“Great White Fleet”的意思、由来-开放百科全书

The Great White Fleet was the popular nickname for the powerful United States Navy battle fleet that completed a journey around the globe from 16 December 1907, to 22 February 1909, by order of United States President Theodore Roosevelt. Its mission was to make friendly courtesy visits to numerous countries, while displaying new U.S. naval power to the world.

It consisted of 16 battleships divided into two squadrons, along with various escorts.^[1]^[2] Roosevelt sought to demonstrate growing American military power and blue-water navy capability. Hoping to enforce treaties and protect overseas holdings, the United States Congress appropriated funds to build American naval power. Beginning in the 1880s with just 90 small ships, over one-third of them wooden and therefore obsolete, the navy quickly grew to include new steel fighting vessels. The hulls of these ships were painted a stark white, giving the armada the nickname "Great White Fleet".^[3]

Background and purpose

In the twilight of his administration, United States President Theodore Roosevelt dispatched 16 U.S. Navy battleships of the Atlantic Fleet on a worldwide voyage of circumnavigation from 16 December 1907 to 22 February 1909.^[1]^[2] The hulls were painted white, the Navy's peacetime color scheme, decorated with gilded scrollwork with a red, white, and blue banner on their bows. These ships would later come to be known as the Great White Fleet.

The purpose of the fleet deployment was multifaceted. Ostensibly, it served as a showpiece of American goodwill, as the fleet visited numerous countries and harbors. In this, the voyage was not unprecedented. Naval courtesy calls, many times in conjunction with the birthdays of various monarchs and other foreign celebrations, had become common in the 19th century. Port calls showcased pomp, ceremony, and militarism during a period of rising pre-war nationalism. In 1891, a large French fleet visited Kronstadt, Russia, in conjunction with negotiations between the two nations. Although France and Russia had been hostile to each other for at least three decades prior, the significance of the call was not lost on Russia, and Tsar Nicholas II signed a treaty of alliance with France in 1894. As navies grew larger, naval pageants grew longer, more elaborate, and more frequent. The United States began participating in these events in 1902 when Roosevelt invited Kaiser Wilhelm II of Germany to send a squadron for a courtesy call to New York City. Invitations for U.S. Navy ships to participate in fleet celebrations in the United Kingdom, France, and Germany followed.{{sfn|Hart|1965|pp=15–21}}

Additionally, the voyage of the Great White Fleet demonstrated both at home and on the world stage that the U.S. had become a major sea power in the years after its triumph in the Spanish–American War, with possessions that included Guam, the Philippines, and Puerto Rico.^[4] It was not the first flexing of U.S. naval muscle since that war, however; during the Algeciras Conference in 1906, which was convened to settle a diplomatic crisis between France and Germany over the fate of Morocco, Roosevelt had ordered eight battleships to maintain a presence in the Mediterranean Sea.{{sfn|Hart|1965|p=21}} Since Japan had arisen as a major sea power with the 1905 annihilation of the Russian fleet at Tsushima, the deployment of the Great White Fleet was therefore intended, at least in part, to send a message to Tokyo that the American fleet could be deployed anywhere, even from its Atlantic ports, and would be able to defend American interests in the Philippines and the Pacific.^[5]^[6]

That gesture capitalized on diplomatic trouble that had resulted from anti-Japanese riots in San Francisco. Those problems had been resolved by the Gentlemen's Agreement of 1907 and the fleet visit was a friendly gesture to Japan. The Japanese welcomed it.^[7] Roosevelt saw the deployment as one that would encourage patriotism, and give the impression that he would teach Japan "a lesson in polite behavior", as historian Robert A. Hart phrased it.{{sfn|Hart|1965|p=24}} After the fleet had crossed the Pacific, Japanese statesmen realized that the balance of power in the East had changed since the Root–Takahira Agreement that defined relevant spheres of interest of the United States and Japan.^[5]

The voyage also provided an opportunity to improve the sea- and battle-worthiness of the fleet. While earlier capital ship classes such as the {{sclass-|Kearsarge|battleship|5}}, {{sclass-|Illinois|battleship|5}} and {{sclass-|Maine|battleship|5}} were designed primarily for coastal defense, later classes such as the {{sclass-|Virginia|battleship|5}} and {{sclass-|Connecticut|battleship|5}} incorporated lessons learned from the Spanish–American War and were conceived as ships with "the highest practicable speed and the greatest radius of action", in the words of the appropriation bills approved by the United States Congress for their construction. They were intended as modern warships capable of long-range operations. Nevertheless, the experience gained in the recent war with Spain had been limited.{{sfn|Crawford|2008|p=12}}

Concerns and preparations

Roosevelt's stated intent was to give the navy practice in navigation, communication, coal consumption and fleet maneuvering; navy professionals maintained, however, that such matters could be served better in home waters. In light of what had happened to the Russian Baltic Fleet, they were concerned about sending their own fleet on a long deployment, especially since part of the intent was to impress a modern, battle-tested navy that had not known defeat. The fleet was untested in making such a voyage, and Tsushima had proven that extended deployments had no place in practical strategy.{{sfn|Hart|1965|pp=23–24}} The Japanese Navy was close to coaling and repair facilities; while American ships could coal in the Philippines, docking facilities were far from optimal. An extended stop on the West Coast of the United States during the voyage for overhaul and refurbishment in dry dock would be a necessity. Planning for the voyage, however, showed a dearth of adequate facilities there, as well. The main sea channel of the Mare Island Navy Yard near San Francisco was too shallow for battleships, which left only the Puget Sound Navy Yard in Bremerton, Washington, for refit and repair. The Hunter's Point civilian yard in San Francisco could accommodate capital ships, but had been closed due to lack of use and was slated for demolition. President Roosevelt ordered that Hunter's Point be reopened, facilities be brought up to date, and the fleet to report there.{{sfn|Albertson|2007|pp=30–31}}

Also, the question of adequate resources for coaling existed. This was not an issue when the Atlantic Fleet cruised the Atlantic or Caribbean, as fuel supplies were readily available. However, the United States did not enjoy a worldwide network of coaling stations like that of Great Britain, nor did it have an adequate supply of auxiliary vessels for resupply. During the Spanish–American War, this lack had forced Admiral George Dewey to buy a collier-load of British coal in Hong Kong before the Battle of Manila Bay to ensure his squadron would not run out of steam at sea. The need had been even more pressing for the Russian Baltic Fleet during its long deployment during the Russo-Japanese War, not just for the distance it was to steam, but also because, as a belligerent nation in wartime, most neutral ports were closed to it due to international law. While the lack of support vessels was pointed out and a vigorous program of building such ships suggested by Rear Admiral George W. Melville, who had served as chief of the Bureau of Equipment, his words were not heeded adequately until World War II.{{sfn|Albertson|2007|pp=31–34}}

Federal regulations that restricted supply vessels for Navy ships to those flying the United States flag, complicated by the lack of an adequate United States Merchant Marine, proved another obstacle. Roosevelt initially offered to award Navy supply contracts to American skippers whose bids exceeded those of foreign captains by less than 50 percent.^[8] Many carriers declined this offer because they could not obtain enough cargo to cover the cost of the return trip. Two months before the fleet sailed, Roosevelt ordered the Navy Department to contract 38 ships to supply the fleet with the 125,000 tons of coal it would need to steam from Hampton Roads, Virginia, to San Francisco. Only eight of these were American-registered; most of the other 30 were of British registry. This development was potentially awkward, since part of the mission was to impress Japan with the perception of overwhelming American naval power. Britain had become a military ally of Japan in 1905 with the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, which obliged it to aid Japan should a foreign power declare war against it. Technically, the list of potential combatants included the United States. The British government decided to play both sides of the political fence with the intent of moderating any Japanese-American friction that might arise.{{sfn|Albertson|2007|pp=34–35}}

Voyage

As the Panama Canal was not yet complete, the fleet had to pass through the Straits of Magellan. The scope of such an operation was unprecedented in U.S. history, as ships had to sail from all points of the compass to rendezvous points and proceed according to a carefully orchestrated, well-conceived plan. It involved almost the entire operational capability of the U.S. Navy. Unlike the formidable obstacles that had faced the Russian fleet{{refn|The Russian fleet had no coaling stations and foreign coaling stations were off limits to them during their voyage. The fleet had to refuel at sea via German contractor coaling vessals or on the sly at French ports.(Busch 86, 87)|group=nb}} on its voyage from the Baltic to the Pacific, which eventually led to its destruction by the Japanese in 1905,^[9]^[10] the U.S. effort benefited from a peaceful environment which aided the coordination of ship movements.

In port after port, citizens in the thousands turned out to see and greet the fleet. In 1908, the Great White Fleet visited Monterey, California, from 1–4 May. The nearby Hotel Del Monte in Del Monte, California, hosted a grand ball for the officers of the fleet.

In Australia, the arrival of the Great White Fleet on 20 August 1908 was used to encourage support for the forming of Australia's own navy.^[11] In Sicily, the sailors helped in recovery operations after the 1908 Messina earthquake.

Fleet composition

The fourteen-month-long voyage was a grand pageant of American naval power. The squadrons were manned by 14,000 sailors. They covered some {{convert|43000|nmi|km}} and made twenty port calls on six continents. The fleet was impressive, especially as a demonstration of American industrial prowess (all eighteen ships had been constructed since the Spanish–American War), but already the battleships represented the suddenly outdated 'pre-dreadnought' type of capital ship, as the first battleships of the revolutionary {{sclass-|Dreadnought|battleship|4}} had just entered service, and the U.S. Navy's first dreadnought, {{USS|South Carolina|BB-26|2}}, was already fitting out. The two oldest ships in the fleet, {{USS|Kearsarge|BB-5|2}} and {{USS|Kentucky|BB-6|2}}, were already obsolete and unfit for battle; two others, {{USS|Maine|BB-10|2}} and {{USS|Alabama|BB-8|2}}, had to be detached at San Francisco because of mechanical troubles and were replaced by the {{USS|Nebraska|BB-14|2}} and the {{USS|Wisconsin|BB-9|2}}. (After repairs, Alabama and Maine completed their "own, more direct, circumnavigation of the globe" via Honolulu, Guam, Manila, Singapore, Colombo, Suez, Naples, Gibraltar, the Azores, and finally back to the United States, arriving on 20 October 1908, four months before the remainder of the fleet, which had taken a more circuitous route.)

The battleships were accompanied during the first leg of their voyage by a "Torpedo Flotilla" of six early destroyers, as well as by several auxiliary ships. The destroyers and their tender did not actually steam in company with the battleships, but followed their own itinerary from Hampton Roads, Virginia to San Francisco, California. Also of note is that the armored cruiser {{USS|Washington|ACR-11|2}} preceded the Fleet itinerary for its first and second legs by about a month, perhaps making arrangements to later receive the Fleet.

General fleet itinerary

With {{USS|Connecticut|BB-18|2}}^[13] as flagship under the command of Rear Admiral Robley D. Evans, the fleet sailed from Hampton Roads on 16 December 1907 for Trinidad, British West Indies, thence to Rio de Janeiro, Brazil; Punta Arenas, Chile; Callao, Peru; Magdalena Bay, Mexico, and up the West Coast, arriving at San Francisco, 6 May 1908.

At San Francisco, Rear Admiral Charles S. Sperry assumed command of the fleet, owing to the poor health of Admiral Evans. Also at San Francisco, the squadrons were slightly rearranged, bringing the newest and best ships in the fleet up to the First Squadron. {{USS|Glacier|AF-4|2}} was detached and later became the supply ship of the Pacific Fleet. At this time also, {{USS|Nebraska|BB-14|2}}, under Captain Reginald F. Nicholson, and {{USS|Wisconsin|BB-9|2}}, under Captain Frank E. Beatty, were substituted for {{USS|Maine|BB-10|2}} and {{USS|Alabama|BB-8|2}}. In San Francisco, {{USS|Minnesota|BB-22|2}} was brought forward into First Squadron, First Division and {{USS|Louisiana|BB-19|2}} took her place as flagship, Second Squadron.

Leaving that port on 7 July 1908 the U.S. Atlantic Fleet visited Honolulu; Auckland, New Zealand; Sydney, Melbourne, and Albany, Australia; Manila, Philippines; Yokohama, Japan; and Colombo, Ceylon; then arriving at Suez, Egypt, on 3 January 1909.

While the fleet was in Egypt, word was received of an earthquake in Sicily, thus affording an opportunity for the United States to show its friendship to Italy by offering aid to the sufferers. Connecticut, {{USS|Illinois|BB-7|2}}, {{USS|Culgoa|AF-3|2}}, and {{USS|Yankton|1893|2}} were dispatched to Messina, Italy, at once. The crew of Illinois recovered the bodies of the American consul, Arthur S. Cheney, and his wife, entombed in the ruins.

Leaving Messina on 9 January 1909, the fleet stopped at Naples, Italy, thence to Gibraltar, arriving at Hampton Roads on 22 February 1909. There, President Roosevelt reviewed the fleet as it passed into the roadstead.

First leg

Itinerary

Ships

The Fleet, First Squadron and First Division, were commanded by Rear Admiral Robley D. Evans.

First Division consisted of four ships of the 1906 {{sclass-|Connecticut|battleship|4}}:

Second Division consisted of four ships of the 1904 {{sclass-|Virginia|battleship|4}}:

Second Squadron and Third Division were commanded by Rear Admiral Charles M. Thomas.

Third Division consisted of one Connecticut-class ship and the three ships of the 1902 {{sclass-|Maine|battleship|4}}:

Fourth Division consisted of two ships of the 1901 {{sclass-|Illinois|battleship|4}} and the two 1900 {{sclass-|Kearsarge|battleship|0}} ships:

Second leg

Itinerary

The second leg of the voyage was from San Francisco to Puget Sound and back. On 23 May 1908 the 16-battleships of the Great White Fleet steamed into the Puget Sound where they separated to visit six Washington state ports: Bellingham, Bremerton, Port Angeles, Port Townsend, Seattle and Tacoma.^[14] The fleet arrived in Seattle on 23 May and departed 27 May 1908.^[15]

Ships

The Fleet, First Squadron, and First Division were commanded by Rear Admiral Charles S. Sperry.

Second Squadron and Third Division were commanded by Rear Admiral William H. Emory.

Third leg

Itinerary

Ships

The Fleet, First Squadron, and First Division were commanded by Rear Admiral Charles S. Sperry.

The Second Squadron and Third Division were commanded by Rear Admiral William H. Emory.

Final leg

Itinerary

Experience gained

The cruise of the Great White Fleet provided practical experience for US naval personnel in sea duty and ship handling. It also showed the viability of US warships for long-range operations as no major mechanical mishaps occurred. However, while the cruise uncovered design flaws, it did not test the abilities to engage in battle fleet action. In fact, the success of the deployment might have helped obscure design deficiencies that were not addressed until World War I. These included excessive draft, low armor belts, large turret openings and exposed ammunition hoists.{{sfn|Crawford|2008|p=6}}

Effects on US capital ship design

While the capital ships of the Great White Fleet were already obsolescent in light of the "big gun" revolution ushered in by the construction of {{HMS|Dreadnought|1906|6}}, their behavior at sea furnished valuable information that affected future construction. For instance, in terms of seaworthiness, all the capital ships in the fleet proved wet in all but the calmest seas, which led to the flared bows of subsequent U.S. battleships, increased freeboard forward and such spray-reducing measures as the elimination of billboards for anchors and gun sponsons. Increased freeboard was needed; this and related considerations demanded increases in beam and overall size. Between the {{sclass-|Florida|battleship|1}}s, the last American capital ships completed before data from the cruise became available, and the {{sclass-|Wyoming|battleship|4}}, the first designed after this data was received, displacement (and, as a result, cost) per ship increased by one third.{{sfn|Friedman|1985|pp=75–85}}

Deficiencies in seaworthiness in turn reduced the battle-worthiness of the fleet. Turret heights for main armament proved too low and needed to be raised. Secondary armament was useless at speed and especially in tradewind conditions (with the wind moving over the sea at {{convert|10|kn|km/h}} or greater) and needed to be moved much higher in the hull. Improved placement began with the Wyoming-class battleships and was further refined in the {{sclass-|Nevada|battleship|4}}. Casemates for the bow 3-inch guns in the newer pre-dreadnoughts were untenable due to wetness and were removed. Another discovery was that, even when fully loaded, the bottom of the battleships' side armor was visible—and the ships thus vulnerable to shells that might hit beneath it to reach their machinery and magazines—in smooth to moderate seas. The profile of crests and troughs in some ships contributed to this problem. Admiral Evans concluded that the standard {{convert|8|ft|m|adj=on}} width of belt armor was inadequate.{{sfn|Friedman|1985|pp=75–9}}

One other necessity the cruise outlined was the need for tactical homogeneity. Before the cruise, critics such as then-Captain William Sims (to whom President Roosevelt listened) had argued that American warship design had remained too conservative and precluded the level of efficiency needed for the fleet to function as an effective unit. The cruise proved the charge true. This would eventually lead to the building of standard type battleships in the U.S. Navy. When President Roosevelt convened the 1908 Newport Conference of the Naval War College, he placed responsibility for U.S. battleship design on the General Board of the United States Navy. This gave line officers and planners direct input and control over warship design, a pattern which has persisted to the present day.{{sfn|Friedman|1985|pp=75, 82}}

Effects on fleet operations

Experience gained by the cruise led to improvements in formation steaming, coal economy and morale. Gunnery exercises doubled the fleet's accuracy. However, the mission also underlined the fleet's dependence on foreign colliers and the need for coaling stations and auxiliary ships for coaling and resupply.{{sfn|Crawford|2008|p=6}}

Background and purpose

Concerns and preparations

Voyage

Fleet composition

General fleet itinerary

First leg

Itinerary

Ships

Second leg

Itinerary

Ships

Third leg

Itinerary

Ships

Final leg

Itinerary

Experience gained

Effects on US capital ship design

Effects on fleet operations

See also

References

Bibliography

External links