“Export of cryptography from the United States”的意思、由来-开放百科全书

The export of cryptographic technology and devices from the United States was severely restricted by U.S. law until 1992, but was gradually eased until 2000; some restrictions still remain.

Since World War II, many governments, including the U.S. and its NATO allies, have regulated the export of cryptography for national security reasons, and, as late as 1992, cryptography was on the U.S. Munitions List as an Auxiliary Military Equipment.^[2]

Due to the enormous impact of cryptanalysis in World War II, these governments saw the military value in denying current and potential enemies access to cryptographic systems. Since the U.S. and U.K. believed they had better cryptographic capabilities than others, their intelligence agencies tried to control all dissemination of the more effective crypto techniques. They also wished to monitor the diplomatic communications of other nations, including those emerging in the post-colonial period and whose position on Cold War issues was vital.^[3]

The First Amendment made controlling all use of cryptography inside the U.S. illegal, but controlling access to U.S. developments by others was more practical — there were no constitutional impediments.

Accordingly, regulations were introduced as part of munitions controls which required licenses to export cryptographic methods (and even their description); the regulations established that cryptography beyond a certain strength (defined by algorithm and length of key) would not be licensed for export except on a case-by-case basis. This policy was also adopted elsewhere for various reasons.

The development and public release of Data Encryption Standard (DES) and asymmetric key techniques in the 1970s, the rise of the Internet, and the willingness of some to risk and resist prosecution, eventually made this policy impossible to enforce, and by the late 1990s it was being relaxed in the U.S., and to some extent elsewhere (e.g., France). As late as 1997, NSA officials in the US were concerned that the widespread use of strong encryption will frustrate their ability to provide SIGINT regarding foreign entities, including terrorist groups operating internationally. NSA officials anticipated that the American encryption software backed by an extensive infrastructure, when marketed, was likely to become a standard for international communications.^[4] In 1997, Louis Freeh, then the Director of the FBI, said

As is so often the case, however, there is another aspect to the encryption issue that if left unaddressed will have severe public safety and national security ramifications. Law enforcement is in unanimous agreement that the widespread use of robust non-key recovery encryption ultimately will devastate our ability to fight crime and prevent terrorism. Uncrackable encryption will allow drug lords, spies, terrorists and even violent gangs to communicate about their crimes and their conspiracies with impunity. We will lose one of the few remaining vulnerabilities of the worst criminals and terrorists upon which law enforcement depends to successfully investigate and often prevent the worst crimes.

For this reason, the law enforcement community is unanimous in calling for a balanced solution to this problem.^[5]}}

History

Cold War era

In the early days of the Cold War, the U.S. and its allies developed an elaborate series of export control regulations designed to prevent a wide range of Western technology from falling into the hands of others, particularly the Eastern bloc. All export of technology classed as 'critical' required a license. CoCom was organized to coordinate Western export controls.

Two types of technology were protected: technology associated only with weapons of war ("munitions") and dual use technology, which also had commercial applications. In the U.S., dual use technology export was controlled by the Department of Commerce, while munitions were controlled by the State Department. Since in the immediate post WWII period the market for cryptography was almost entirely military, the encryption technology (techniques as well as equipment and, after computers became important, crypto software) was included as a Category XIII item into the United States Munitions List. The multinational control of the export of cryptography on the Western side of the cold war divide was done via the mechanisms of CoCom.

By the 1960s, however, financial organizations were beginning to require strong commercial encryption on the rapidly growing field of wired money transfer. The U.S. Government's introduction of the Data Encryption Standard in 1975 meant that commercial uses of high quality encryption would become common, and serious problems of export control began to arise. Generally these were dealt with through case-by-case export license request proceedings brought by computer manufacturers, such as IBM, and by their large corporate customers.

Encryption export controls became a matter of public concern with the introduction of the personal computer. Phil Zimmermann's PGP cryptosystem and its distribution on the Internet in 1991 was the first major 'individual level' challenge to controls on export of cryptography. The growth of electronic commerce in the 1990s created additional pressure for reduced restrictions.

In 1992, a deal between NSA and the Software Publishers Association made 40-bit RC2 and RC4 encryption easily exportable using a Commodity Jurisdiction (which transferred control from the State Department to the Commerce Department). At this stage Western governments had, in practice, a split personality when it came to encryption; policy was made by the military cryptanalysts, who were solely concerned with preventing their 'enemies' acquiring secrets, but that policy was then communicated to commerce by officials whose job was to support industry.

Shortly afterward, Netscape's SSL technology was widely adopted as a method for protecting credit card transactions using public key cryptography. Netscape developed two versions of its web browser. The "U.S. edition" supported full size (typically 1024-bit or larger) RSA public keys in combination with full size symmetric keys (secret keys) (128-bit RC4 or 3DES in SSL 3.0 and TLS 1.0). The "International Edition" had its effective key lengths reduced to 512 bits and 40 bits respectively (RSA_EXPORT with 40-bit RC2 or RC4 in SSL 2.0, SSL 3.0 and TLS 1.0), by zero-padding 88 bits of the normal 128-bit symmetric key.^[6] Acquiring the 'U.S. domestic' version turned out to be sufficient hassle that most computer users, even in the U.S., ended up with the 'International' version,^[7] whose weak 40-bit encryption could be broken in a matter of days using a single computer. A similar situation occurred with Lotus Notes for the same reasons.

Current status

U.S. export rules

U.S. non-military exports are controlled by Export Administration Regulations (EAR), a short name for the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Title 15 chapter VII, subchapter C.

Encryption items specifically designed, developed, configured, adapted or modified for military

applications (including command, control and intelligence applications) are controlled by

Terminology

Export destinations are classified by the EAR Supplement No. 1 to Part 740 into four country groups (A, B, D, E) with further subdivisions;^[15] a country can belong to more than one group. For the purposes of encryption, groups B, D:1, and E:1 are important:

The EAR Supplement No. 1 to Part 738 (Commerce Country Chart) contains the table with country restrictions.^[16] If a line of table that corresponds to the country contains an X in the reason for control column, the export of a controlled item requires a license, unless an exception can be applied. For the purposes of encryption, the following three reasons for control are important:

Classification

For export purposes each item is classified with the Export Control Classification Number (ECCN) with the help of the Commerce Control List (CCL, Supplement No. 1 to the EAR part 774). In particular:^[10]

An item can be either self-classified, or a classification ("review") requested from the BIS. A BIS review is required for typical items to get the 5A992 or 5D992 classification.

See also

References

1. ^http://www.cypherspace.org/adam/rsa/uk-shirt.html
2. ^Department of State -- International Traffic in Arms Regulations, April 1, 1992, Sec 121.1
3. ^Kahn, The Codebreakers, Ch. 19
4. ^The encryption debate: Intelligence aspects. See reference below, p. 4
5. ^Statement of Louis J. Freeh, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation before the Senate Judiciary Committee. July 9, 1997
6. ^{{cite web|title=Fortify for Netscape|url=https://www.fortify.net/README.html#do|website=www.fortify.net|accessdate=1 Dec 2017}}
7. ^{{cite web |url=http://www26.netscape.com/computing/download/index.html?cp=hom01tdow |title=January 25, 1999 archive of the Netscape Communicator 4.61 download page showing a more difficult path to download 128-bit version |accessdate=2017-03-26 |deadurl=bot: unknown |archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/19990916095715/http://www26.netscape.com/computing/download/index.html?cp=hom01tdow |archivedate=September 16, 1999 |df= }}
8. ^US Executive order 13026
9. ^{{cite web | url=http://epic.org/crypto/export_controls/regs_1_00.html | title=Revised U.S. Encryption Export Control Regulations | work=EPIC copy of document from U.S. Department of Commerce | date=January 2000 | accessdate=2014-01-06 }}
10. ^¹²³⁴[https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/forms-documents/doc_view/335-supplement-no-1-to-part-774-category-5-part-ii-information-security Commerce Control List Supplement No. 1 to Part 774 Category 5 Part 2 - Info. Security]
11. ^{{cite web |url=http://www.bis.doc.gov/encryption/pubavailencsourcecodenofify.html |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20020921015009/http://www.bis.doc.gov/Encryption/PubAvailEncSourceCodeNofify.html |dead-url=yes |archive-date=2002-09-21 |title=U. S. Bureau of Industry and Security - Notification Requirements for "Publicly Available" Encryption Source Code |publisher=Bis.doc.gov |date=2004-12-09 |accessdate=2009-11-08 |df= }}
12. ^Participating States {{webarchive|url=https://archive.is/20120527005006/http://www.wassenaar.org/participants/index.html |date=2012-05-27 }} The Wassenaar Arrangement
13. ^[https://web.archive.org/web/20110514115526/http://www.wassenaar.org/guidelines/docs/Initial%20Elements%20-%202009.pdf Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies: Guidelines & Procedures, including the Initial Elements] The Wassenaar Arrangement, December 2009
14. ^{{Cite web |url=http://www.access.gpo.gov/bis/ear/pdf/772.pdf |title=EAR Part 772 |access-date=2009-06-27 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090509112946/http://www.access.gpo.gov/bis/ear/pdf/772.pdf |archive-date=2009-05-09 |dead-url=yes |df= }}
15. ^EAR Supplement No. 1 to Part 740
16. ^EAR Supplement No. 1 to Part 738