词条 | Je Tsongkhapa |
释义 |
| name = Tsongkhapa, Wylie:tsong kha pa, {{IPA-bo|tsoŋkʰapa|}} Tibetan:ཙོང་ཁ་པ། Traditional Chinese:宗哥·善慧稱, Simplified:宗哥·善慧称, Pinyin:Zōnggē Shànhuìchēng | image = Tsong-kha-pa%2C_1644-1911_AD%2C_thangka_-_Sichuan_University_Museum_-_Chengdu%2C_China_-_DSC06193.jpg | birth_date = c. 1357 CE | image_size = 250px | caption = Thangka of Tsongkhapa - Sichuan University Museum - Chengdu, China | birth_place = Amdo | death_date = c. 1419 CE | death_place = Tibet | known = Founder of the Gelug school | occupation = Buddhist teacher, monk and philosopher| }}{{Tibetan Buddhism}}Tsongkhapa ("The man from Tsongkha",[1] 1357–1419), usually taken to mean "the Man from Onion Valley", born in Amdo,[2] was a famous teacher of Tibetan Buddhism whose activities led to the formation of the Gelug school of Tibetan Buddhism. He is also known by his ordained name Losang Drakpa ({{bo|w=blo bzang grags pa}}) or simply as "Je Rinpoche" ({{bo|w=rje rin po che}}). Also, he is known by Chinese as Zongkapa Lobsang Zhaba,[2] He was the son of a Tibetan Longben Tribal leader who also once served as an official of the Yuan Dynasty of China.[2] In his two main treatises, the Lamrim Chenmo ({{bo|w=lam rim chen mo}}) and Ngakrim Chenmo ({{bo|w=sngags rim chen mo}}), Tsongkhapa meticulously sets forth this graduated way and how one establishes oneself in the paths of sutra and tantra. BiographyEarly yearsWith a Mongolian father and a Tibetan mother, Tsongkhapa was born into a nomadic family in the walled city of Tsongkha in Amdo, Tibet (present-day Haidong and Xining, Qinghai) in 1357. It is said that the Buddha Sakyamuni spoke of his coming as an emanation of the Bodhisattva Manjusri in the short verse from the Root Tantra of Manjushri ({{bo|w='jam dpal rtsa rgyud}}): {{quote|After I pass awayAnd my pure doctrine is absent, You will appear as an ordinary being, Performing the deeds of a Buddha And establishing the Joyful Land, the great Protector, In the Land of the Snows.[3]}} According to hagiographic accounts, Tsongkhapa's birth was prophesied by the 12th abbot of the Snar thang monastery, and was recognized as such at a young age, taking the lay vows at the age of three before Rolpe Dorje, 4th Karmapa Lama and was named Künga Nyingpo ({{bo|w=kun dga' snying po}}).[4] At the age of seven, he was ordained as a śrāmaṇera by Döndrup Rinchen ({{bo|w=don grub rin chen}}, 1309–1385), the first abbott of Jakhyung Monastery ({{bo|w=bya khyung brag}}), and was given the ordination name Losang Drakpa ({{bo|w=blo bzang grags pa}}). Monastic careerIt was at this early age that he was able to receive the empowerments of Heruka, Hevajra, and Yamantaka, three of the most prominent wrathful deities of Tibetan Buddhism, as well as being able to recite a great many Sutras, not the least of which was Mañjuśrīnāmasamgīti. He would go on to be a great student of the vinaya, the doctrine of behaviour, and even later of the Six Yogas of Naropa, the Kalachakra tantra, and the practice of Mahamudra. At the age of 24, he received full ordination as a monk of the Sakya school. From Zhönnu Lodrö ({{bo|w=gzhon nu blo gros}}) and Rendawa ({{bo|w=red mda' pa}}), he received the lineage of the Pramanavarttika transmitted by Sakya Pandita.[7] He mastered all the courses of study at Drigung kagyud Monastery in Ü-Tsang.[7] As an emanation of Manjusri, Tsongkhapa is said have been of "one mind" with Atiśa,[5] received the Kadam lineages and studied the major Sarma tantras under Sakya and Kagyu masters.[7] He also studied with a Nyingma teacher, the siddha Lek gyi Dorjé ({{bo|w=legs gyi rdo rje}}) and the abbot of Shalu Monastery, Chö kyi Pel ({{bo|w=zhwa lus pa chos kyi dpal}}),[7] and his main Dzogchen master was Drupchen Lekyi Dorje ({{bo|w=grub chen las kyi rdo je}}), also known as Namkha Gyaltsen ({{bo|w=nam mkha' rgyal mtshan}}, 1326–1401).[6] In addition to his studies, he engaged in extensive meditation retreats. He is reputed to have performed millions of prostrations, mandala offerings and other forms of purification practice. Tsongkhapa often had visions of iṣṭadevatās, especially of Manjusri, with whom he would communicate directly to clarify difficult points of the scriptures. HonoursTsongkhapa was one of the foremost authorities of Tibetan Buddhism at the time. He composed a devotional prayer called the Migtsema Prayer to his Sakya master Rendawa, which was offered back to Tsongkhapa, with the note of his master saying that these verses were more applicable to Tsongkhapa than to himself.[7] DeathTsongkhapa died in 1419 at the age of sixty-two. After his death several biographies were written by Lamas of different traditions.[8] Wangchuk Dorje, 9th Karmapa Lama, praised Tsongkhapa as one "who swept away wrong views with the correct and perfect ones."[8] Mikyö Dorje, 8th Karmapa Lama, wrote in his poem In Praise of the Incomparable Tsong Khapa: And Nyingma sects in Tibet were declining, You, O Tsong Khapa, revived Buddha's Doctrine, Hence I sing this praise to you of Ganden Mountain.{{sfn|Thurman|2009|p=243}} Philosophy and practice{{Asian philosophy sidebar}}BackgroundTsongkhapa was acquainted with all Tibetan Buddhist traditions of his time, and received lineages transmitted in the major schools.[9] His main source of inspiration was the Kadam school, the legacy of Atiśa. Tsongkhapa received two of the three main Kadampa lineages (the Lam-Rim lineage, and the oral guideline lineage) from the Nyingma Lama, Lhodrag Namka-gyeltsen; and the third main Kadampa lineage (the lineage of textual transmission) from the Kagyu teacher Lama Umapa.[10] Tsongkhapa's teachings drew upon these Kadampa teachings of Atiśa, emphasizing the study of Vinaya, the Tripiṭaka, and the Shastras.[9] Atiśa's Lamrim inspired Tsongkhapa's Lamrim Chenmo, which became a main text among his followers. He also practised and taught extensively the Vajrayana, and especially how to bring the Sutra and Tantra teachings together, wrote works that summarized the root teachings of the Buddhist philosophical schools, as well as commentaries on the Prātimokṣa, Prajnaparamita, Candrakirti's Madhyamakavatara, logic, Pure Land and [11] the Sarma tantras.[9] EssentialsAccording to Thupten Jinpa, the following elements are essential in a coherent understanding of Tsongkhapa's understanding and interpretation of the Madhyamaka refutation of essentialist ontology:[21]{{refn|group=note|According to Thupten Jinpa, Tsongkhapa's interpretation of the Madhyamaka's key tenets is to be regarded as an important lineage within the Buddhist religious and philosophical milieu, sharing the basic soteriological concerns of the Buddhist path.[12]}}
DevelopmentTsongkhapa's first principal work, The Golden Garland of Eloquence ({{bo|w=legs bshad gser phreng}}[13]) demonstrated a philosophical view in line with the Yogacara school[14] and, as became one of his hallmarks, was more influenced by Indian authors than contemporary Tibetan sources. At this time his account of the Madhyamaka "propounds a philosophy that later Gelukpas [...] call Yogācāra-svātantrika-madhyamaka, [...] yet does not have the authority of Candrakīrti's Prāsaṅgika interpretation."[15] After this early work, his attention focussed on the Prajnaparamita sutras and Dharmakirti's Pramanavartika, and it is this emphasis that dominates all his later philosophical works.[14] Garfield suggests his stance as: {{quote|A complete understanding of Buddhist philosophy requires a synthesis of the epistemology and logic of Dharmakirti with the metaphysics of Nagarjuna[14]|}} PhilosophyFor Tsongkhapa, calming meditation alone is not sufficient, but should be paired to rigorous, exact thinking "to push the mind and precipitate a breakthrough in cognitive fluency and insight."[28] Prasangika - rejection of essentialism{{Main|Prasaṅgika according to Tsongkhapa|Prasangika|Rangtong}}Tsongkhapa was a proponent of Candrakirti's consequentialist or prasangika interpretation of the Madhyamaka teachings on sunyata (emptiness),{{sfn|Cabezón|2005|p=9387}} rejecting the Svatantrika point of view.[16] According to Tsongkhapa, the Prāsaṅgika-approach is the only acceptable approach within Madhyamaka,[16] rejecting the Svatantrikas because they state that the conventional reality is "established by virtue of particular characteristics" (rang gi mtshan nyid kyis grub pa):[16] {{quote|The opponents of Candrakirti's Prasanna-padā{{refn|group=note|A seminal text regarding the Prāsaṅgika/Svātantrika distinction}} are both (a) the essentialists, who accept that things ultimately have intrinsic nature, and (b) the Svātantrikas, who refute that, but accept that things conventionally have intrinsic character or intrinsic nature.[17]}}The classification into Prasangika and Svatantrika originated from their different usages of reason to make "emptiness" understandable.{{sfn|Newland|2008|p=77}} The Svātantrikas strive to make positive assertions to attack wrong views,{{sfn|Newland|2008|p=77}} whereas the Prasangikas draw out the contradictory consequences (prasanga) of the opposing views.{{sfn|Newland|2008|p=77–78}} In Tsongkhapa's reading, the difference becomes one of the understanding of emptiness,{{sfn|Newland|2008|p=78}} which centers on the nature of conventional existence. The Svātantrikas state that conventional phenomena have particular characteristics, by which they can be distinguished, but without an ultimately existing essence.{{sfn|Shantarakshita|2005|p=131–141}}[16] In Tsongkhapa's understanding, these particular characteristics are posited as establishing that conventionally things do have an intrinsic nature, a position which he rejects: {{quote|Svatantrikas (like Bhavaviveka) are those Madhyamikas who accept that, at a conventional level, things actually do have intrinsic nature just as they are perceived. To exist at all entails having intrinsic existence. However, since there is nothing that holds up under ultimate analysis, everything is ultimately empty. Emptiness is the lack of ultimate existence.{{sfn|Newland|2008|p=77}}}}Although Tsongkhapa is regarded as the great champion of the Prasangika-view, according to Thomas Doctor, Tsongkhapa's views on the difference between Prasanghika and Svatantrika are preceded by a 12th-century author, Mabja Jangchub Tsondru (d. 1185).[16] Tsongkhapa nevertheless argues that the Prāsaṅgika's use of reductio ad absurdum is also syllogistic, because one "refutes the opponent using a subject, a reason, and so forth that are accepted by that opponent."[18]{{refn|group=note|For example, if cause-effect relationships occur because the sprout itself produces the effect of being a sprout (self-arising), then this "would mean that something that already exists is being produced, [and] production would be purposeless and endless [... if] contradictions are assembled in this way, the only result is that the opponents understand them and abandon" wrong tenets.[18] Conventional valid cognitionWhile objecting to Bhavaviveka's understanding of a shared object at the conventional level, Tsongkhapa has to leave intact conventional reality and causality, to keep intact the teachings on cyclic existence and the basis for moral behavior.{{sfn|Tsong Khapa|2002|p=274-275}}{{sfn|Brünholzl|2004|p=560}} Therefore, he has to explain how conventional reality is perceived in a valid way, which he does by introducing "conventional valid cognition."{{sfn|Brünholzl|2004|p=560}} According to Tsongkhapa, following Candrakirti, all phenomena are empty of inherent existence or essence, because they are dependently co-arisen with (created by) mental imputation, c.q. the mind.{{refn|group=note|According to Jay Garfield, "[a] fundamental tenet of any Buddhist school is that all phenomena are dependently originated. In Madhyamaka Buddhist thought, following Candrakrti [...], this dependency is glossed in three ways":[19]
From the Prāsaṅgika perspective, in order for something to exist, it must be designated validly by a designating consciousness. To talk about an object that does not exist in relation to a subject is incoherent.[25]{{refn|group=note|"Thus, [Chandrakirti] says that those are synonyms. 'Without depending on another' does not mean not depending on causes and conditions. Instead, 'other' refers to a subject, i.e., a conventional consciousness, and something is said not to depend on another due to not being posited through the force of that conventional consciousness."[26]}}{{refn|group=note|A parallel in western thought can be found in the viewpoint of intentionality: "{{quote|Every mental phenomenon is characterized by what the Scholastics of the Middle Ages called the intentional (or mental) inexistence of an object, and what we might call, though not wholly unambiguously, reference to a content, direction towards an object (which is not to be understood here as meaning a thing), or immanent objectivity. Every mental phenomenon includes something as object within itself, although they do not all do so in the same way. In presentation something is presented, in judgment, something is affirmed or denied, in love loved, in hate hated, in desire desired and so on. This intentional in-existence is characteristic exclusively of mental phenomena. No physical phenomenon exhibits anything like it. We could, therefore, define mental phenomena by saying that they are those phenomena which contain an object intentionally within themselves.| Franz Brentano|source=Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, edited by Linda L. McAlister (London: Routledge, 1995), pp. 88–89.}}}} Anything which comes into existence through valid designation is part of "conventional reality" or "conventional truth." According to Lama Tsongkhapa, something is validly designated (exists conventionally) if it meets all of the following three conditions:
Whatever fails to meet those criteria does not exist, and relationships between objects cannot exist without being validly designated into existence.{{sfn|Tsong Khapa|2002|p=178}}{{refn|group=note|In Ocean of Reasoning, Tsongkhapa and Nagarjuna spell out various analysis to the effect that phenomenon cannot possibly exist without mental imputation. The list includes: "causes" including Conditions, Motion, the Senses, the Aggregates, the Elements, Desire & the Desirous One, "Arising, Enduring, & Ceasing," Agent & Action, Prior Entity, Fire & Fuel, Beginning & End, Suffering, Compounded Phenomena, Contact, Essence, Bondage, Action, Self & Phenomena, Time, Assemblage, Becoming & Destruction, the Buddha, Errors, the Four Noble Truths, Nirvana, the Twelve Links of Dependent Origination, and Views. {{sfn|Ocean of Reasoning|Tsong Khapa|2006}}}}{{refn|group=note| According to Lama Tsongkhapa's interpretation of Nagarjuna, both causes and effects are also merely designated by mind.[27] It is mind that determines that a cause has ceased and its effect is now in existence.[28]{{refn|group=subnote|To exemplify this, Lama Tsongkhapa quotes Buddhapalita's response to an Abhidharmica's objection: "It is utterly impossible for time, [causes, effects, and collections of causes and conditions] and such to exist essentially, as you imagine. However, they are established as dependent designation."[29] Nevertheless, Prāsaṅgika are not stating that nothing exists, but instead, hold that phenomena only come into existence co-dependently with minds which are applying conceptual and nominal conventions to uncharacterized mere experiences.{{sfn|Dalai Lama|Berzin|1997|p=101}} Things and phenomenon do exist co-dependently, based upon a relationship with a knowing and designating mind, but nothing exists - including the fundamental characteristics which compose our experience - in an independent, self-arising, or self-sustaining manner.[35] Identifying the correct Object of NegationFor Tsongkhapa, extended rational analysis is required to correctly establish what it is that is to be negated.{{refn|group=note|In his Lamrim Chenmo, Tsongkhapa refers to opponents{{refn|group=note|It is unclear which specific school of thought Tsongkhapa refers here to.}} who argue that it is absurd "to conduct the extensive rational analysis required for refutations and proofs [which] is to meander among mere conventional words," because "if something exists, it cannot be refuted, and, if it does not exist, it need not be refuted." {{sfn|Tsong Khapa|2002|p=205}} In response, Tsonghkhapa refers to Nagarjuna’s Refutation of Objections, among other texts, : While the "I" or self is accepted as nominally existing in a conventional way,{{sfn|Hopkins|1999|p=49}}{{sfn|Tsong Khapa|2002|p=215}}{{refn|group=note|See: According to Tsongkhapa, Buddhist (in concreto, the Sarvastivada) and non-Buddhist essentialist schools are not negating the correct object,{{sfn|Tsong Khapa|2002|p=211}} but are only negating "imaginary constructs" and "acquired ignorance," not the innate perception of an inherently existing self.{{refn|group=note|Tsonghkhapa: "Based on just this [intrinsic nature], the referent object of the way that ignorance apprehends things as explained above, essentialist schools—Buddhist and non-Buddhist—reify many different things. When you negate the referent of ignorance’s cognitive process, you completely stop all of these tenet-driven reifications, as though you cut a tree at its root. Therefore, those who have the faculty of wisdom should understand that the referent object of innate ignorance is the basic object of negation and should not devote themselves merely to refuting imaginary constructs that are imputed only by the advocates of philosophical tenets. [...] What binds all living beings in cyclic existence is innate ignorance; acquired ignorance exists only among those who advocate philosophical tenets, so it cannot be the root of cyclic existence. It is extremely important to gain specific and certain knowledge of this point."{{sfn|Tsong Khapa|2002|p=211}}}} They have "realized only a coarse selflessness and having thereby suppressed, but not removed from the root, the obstructions to liberation."{{refn|group=note|Daniel Cozart explaining this idea in greater detail:"A second category of tenets is concerned with implications of the Mahayana and Hinayana path structures. For the most part, they are tenets propounded to demonstrate that some persons who are regarded by other schools as Arhats liberated beings-are only ersatz Arhats, having realized only a coarse selflessness and having thereby suppressed, but not removed from the root, the obstructions to liberation. These tenets, then, revolve around the unique Prasangika assertion that the root of cyclic existence is the conception of inherent existence, which is more subtle than the conception of a self described by other systems of tenets. Five assertions are elucidated in this regard:
Gyumed Khensur Rinpoche Lobsang Jampa, referring to Kalden Gyatso, notes that "there are actually two objects that must be refuted or destroyed," namely this sense of "I," and the subjective self, "the mind grasping at that false 'I'." By analyzing the sense of "I" and it's logical contradictions, it's seemingly true existence is seen through, which "destroys the continuum of the subjective mind grasping it. What continues is a wisdom mind."[42] Lack of Intrinsic NatureAccording to Patrick Jennings, {{quote|Tsongkhapa describes a procedure for establishing the non-existence of a substantial, abiding essence in either the self or in 'exterior' phenomena, such as pots or potatoes. It is essential during this procedure that one does not confuse the non-findability of a substantial, non-relational self with the refutation of the existence of a relative or conventional self – the self as it appears to ordinary cognition and which is subject to the law of cause and effect.[28]}}This procedure is described in chapter 23, The person Lacks Intrinsic Nature, of volume three of the Lamrim Chenmo, and entails four steps:{{sfn|Tsong Khapa|2002|p=291-307}} {{refn|It has become a stock procedure of the Gelugpa:See, for example, Jeffrey Hopkins'ontroduction to the Kalachakra Tantra.}}
Emptiness{{Main|Svatantrika-Prasaṅgika distinction}}{{See also|sunyata}}Tsongkhapa saw emptiness as a consequence of pratītyasamutpāda (dependent arising),{{sfn|Cabezón|2005|p=9387}} the teaching that no dharma ("thing") has an existence of its own, but always comes into existence in dependence on other dharmas. According to Tsonghkhapa, dependent-arising and emptiness are inseparable.{{sfn|Newland|2008|pp=32-33}}{{refn|group=note|They exist in a relationship of entity or identity. A relationship of entity or identity is one in which two objects are merely conceptually distinct, but not actually distinct. For example, the relationship between the mental categorization of a dog and that of an animal, with regards to the same being. If it is a dog, then it must also be an animal. Additionally, this relationship applies to impermanent phenomenon and products: if it's impermanent, it must be a product.[43]}}{{refn|group=note|The Heart Sutrastates this as follows: {{quote| Emptiness is not other than form; form is also not other than emptiness. In the same way, feeling, discrimination, compositional factors, and consciousness are empty. Shariputra, likewise, all phenomena are emptitness; without characteristic; unproduced, unceased; stainless, not without stain; not deficient, not fulfilled."[44]}}}} Tsongkhapa's view on "ultimate reality" is condensed in the short text In Praise of Dependent Arising[45] c.q. In Praise of Relativity[46][28] c.q. The Essence of Eloquency.[28] It states that "things" do exist conventionally, but ultimately everything is dependently arisen, and therefore void of inherent existence:[28] {{quote|Whatever depends on causes and conditionsIs empty of intrinsic reality What excellent instruction could there be More marvellous than this discovery?[47]}} This means that conventionally things do exist, and that there is no use in denying that. But it also means that ultimately those things have no 'existence of their own', and that cognizing them as such results from cognitive operations, not from some unchangeable essence.[48] Tsongkhapa: {{quote|Since objects do not exist through their own nature, they are established as existing through the force of convention.[48]}}According to Tsongkhapa, emptiness is empty of inherent existence: emptiness only exists nominally and conventionally. Emptiness is co-dependently arisen as a quality of conventional phenomenon and is itself a conventional phenomenon.{{sfn|Tsong Khapa|2002|p=191}} There is no "transcendental ground," and "ultimate reality" has no existence of its own, but is the negation of such a transcendental reality, and the impossibility of any statement on such an ultimately existing transcendental reality: it is no more than a fabrication of the mind.[47] Emptiness is an ultimate truth (a fact which applies to all possible phenomena, in all possible worlds), but it is not an ultimate phenomenon or ultimate reality (something which has always existed, is self-created, and is self-sustaining). It is also not a "Tao" or a primal substance from which all other things arise. Buddhapalita: {{Quote|There is no way to overcome the misconceptions of those who think that emptiness is a real thing. For example, if you tell someone, 'I have nothing.' and that person says, 'Give me that nothing.' How could you make that person understand that you have nothing?[49]}}Susan Kahn further explains: {{quote|Ultimate truth does not point to a transcendent reality, but to the transcendence of deception. It is critical to emphasize that the ultimate truth of emptiness is a negational truth. In looking for inherently existent phenomena it is revealed that it cannot be found. This absence is not findable because it is not an entity, just as a room without an elephant in it does not contain an elephantless substance. Even conventionally, elephantlessness does not exist. Ultimate truth or emptiness does not point to an essence or nature, however subtle, that everything is made of.[48]}}Non-affirming negationA prominent and important feature{{citation needed|date=October 2017}} of the {{IAST|Prāsaṅgika}} approach is their use of the non-affirming negation.{{refn|group=note|Pabongka Rinpoche states in Liberation in Our Hands that if we can not correctly "recognize the nature of the false mode of existence that is being denied, we will not be able to realize the simple negation [Skr. prasajyapratisedhah or non-affirming negation] that is established through its refutation."[50]}} A non-affirming negation is a negation which does not leave something in the place of what has been negated. For instance, when one says that a Buddhist should not drink alcohol, they are not affirming that a Buddhist should, in fact, drink something else. One is merely negating the consumption of alcohol under a particular circumstance.{{refn|group=note|"[A non-affirming negation is defined as] a negative object in which no further entity is implied when the mind negates the object that is related to it."[51]}}{{refn|group=note|Another example can be found in the debate over the use of the terms "devoid of nature itself" in Gelug Mahamudra (non-affirming negation) and "that which has voidness as its nature" in non-Gelug Mahamudra and Dzogchen (an affirming negation).{{sfn|Dalai Lama|Berzin|1997|p=235}}}} According to Tsongkhapa, for the {{IAST|Prāsaṅgika}} the philosophical position of emptiness is itself a non-affirming negation, since emptiness is a "lack of inherent existence." One is not affirming anything in the place of that absence of inherence.[52] It is not the presence of some other quality. If one were to describe emptiness as the presence of some quality -for example, a "voidness" or a "thusness" - it would linguistically and philosophically contradict the nature of the object which it is attempting to characterize.{{sfn|Dalai Lama|Berzin|1997|p=235}} Rejection of the storehouse-consciousnessThe dawning realization of emptiness can be frightening, arousing "fear of annihilation."{{sfn|Hopkins|1994|p=245}} Some Mahayana sutras therefore argue that the so-called storehouse consciousness or mind-basis-of-all consciousness was taught by the Buddha "provisionally, for the benefit of those who could be helped by believing in its existence but who would be harmed by hearing the teachings about emptiness."[53] Tsongkhapa adheres to this provisional adherence of the storehouse-consciousness, but rejects it as faulty once one has gained insight into emptiness.[54] He presents the alternative viewpoint of "the mere 'I'" which carries karma from life-to-life and uses other techniques to overcome the fear of annihilation.{{sfn|Hopkins|1994|p=245}}{{refn|group=note|According to the Gelugpa, the Chittamatra hold that the mind-basis-of-all consciousness is that which bears the karmic seeds and is findable upon analysis. That is, "if one sought the basis of the designation of the person one would discover the mind-basis-of-all."[55] The Madhyamika-Prasangika posit that beings accumulate karma and experience their effects without the mind-basis-of-all? They posit that karma is carried on the mere "I" which is dependently designated on the basis of the aggregates, stating that "it is a sufficient basis with which to associate the factors of disintegratedness (karma)."[56] Daniel Cozant expands by saying that since phenomena are neither inherently created nor inherently destroyed according to Prasangika, that "therefore, the possibility of a later effect is not precluded."[57]}} InfluenceNew traditionSam van Schaik says that Tsongkhapa "wanted to create something new" and that the early Gandenpas defined themselves by responding to accusations from the established schools: {{quote|Though the Sakya had their own teachings on these subjects, Tsongkhapa was coming to realize that he wanted to create something new, not necessarily a school, but at least a new formulation of the Buddhist Path.[58]}}Monasticism and lineageTsongkhapa emphasised a strong monastic Sangha.[9] With the founding of the Ganden monastery in 1409, he laid down the basis for what was later named the Gelug ("virtuous ones") order. At the time of the foundation of the Ganden monastery, his followers became to be known as "Gandenbas." Tsongkhapa himself never announced the establishment of a new monastic order.[59] After Tsongkhapa had founded Ganden Monastery in 1409, it became his main seat. He had many students, among whom Gyaltsab Je (1364–1431), Khedrup Gelek Pelzang, 1st Panchen Lama (1385–1438), Togden Jampal Gyatso, Jamyang Choje, Jamchenpa Sherap Senge, and the 1st Dalai Lama (1391–1474), were the most outstanding. After Tsongkhapa's passing his teachings were held and kept by Gyaltsab Dharma Rinchen and Khedrub Gelek Pälsang. From then on, his lineage has been held by the Ganden Tripas, the throne-holders of Ganden Monastery, among whom the present one is Thubten Nyima Lungtok Tenzin Norbu, the 102nd Ganden Tripa. After the founding of Ganden Monastery by Tsongkhapa, Drepung Monastery was founded by Jamyang Choje, Sera Monastery was founded by Chöje Shakya Yeshe and the 1st Dalai Lama founded Tashilhunpo Monastery. Many Gelug monasteries were built throughout Tibet but also in China and Mongolia. He spent some time as a hermit in Pabonka Hermitage, which was built during Songsten Gampo times, approximately 8 kilometres north west of Lhasa. Today, it is also part of Sera. Among the many lineage holders of the Gelugpas there are the successive incarnations of the Panchen Lama as well as the Chagkya Dorje Chang, Ngachen Könchok Gyaltsen, Kyishö Tulku Tenzin Thrinly, Jamyang Shepa, Phurchok Jampa Rinpoche, Jamyang Dewe Dorje, Takphu Rinpoche, Khachen Yeshe Gyaltsen, Trijang Rinpoche, Domo Geshe Rinpoche,[60] and many others. Prayer FestivalThe annual Tibetan prayer festival Monlam Prayer Festival was established by Tsongkhapa. There he offered service to ten thousand monks. The establishment of the Great Prayer Festival is seen as one of his Four Great Deeds. It celebrates the miraculous deeds of Gautama Buddha. Western understanding of MadhyamakaAccording to Karl Brunnholzl, Tsongkhapa's Madhyamaka has become widely influential in the western understanding of Madhyamaka: {{quote|First, with a few exceptions, the majority of books or articles on Madhyamaka by Western - particularly North American - scholars is based on the explanations of the Gelugpa school of Tibetan Buddhism. Deliberately or not, many of these Western presentations give the impression that the Gelugpa system is more or less equivalent to Tibetan Buddhism as such and that this school's way of presenting Madhyamaka is the standard or even the only way to explain this system, which has led to the still widely prevailing assumption that this is actually the case. From the perspective of Indian and Tibetan Buddhism in general, nothing could be more wrong. In fact, the peculiar Gelugpa version of Madhaymaka is a minority position in Indo-Tibetan Buddhism, since its uncommon features are neither found in any Indian text nor accepted by any of the other Tibetan schools.[61]}}CriticismSome of the greatest subsequent Tibetan scholars have become famous for their own works either defending or attacking Tsongkhapa's views.{{refn|group=note|As Thakchö says,[62] Rongton Shakya Gyaltsen, Taktsang Lotsawa, Gorampa, Shakya Chogden, The eighth Karmapa Mikyo Dorje, Mipham Rinpoche, Gendün Chöphel and others have raised serious and fierce objections against Tsongkhapa's views of Madhyamaka, whereas Gyaltsab Je, Khedrub Je, Gendun Drub, Sera Jetsun Chokyi Gyaltsen, Panchen Sonam Dragpa, Panchen Lobsang Chokyi Gyaltsen, The first Jamyang Zhépa, Changkya Rolpai Dorje, Konchog Jigme Wangpo and others have vehemently defended his interpretation.}} Own inventionsTsongkhapa's rejection of Svatantrika has been criticised within the Tibetan tradition, qualifying it as Tsongkhapa's own invention, "novelties that are not found in any Indian sources,"{{sfn|Brunnhölzl|2004|p=555}} and therefore "a major flaw"{{sfn|Brunnhölzl|2004|p=555}} and "unwarranted and unprecedented within the greater Madhyamaka tradition."[16]{{refn|group=note|According to Brunnhölzl, writing from a Karma Kagyü (Mahamudra) point of view on Madhyamaka,{{sfn|Brunnhölzl|2004|p=11-12}} "All critics of Tsongkhapa, including the Eighth Karmapa, agree that many features of his Centrism are novelties that are not found in any Indian sources and see this as a major flaw."{{sfn|Brunnhölzl|2004|p=555}} Yet, Brunnhölzl also notes that "the point here is whether what is said accords with and serves to accomplish the Buddha’s fundamental concern of liberation from cyclic existence and attaining Buddhood."{{sfn|Brunnhölzl|2004|p=556}}}} According to Thupten Jinpa, the Gelugpa school sees Tsongkhapa's ideas as mystical revelations from the bodhisattva Manjusri,[63]{{refn|group=note|Thupten: "The traditional Geluk understanding of these deviations in Tsongkhapa's thought attributes the development of his distinct reading of Madhyamaka philosophy to a mystical communion he is reported to have had with the bodhisattva Manjusri [...] It is interesting that the tradition Tsongkhapa is claiming to honour is, in a strict sense, not the existing system in Tibet; rather, it appears to be in the tradition of Manjusri as revealed in a mystic vision![63]}} whereas Gorampa accused him of being inspired by a demon.{{sfn|Thakchoe|2004|p=125}}{{sfn|Cabezón|Dargyay|2007|p=17}}{{refn|group=note|Sonam Thakchoe or José Cabezón: "Gorampa, in the Lta ba ngan sel (Eliminating the Erroneous View), accuses Tsongkhapa of being "seized by demons" (bdud kyis zin pa) and in the Lta ba'i shan 'byed (Distinguishing Views) decries him as a "nihilistic Madhyamika" (dbu ma chad lta ba) who is spreading "demonic words" (bdud kyi tshig)."{{sfn|Thakchoe|2004|p=125}}{{sfn|Cabezón|Dargyay|2007|p=17}}}} Brunnhölzl further notes that, according to his Karma Kagyü (Mahamudra) critics, Tsongkhapa was mistaken in some regards in his understanding of emptiness,{{sfn|Brunnhölzl|2004|p=558-560}} taking it as a real existent, and thereby hindering the liberation of his followers.{{sfn|Brunnhölzl|2004|p=556}}{{refn|group=note|According to Karmapa Mikyö Dorje, as described by Brunnhölzl, there are "two main types of misunderstanding emptiness: Hornlike object of negationKarl Brunnholzl notes that Tsongkhapa's "object of negation," the "phantom notion of 'real existence' different from the 'table that is established through valid cognition'," is called a "hornlike object of negation" by his critics: Tsongkhapa first puts a horn on the head of the rabbit, and then removes it again, a maneuver which "affects neither the rabbit's existence nor your taking the rabbit for a rabbit." According to Brunnholzl, {{quote|This is precisely why it is said that such an approach to the object of negation is not suitable for relinquishing the reifying clinging to persons and phenomena and thus does not lead to liberation from cyclic existence. Through negating the hornlike object of negation called “real existence” with regard to a table, we will neither relinquish the clinging to the reality of this table nor realize its ultimate nature.{{sfn|Brunnholzl|2004|p=565}}{{refn|group=note|The subtle difference between "conventional existence" and "true existence," and the dangers it entails when not understanding it, has also been noted and accepted by later critics of Tsongkhapa, such as Mipham Rinpoche. Padmakara Translation Group: "Mipham Rinpoche attacked it tirelessly as a pernicious distortion that actively hinders the experience of the absence of conceptual construction, which alone is the hallmark of the true realization of emptiness. It is clear, however, that Mipham’s attack was not directed at Tsongkhapa personally, about whom he invariably speaks in respectful terms. His critique, like that of Gendun Chöpel in his Ornament of Nagarjuna’s Meaning, is directed at a possible misrepresentation of Tsongkhapa’s meaning, resulting in what Jeffrey Hopkins refers to as a "pedagogical fault." The assertion that 'the pot is not empty of pot but of true existence' — by someone for whom the distinction between the object of negation and the basis of negation means nothing on the experiential or even intellectual level — far from calling into question the apparent reality of phenomena, tends instead to confirm the deep-rooted habitual belief in substantial reality. In the last analysis, it is a species of realism. It involves a separation of the two truths and is in practice indistinguishable from Bhavaviveka’s Svatantrika assertion that phenomena, though empty ultimately, exist according to their characteristics on the conventional level."[65]}}}}WorksTsongkhapa promoted the study of logic, encouraged formal debates as part of Dharma studies,[9] and instructed disciples in the Guhyasamāja, Kalacakra, and Hevajra Tantras.[9] Tsongkhapa's writings comprise eighteen volumes, with the largest amount being on Guhyasamāja tantra. These 18 volumes contain hundreds of titles relating to all aspects of Buddhist teachings and clarify some of the most difficult topics of Sutrayana and Vajrayana teachings. Tsongkhapa's main treatises and commentaries on Madhyamaka are based on the tradition descended from Nagarjuna as elucidated by Buddhapālita and Candrakīrti. Major worksMajor works among them are:
English translations
See also
Notes1. ^{{cite web|last1=van Schaik|first1=Sam|title=Amdo Notes III: Gold and turquoise temples|url=http://earlytibet.com/2010/08/25/amdo-notes-iii//|website=early Tibet|accessdate=11 November 2014}} 2. ^1 2 {{cite book|author=陈庆英|title=达赖喇嘛转世及历史定制英|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=haMIsdC3iZwC&pg=PA11|year=2005|publisher=五洲传播出版社|isbn=978-7-5085-0745-3|pages=6–}} 3. ^Heart Jewel: The Essential Practices of Kadampa Buddhism, p. 3, Tharpa Publications (2nd. ed., 1997) {{ISBN|978-0-948006-56-2}} 4. ^{{harvnb|Cabezón|Dargyay|2007|p=9386}} 5. ^Geshe Tenzin Zopa, LAM RIM Graduated Path to Enlightenment, p. 7 6. ^The Life of Shabkar: The Autobiography of a Tibetan yogin by Źabs-dkar Tshogs-drug-raṅ-grol, Matthieu Ricard. State University of New York Press: 1994. {{ISBN|0-7914-1835-9}} pg 25[https://books.google.com/books?id=IA1VhyLNIccC&pg=PA25&lpg=PA25&dq=%22lho+brag+grub+chen%22&source=bl&ots=L341bTHKyL&sig=IngcIcJn-lXAIbnouJy9yy_8KWc&hl=en&ei=R39_TdaaM8Tk0gHTpK2PCQ&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=5&ved=0CDEQ6AEwBA#v=onepage&q=%22lho%20brag%20grub%20chen%22&f=false] 7. ^{{harvnb|Thurman|2009|p=9}} 8. ^1 {{harvnb|Thurman|2009|p=34}} 9. ^1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Crystal Mirror VI : 1971, Dharma Publishing, page 464, 0-913546-59-3 10. ^{{Cite web|first=Alexander |last=Berzin|authorlink=Alexander Berzin (scholar)|title=The Life of Tsongkhapa|date=December 2003|url=http://studybuddhism.com/en/tibetan-buddhism/spiritual-teachers/tsongkhapa/the-life-of-tsongkhapa|website=Study Buddhism|accessdate=2016-06-06}} 11. ^Halkias, Georgios. Luminous Bliss: a Religious History of Pure Land Literature in Tibet. With an Annotated Translation and Critical Analysis of the Orgyen-ling golden short Sukhāvatīvyūha-sūtra. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2013, Chapter 4. 12. ^1 Thupten Jinpa. Self, Reality and Reason in Tibetan Philosophy - Tsongkhapa's quest for the middle way. RoutledgeCurzon 2002, pages 68–69 13. ^{{cite web|title=legs bshad gser phreng|url=http://www.tbrc.org/#!rid=W1KG16138|website=Tibetan Buddhist Resource Center|publisher=TBRC}} 14. ^1 2 Ngawang Samten/Garfield. Ocean of Reasoning. OUP 2006, page x 15. ^Gareth Sperham, [https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/tsongkhapa/#MatPer Tsongkhapa: mature period], Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 16. ^1 2 3 4 5 Thomas Doctor, Exploring the Stuff that Madhyamaka Hermeneutics are Made of: A Note on a Clear Predecessor to Tsongkhapa's Prasangika/Svatantrika Distinction {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150324104523/http://about.tbrc.org/rare-tibetan-texts-05-new-sources-for-madhyamaka/ |date=2015-03-24 }} 17. ^Tsongkhapa, The Great Treatise on the Stages of the Path to Enlightenment (Volume Three); {{ISBN|1-55939-166-9}}, pp 225–275 after a very lengthy and well-referenced debate, strongly relying upon Candrakirti's (a Prasaṅgika) analysis of Bhāvaviveka (a Svātantrika) in the Prasanna-padā ('Clear Words' La Vallée Poussin (1970) 28.4–29; sDe dGe Kanjur (Kanakura 1956) 3796: Ha 9a7-b3) 18. ^1 {{Cite book|title=Lamrim Chenmo|last=Tsongkhapa|first=|publisher=|year=|isbn=|location=|pages=229}} 19. ^Jay Garfield (2013), Just Another Word for Nothing Left to Lose: Freedom, Agency and Ethics for Mādhyamikas, p.9-10 20. ^"Prasannapadā", 2b.; trans. Garfield, Candrakīrti. (2003). Sarnath: Gelukpa Student Welfare Committee. 21. ^Madhyamakāvatāra, VI:159", trans. Garfield 22. ^"Madhyamakavatara-bhasya", p.259, trans. Garfield, Candrakīrti. (1992). Sarnath: Kagyud Relief and Protection Society. 23. ^Geshe Kelsang Gyatso, Understanding the Mind Pp 9-12 24. ^Garfield, Jay & Tsongkhapa. Ocean of Reasoning pp 12-3 25. ^Geshe Kelsang Gyatso, Understanding the Mind Pp 9 26. ^Lama Tsongkhapa, Lamrim Chenmo Pg212 27. ^Lama Tsongkhapa, Ocean of Reasoning, pg. 67. 28. ^Lama Tsongkhapa, Ocean of Reasoning, pg. 67. 29. ^1 {{harvnb|Tsong Khapa|2002|pp=152–3, 156–8}} 30. ^Lama Tsongkhapa, Ocean of Reasoning, pg. 67. 31. ^{{Cite book|title=Lamrim Chenmo|last=Tsongkhapa|first=|publisher=|year=|isbn=|location=|pages=279}} 32. ^Rigpawiki, Sevenfold Reasoning of the Chariot 33. ^{{Cite book|title=Lamrim Chenmo|last=Tsongkhapa|first=|publisher=|year=|isbn=|location=|pages=279}} 34. ^Kelsang Gyatso, Understanding the Mind P17 35. ^{{Cite book|title=Lamrim Chenmo|last=Tsongkhapa|first=|publisher=|year=|isbn=|location=|pages=155-157, deeper reading 155-194}} 36. ^Lama Tsongkhapa, Lamrim Chenmo Pg 212 37. ^1 Lama Tsongkhapa, Lamrim Chenmo Pg 213 38. ^Dalai Lama, Alexander Berzin The Gelug-Kagyu Tradition of Mahamudra P 323 39. ^Dalai Lama, Alexander Berzin The Gelug-Kagyu Tradition of Mahamudra P 323 40. ^Dalai Lama, Alexander Berzin The Gelug-Kagyu Tradition of Mahamudra P 323 41. ^Cozart, Daniel Unique Tenets of the Middle Way Consequence School Pg 235 42. ^Gyumed Khensur Rinpoche Lobsang Jampa, [https://fpmt.org/mandala/archives/mandala-for-2013/october/the-easy-path/ Identifying the Object of Negation] 43. ^Duckworth, Douglass. Mipam on Buddha-Nature: The Ground of the Nyingma Tradition Pg 255 44. ^https://fpmt.org/wp-content/uploads/sutras/heart_sutra_bklt_lttr.pdf?x25788 45. ^Alexander Berzin, In Praise of Dependent Arising 46. ^Robert Thurman, Praise of Buddha Shakyamuni for his teaching of Relativity. The Short Essence of Eloquence 47. ^1 2 3 4 5 6 Patrick Jennings, Tsongkhapa: In Praise of Relativity; The Essence of Eloquence {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150518074106/http://thenonbuddhist.com/2014/01/12/tsongkhapa-in-praise-of-relativity-the-essence-of-eloquence/ |date=2015-05-18 }} 48. ^1 2 Susan Kahn, The Two Truths of Buddhism and The Emptiness of Emptiness 49. ^Lama TsongkhapaLamrim ChenmoPg 192 50. ^Pabongka Rinpoche "Liberation in Our Hands" Pg 274-275 51. ^Pabongka Rinpoche "Liberation in Our Hands" Pg 274-275 52. ^Lama Tsongkhapa, Ocean of Reasoning, pg. 59 53. ^Cozart, Daniel. "Unique Tenets of The Middle Way Consequence School" Pg 436 54. ^Cozart, Daniel. "Unique Tenets of The Middle Way Consequence School" Pg 236-7 55. ^Cozart, Daniel. "Unique Tenets of The Middle Way Consequence School" Pg 235 56. ^Cozart, Daniel. "Unique Tenets of The Middle Way Consequence School" Pg 236 57. ^Cozart, Daniel. "Unique Tenets of The Middle Way Consequence School" Pg 236-7 58. ^{{harvnb|van Schaik|2011|p=103}} 59. ^Cozort/Preston : 2003, Buddhist Philosophy, page VIII-IX 60. ^Kyabje Domo Geshe Rinpoche 61. ^{{harvnb|Brunnhölzl|2004|p=17}} 62. ^{{harvnb|Thakchoe|2004|p=4}} 63. ^1 Jinpa, Thupten. Self, Reality and Reason in Tibetan Philosophy. Routledge 2002, page 17. 64. ^{{harvnb|van Schaik|2011|p=109}} 65. ^Introduction to the Middle Way: Chandrakirti's Madhyamakavatara with Commentary by Ju Mipham, Section "Mipham Rinpoche and the Prasangika-Svatantrika Distinction"
References{{reflist|24em}}Sources{{Refbegin}}
Further reading
External links{{wikiquote}}
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