages = 336–353 | doi = 10.1037/1528-3542.7.2.336 | pmid = 17516812 | citeseerx = 10.1.1.453.3592 }}
47. ^{{cite book |last=Kahneman |first=Daniel |author2=Shane Frederick |title=Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment |editor=Thomas Gilovich |editor2=Dale Griffin |editor3=Daniel Kahneman |publisher=Cambridge University Press |location=Cambridge |year=2002 |pages=49–81 |chapter=Representativeness Revisited: Attribute Substitution in Intuitive Judgment |isbn=978-0-521-79679-8 |oclc=47364085}}
48. ^1 {{cite journal |last=Tversky |first=Amos |author2=Daniel Kahneman |date=September 27, 1974 |title=Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases |journal=Science |volume=185 |issue=4157 |pages=1124–1131 |pmid=17835457 |doi=10.1126/science.185.4157.1124 |bibcode=1974Sci...185.1124T }}
49. ^{{cite book |last=Slovic |first=Paul |author2=Melissa Finucane |author3=Ellen Peters |author4=Donald G. MacGregor |chapter=The Affect Heuristic |pages=397–420 |editor=Thomas Gilovich |editor2=Dale Griffin |editor3=Daniel Kahneman |year=2002 |publisher=Cambridge University Press |title=Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment |isbn=978-0-521-79679-8}}
50. ^1 2 {{cite journal|author=Martin Hilbert|year=2012|url=http://www.martinhilbert.net/HilbertPsychBull.pdf|layurl=http://psycnet.apa.org/psycinfo/2011-27261-001|title=Toward a synthesis of cognitive biases: How noisy information processing can bias human decision making|journal=Psychological Bulletin|volume=138|issue=2|pages= 211–237|doi=10.1037/a0025940|pmid=22122235|citeseerx=10.1.1.432.8763}}
51. ^{{Cite journal|title = Bias Blind Spot: Structure, Measurement, and Consequences|journal = Management Science|date = 2015-04-24|doi = 10.1287/mnsc.2014.2096|first = Irene|last = Scopelliti|first2 = Carey K.|last2 = Morewedge|first3 = Erin|last3 = McCormick|first4 = H. Lauren|last4 = Min|first5 = Sophie|last5 = Lebrecht|first6 = Karim S.|last6 = Kassam|volume=61|issue = 10|pages=2468–2486}}
52. ^{{Cite journal|title = Debiasing Decisions Improved Decision Making With a Single Training Intervention|url = http://bbs.sagepub.com/content/2/1/129|journal = Policy Insights from the Behavioral and Brain Sciences|date = 2015-10-01|issn = 2372-7322|pages = 129–140|volume = 2|issue = 1|doi = 10.1177/2372732215600886|first = Carey K.|last = Morewedge|first2 = Haewon|last2 = Yoon|first3 = Irene|last3 = Scopelliti|first4 = Carl W.|last4 = Symborski|first5 = James H.|last5 = Korris|first6 = Karim S.|last6 = Kassam}}
53. ^Popper, Karl, Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge
54. ^"Surely You're Joking, Mr. Feynman!": Adventures of a Curious Character, 1985, Richard Feynman

Further reading

{{refbegin}}
  • Eiser, J.R. and Joop van der Pligt (1988) Attitudes and Decisions London: Routledge. {{ISBN|978-0-415-01112-9}}
  • Fine, Cordelia (2006) A Mind of its Own: How your brain distorts and deceives Cambridge, UK: Icon Books. {{ISBN|1-84046-678-2}}
  • Gilovich, Thomas (1993). How We Know What Isn't So: The Fallibility of Human Reason in Everyday Life. New York: The Free Press. {{ISBN|0-02-911706-2}}
  • Haselton, M.G., Nettle, D. & Andrews, P.W. (2005). The evolution of cognitive bias. In D.M. Buss (Ed.), Handbook of Evolutionary Psychology, (pp. 724–746). Hoboken: Wiley. Full text
  • {{cite web |last=Heuer |first=Richards J. Jr. |authorlink=Richards Heuer |year= 1999 |title= Psychology of Intelligence Analysis. Central Intelligence Agency |url=http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/psych-intel/art5.html}}
  • Young, S. (2007) Micromessaging - Why Great Leadership Is Beyond Words New York: McGraw-Hill. {{ISBN|978-0-07-146757-5}}
  • Kahneman D., Slovic P., and Tversky, A. (Eds.) (1982) Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases. New York: Cambridge University Press {{ISBN|978-0-521-28414-1}}
  • Kahneman, Daniel (2011) Thinking, Fast and Slow. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux {{ISBN|978-0-374-27563-1}}
  • Kida, Thomas (2006) Don't Believe Everything You Think: The 6 Basic Mistakes We Make in Thinking New York: Prometheus. {{ISBN|978-1-59102-408-8}}
  • Nisbett, R., and Ross, L. (1980) Human Inference: Strategies and shortcomings of human judgement. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall {{ISBN|978-0-13-445130-5}}
  • Piatelli-Palmarini, Massimo (1994) Inevitable Illusions: How Mistakes of Reason Rule Our Minds New York: John Wiley & Sons. {{ISBN|0-471-15962-X}}
  • {{Cite book |title=What Intelligence Tests Miss: The Psychology of Rational Thought |last=Stanovich |first=Keith |year=2009 |publisher=Yale University Press |location=New Haven (CT) |isbn=978-0-300-12385-2 |laysummary=http://web.mac.com/kstanovich/iWeb/Site/YUP_Reviews_files/TICS_review.pdf |laydate=21 November 2010 }}
  • Sutherland, Stuart (2007) Irrationality: The Enemy Within Second Edition (First Edition 1994) Pinter & Martin. {{ISBN|978-1-905177-07-3}}
  • Tavris, Carol and Elliot Aronson (2007) Mistakes Were Made (But Not by Me): Why We Justify Foolish Beliefs, Bad Decisions and Hurtful Acts Orlando, Florida: Harcourt Books. {{ISBN|978-0-15-101098-1}}
  • {{cite journal|last=Funder|first=David C.|author2=Joachim I. Krueger|title=Towards a balanced social psychology: Causes, consequences, and cures for the problem-seeking approach to social behavior and cognition|journal=Behavioral and Brain Sciences|date=June 2004|volume=27|pages=313–376|pmid=15736870|url=http://132.74.59.154/internal/wiki/images/3/35/%D7%A4%D7%A1%D7%99%D7%9B%D7%95%D7%9C%D7%95%D7%92%D7%99%D7%94_3.pdf|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140222041533/http://132.74.59.154/internal/wiki/images/3/35/%D7%A4%D7%A1%D7%99%D7%9B%D7%95%D7%9C%D7%95%D7%92%D7%99%D7%94_3.pdf|dead-url=yes|archive-date=2014-02-22|accessdate=3 May 2011|issue=3|doi=10.1017/s0140525x04000081}}
{{refend}}

External links

  • The Roots of Consciousness: To Err Is human
  • [https://web.archive.org/web/20060620222654/http://www.cxoadvisory.com/gurus/Fisher/article/ Cognitive bias in the financial arena]
  • [https://www.scribd.com/doc/30548590/Cognitive-Biases-A-Visual-Study-Guide A Visual Study Guide To Cognitive Biases]
  • Cognitive Bias Parade
{{Biases}}{{DEFAULTSORT:Cognitive Bias}}

4 : Cognition|Cognitive biases|Decision theory|Intelligence analysis
随便看

　

开放百科全书收录14589846条英语、德语、日语等多语种百科知识，基本涵盖了大多数领域的百科知识，是一部内容自由、开放的电子版国际百科全书。

　

Copyright © 2023 OENC.NET All Rights Reserved
京ICP备2021023879号 更新时间：2024/11/17 22:58:33