| 词条 | Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. |
| 释义 |
|Litigants=Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. |ArgueDate=March 29 |ArgueYear=1993 |DecideDate=June 21 |DecideYear=1993 |FullName=Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. |USVol=509 |USPage=209 |ParallelCitations=113 S. Ct. 2578; 125 L. Ed. 2d 168 |Prior= |Subsequent= |Holding=Brown & Williamson is entitled to judgment as a matter of law because it did not engage in predatory pricing in violation of §2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act. |SCOTUS=1991-1993 |Majority=Kennedy |JoinMajority=Rehnquist, O'Connor, Scalia, Souter, Thomas |Concurrence= |JoinConcurrence= |Concurrence2= |JoinConcurrence2= |Concurrence/Dissent= |JoinConcurrence/Dissent= |Dissent=Stevens |JoinDissent=White, Blackmun |Dissent2= |JoinDissent2= |LawsApplied=Clayton Act §2 }} Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209 (1993), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the court required that an antitrust plaintiff alleging predatory pricing must show not only changes in market conditions adverse to its interests, as a threshold matter, but must show on the merits that (1) the prices complained of are below an appropriate measure of its rival's costs, and (2) that the competitor had a reasonable prospect or a "dangerous probability" of recouping its investment in the alleged scheme. HoldingAn oligopoly's interdependent pricing may provide a means for achieving recoupment, and thus may form the basis of a primary-line injury claim. Predatory pricing schemes, in general, are implausible, and are even more improbable when they require coordinated action among several firms. They are least likely to occur where, as alleged here, the cooperation among firms is tacit, since effective tacit coordination is difficult to achieve. Since there is a high likelihood that any attempt by one oligopolist to discipline a rival by cutting prices will produce an outbreak of competition; and since a predator's present losses fall on it alone, while the later supracompetitive profits must be shared with every other oligopolist in proportion to its market share, including the intended victim. Ultimately, Justice Kennedy, held that:
See also
External links
| case = Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., {{Ussc|509|209|1993|el=no}} | cornell =https://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/92-466.ZO.html | courtlistener = | googlescholar = https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=10207416770663828054 | justia =https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/509/209/ | loc =http://cdn.loc.gov/service/ll/usrep/usrep509/usrep509209/usrep509209.pdf | oyez =https://www.oyez.org/cases/1992/92-466{{DEFAULTSORT:Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown and Williamson Tobacco Corp.}} 7 : United States antitrust case law|United States Supreme Court cases|1993 in United States case law|United States tobacco case law|Brown & Williamson|United States Supreme Court cases of the Rehnquist Court|History of Louisville, Kentucky |
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