| 词条 | Jurisprudence |
| 释义 |
}}Jurisprudence or legal theory is the theoretical study of law, principally by philosophers but, from the twentieth century, also by social scientists. Scholars of jurisprudence, also known as jurists or legal theorists, hope to obtain a deeper understanding of legal reasoning, legal systems, legal institutions, and the role of law in society.[1] Modern jurisprudence began in the 18th century and was focused on the first principles of natural law, civil law, and the law of nations.[2] General jurisprudence can be divided into categories both by the type of question scholars seek to answer and by the theories of jurisprudence, or schools of thought, regarding how those questions are best answered. Contemporary philosophy of law, which deals with general jurisprudence, addresses problems internal to law and legal systems and problems of law as a social institution that relates to the larger political and social context in which it exists.[3] This article addresses three distinct branches of thought in general jurisprudence. Ancient natural law is the idea that there are rational objective limits to the power of legislative rulers. The foundations of law are accessible through reason, and it is from these laws of nature that human laws gain whatever force they have.[3] Analytic jurisprudence (Clarificatory jurisprudence) rejects natural law's fusing of what law is and what it ought to be. It espouses the use of a neutral point of view and descriptive language when referring to aspects of legal systems.[5] It encompasses such theories of jurisprudence as "legal positivism", which holds that there is no necessary connection between law and morality and that the force of law comes from basic social facts;[4] and "legal realism", which argues that the real-world practice of law determines what law is, the law having the force that it does because of what legislators, lawyers, and judges do with it. Normative jurisprudence is concerned with "evaluative" theories of law. It deals with what the goal or purpose of law is, or what moral or political theories provide a foundation for the law. It not only addresses the question "What is law?", but also tries to determine what the proper function of law should be, or what sorts of acts should be subject to legal sanctions, and what sorts of punishment should be permitted. EtymologyThe English word is derived from the Latin maxim jurisprudentia. Juris is the genitive form of jus meaning law, and prudentia means prudence (also: discretion, foresight, forethought, circumspection. It refers to the exercise of good judgment, common sense, and caution, especially in the conduct of practical matters. The word first appeared in written English[5] in 1628, at a time when the word prudence meant knowledge of, or skill in, a matter. It may have entered English via the French jurisprudence, which appeared earlier. HistoryAncient Indian jurisprudence is mentioned in various Dharmaśāstra texts, starting with the Dharmasutra of Bhodhayana.[6] Jurisprudence in Ancient Rome had its origins with the (periti)—experts in the jus mos maiorum (traditional law), a body of oral laws and customs. Praetors established a working body of laws by judging whether or not singular cases were capable of being prosecuted either by the edicta, the annual pronunciation of prosecutable offense, or in extraordinary situations, additions made to the edicta. An iudex would then prescribe a remedy according to the facts of the case. The sentences of the iudex were supposed to be simple interpretations of the traditional customs, but—apart from considering what traditional customs applied in each case—soon developed a more equitable interpretation, coherently adapting the law to newer social exigencies. The law was then adjusted with evolving institutiones (legal concepts), while remaining in the traditional mode. Praetors were replaced in the 3rd century BC by a laical body of prudentes. Admission to this body was conditional upon proof of competence or experience. Under the Roman Empire, schools of law were created, and practice of the law became more academic. From the early Roman Empire to the 3rd century, a relevant body of literature was produced by groups of scholars, including the Proculians and Sabinians. The scientific nature of the studies was unprecedented in ancient times. After the 3rd century, juris prudentia became a more bureaucratic activity, with few notable authors. It was during the Eastern Roman Empire (5th century) that legal studies were once again undertaken in depth, and it is from this cultural movement that Justinian's Corpus Juris Civilis was born. {{Anchor|Natural law}}Natural lawIn its general sense, natural law theory may be compared to both state-of-nature law and general law understood on the basis of being analogous to the laws of physical science. Natural law is often contrasted to positive law which asserts law as the product of human activity and human volition. Another approach to natural-law jurisprudence generally asserts that human law must be in response to compelling reasons for action. There are two readings of the natural-law jurisprudential stance.
Notions of an objective moral order, external to human legal systems, underlie natural law. What is right or wrong can vary according to the interests one is focused on. John Finnis, the most important of modern natural barristers[7], has argued that the maxim "an unjust law is no law at all" is a poor guide to the classical Thomist position. Strongly related to theories of natural law are classical theories of justice, beginning in the West with Plato's Republic. AristotleAristotle is often said to be the father of natural law.[8] Like his philosophical forefathers Socrates and Plato, Aristotle posited the existence of natural justice or natural right (dikaion physikon, δικαίον φυσικόν, Latin ius naturale). His association with natural law is largely due to how he was interpreted by Thomas Aquinas.[9] This was based on Aquinas' conflation of natural law and natural right, the latter of which Aristotle posits in Book V of the Nicomachean Ethics (= Book IV of the Eudemian Ethics). Aquinas's influence was such as to affect a number of early translations of these passages,[10] though more recent translations render them more literally.[11] Aristotle's theory of justice is bound up in his idea of the golden mean. Indeed, his treatment of what he calls "political justice" derives from his discussion of "the just" as a moral virtue derived as the mean between opposing vices, just like every other virtue he describes.[12] His longest discussion of his theory of justice occurs in Nicomachean Ethics and begins by asking what sort of mean a just act is. He argues that the term "justice" actually refers to two different but related ideas: general justice and particular justice.[13][14] When a person's actions toward others are completely virtuous in all matters, Aristotle calls them "just" in the sense of "general justice"; as such, this idea of justice is more or less coextensive with virtue.[15] "Particular" or "partial justice", by contrast, is the part of "general justice" or the individual virtue that is concerned with treating others equitably.[14] Aristotle moves from this unqualified discussion of justice to a qualified view of political justice, by which he means something close to the subject of modern jurisprudence. Of political justice, Aristotle argues that it is partly derived from nature and partly a matter of convention.[16] This can be taken as a statement that is similar to the views of modern natural law theorists. But it must also be remembered that Aristotle is describing a view of morality, not a system of law, and therefore his remarks as to nature are about the grounding of the morality enacted as law, not the laws themselves. The best evidence of Aristotle's having thought there was a natural law comes from the Rhetoric, where Aristotle notes that, aside from the "particular" laws that each people has set up for itself, there is a "common" law that is according to nature.[17] The context of this remark, however, suggests only that Aristotle thought that it could be rhetorically advantageous to appeal to such a law, especially when the "particular" law of one's own city was adverse to the case being made, not that there actually was such a law.[18] Aristotle, moreover, considered certain candidates for a universally valid, natural law to be wrong.[19] Aristotle's theoretical paternity of the natural law tradition is consequently disputed.{{Citation needed|date=October 2009}} Thomas Aquinas{{Main|Thomas Aquinas}}Thomas Aquinas (Thomas of Aquin, or Aquino, c. 1225 – 7 March 1274) was an Italian philosopher and theologian in the scholastic tradition, known as "Doctor Angelicus, Doctor Universalis". He is the foremost classical proponent of natural theology, and the father of the Thomistic school of philosophy, for a long time the primary philosophical approach of the Roman Catholic Church. The work for which he is best known is the Summa Theologica. One of the thirty-five Doctors of the Church, he is considered by many Catholics to be the Church's greatest theologian. Consequently, many institutions of learning have been named after him. Aquinas distinguished four kinds of law: eternal, natural, divine, and human:
Natural law, of course, is based on "first principles": ... this is the first precept of the law, that good is to be done and promoted, and evil is to be avoided. All other precepts of the natural law are based on this ...[21] The desires to live and to procreate are counted by Aquinas among those basic (natural) human values on which all other human values are based. School of Salamanca{{Main|School of Salamanca|ius gentium}}Francisco de Vitoria was perhaps the first to develop a theory of ius gentium (the rights of peoples), and thus is an important figure in the transition to modernity. He extrapolated his ideas of legitimate sovereign power to international affairs, concluding that such affairs ought to be determined by forms respecting of the rights of all and that the common good of the world should take precedence before the good of any single state. This meant that relations between states ought to pass from being justified by force to being justified by law and justice. Some scholars have upset the standard account of the origins of International law, which emphasises the seminal text De iure belli ac pacis by Grotius, and argued for Vitoria and, later, Suárez's importance as forerunners and, potentially, founders of the field.[22] Others, such as Koskenniemi, have argued that none of these humanist and scholastic thinkers can be understood to have founded international law in the modern sense, instead placing its origins in the post-1870 period.[23]Francisco Suárez, regarded as among the greatest scholastics after Aquinas, subdivided the concept of ius gentium. Working with already well-formed categories, he carefully distinguished ius inter gentes from ius intra gentes. Ius inter gentes (which corresponds to modern international law) was something common to the majority of countries, although, being positive law, not natural law, it was not necessarily universal. On the other hand, ius intra gentes, or civil law, is specific to each nation. Thomas Hobbes{{Main|Thomas Hobbes}}In his treatise, Leviathan (1651), Hobbes expresses a view of natural law as a precept—or general rule, founded on reason—by which a man is forbidden to do that which is destructive to his life, to take away the means of preserving the same, or to omit that by which he thinks it may best be preserved. Hobbes was a social contractarian[24] and believed that the law had peoples' tacit consent. He believed that society was formed from a state of nature to protect people from the state of war that would exist otherwise. According to Hobbes, without an ordered society, life is, "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short". It is commonly said that Hobbes's views on human nature were influenced by his times. The English Civil War and the Cromwellian dictatorship had taken place; and, in reacting to that, Hobbes felt that absolute authority vested in a monarch, whose subjects obeyed the law, was the basis of a civilized society. Lon Fuller{{Main|Lon L. Fuller}}Writing after World War II, Lon L. Fuller defended a secular and procedural form of natural law. He emphasised that the (natural) law must meet certain formal requirements (such as being impartial and publicly knowable). To the extent that an institutional system of social control falls short of these requirements, Fuller argued, we are less inclined to recognise it as a system of law, or to give it our respect. Thus, the law must have a morality that goes beyond the societal rules under which laws are made. John Finnis{{Main|John Finnis}}Sophisticated positivist and natural law theories sometimes resemble each other and may have certain points in common. Identifying a particular theorist as a positivist or a natural law theorist sometimes involves matters of emphasis and degree, and the particular influences on the theorist's work. The natural law theorists of the distant past, such as Aquinas and John Locke made no distinction between analytic and normative jurisprudence, while modern natural law theorists, such as John Finnis, who claim to be positivists, still argue that law is moral by nature. In his book Natural Law and Natural Rights (1980, 2011), John Finnis provides a restatement of natural law doctrine. {{Anchor|Analytic jurisprudence}}Analytic jurisprudence{{Main|Analytic jurisprudence}}Analytic, or "clarificatory", jurisprudence means taking a neutral point of view and using descriptive language when referring to various aspects of legal systems. This was a philosophical development that rejected natural law's fusing of what law is and what it ought to be.[25] David Hume argued, in A Treatise of Human Nature,[26] that people invariably slip from describing what the world is to asserting that we therefore ought to follow a particular course of action. But as a matter of pure logic, one cannot conclude that we ought to do something merely because something is the case. So analysing and clarifying the way the world is must be treated as a strictly separate question from normative and evaluative questions of what ought to be done. The most important questions of analytic jurisprudence are: "What are laws?"; "What is the law?"; "What is the relationship between law and power/sociology?"; and "What is the relationship between law and morality?" Legal positivism is the dominant theory, although there is a growing number of critics who offer their own interpretations. Historical schoolHistorical jurisprudence came to prominence during the debate on the proposed codification of German law. In his book On the Vocation of Our Age for Legislation and Jurisprudence,[27] Friedrich Carl von Savigny argued that Germany did not have a legal language that would support codification because the traditions, customs, and beliefs of the German people did not include a belief in a code. Historicists believe that law originates with society. Sociological jurisprudence{{Main|Sociology of Law}}An effort to systematically to inform jurisprudence from sociological insights developed from the beginning of the twentieth century, as sociology began to establish itself as a distinct social science, especially in the United States and in continental Europe. In Germany, the work of the "free law" theorists (e.g. Ernst Fuchs, Hermann Kantorowicz, and Eugen Ehrlich) encouraged the use of sociological insights in the development of legal and juristic theory. The most internationally influential advocacy for a "sociological jurisprudence" occurred in the United States, where, throughout the first half of the twentieth century, Roscoe Pound, for many years the Dean of Harvard Law School, used this term to characterise his legal philosophy. In the United States, many later writers followed Pound's lead or developed distinctive approaches to sociological jurisprudence. In Australia, Julius Stone strongly defended and developed Pound's ideas. In the 1930s, a significant split between the sociological jurists and the American legal realists emerged. In the second half of the twentieth century, sociological jurisprudence as a distinct movement declined as jurisprudence came more strongly under the influence of analytical legal philosophy; but with increasing criticism of dominant orientations of legal philosophy in English-speaking countries in the present century, it has attracted renewed interest. Legal positivism{{Main|Legal positivism}}Positivism simply means that law is something that is "posited": laws are validly made in accordance with socially accepted rules. The positivist view of law can be seen to be based on two broad principles: Firstly, that laws may seek to enforce justice, morality, or any other normative end, but their success or failure to do so does not determine their validity. Provided a law is properly formed, in accordance with the rules recognized in the society concerned, it is a valid law, regardless of whether it is just by some other standard. Secondly, that law is nothing more than a set of rules to provide order and governance of society. No legal positivist, however, argues that it follows that the law is therefore to be obeyed, no matter what. This is seen as a separate question entirely.
Bentham and Austin{{Main|Jeremy Bentham|John Austin (legal philosopher)}}One of the earliest legal positivists was Jeremy Bentham. Along with Hume, Bentham was an early and staunch supporter of the utilitarian concept, and was an avid prison reformer, advocate for democracy, and firm atheist. Bentham's views about law and jurisprudence were popularized by his student John Austin. Austin was the first chair of law at the new University of London, from 1829. Austin's utilitarian answer to "what is law?" was that law is "commands, backed by threat of sanctions, from a sovereign, to whom people have a habit of obedience".[28] Contemporary legal positivists, H. L. A. Hart particularly, have long abandoned this view, and have criticised its oversimplification. Hans Kelsen{{Main|Hans Kelsen}}Hans Kelsen is considered one of the prominent jurists of the 20th century and has been highly influential in Europe and Latin America, although less so in common-law countries. His Pure Theory of Law describes law as "binding norms", while at the same time refusing to evaluate those norms. That is, "legal science" is to be separated from "legal politics". Central to the Pure Theory of Law is the notion of a "basic norm" (Grundnorm)'—a hypothetical norm, presupposed by the jurist, from which all "lower" norms in the hierarchy of a legal system, beginning with constitutional law, are understood to derive their authority or the extent to which they are binding. Kelsen contends that the extent to which legal norms are binding, their specifically "legal" character, can be understood without tracing it ultimately to some suprahuman source such as God, personified Nature or—of great importance in his time—a personified State or Nation. H. L. A. Hart{{Main|H. L. A. Hart}}In the English-speaking world, the pivotal writer was H. L. A. Hart, professor of jurisprudence at Oxford University, who argued that the law should be understood as a system of social rules. Hart rejected Kelsen's views that sanctions were essential to law and that a normative social phenomenon, like law, cannot be grounded in non-normative social facts. Hart revived analytical jurisprudence as an important theoretical debate in the twentieth century, through his book The Concept of Law.[29] Rules, said Hart, are divided into primary rules (rules of conduct) and secondary rules (rules addressed to officials who administer primary rules). Secondary rules are divided into rules of adjudication (how to resolve legal disputes), rules of change (how laws are amended), and the rule of recognition (how laws are identified as valid). The "rule of recognition" is a customary practice of officials (especially barristers and judges) who identify certain acts and decisions as sources of law. In 1981, Neil MacCormick[30] wrote a pivotal book on Hart (second edition published in 2008), which further refined and offered some important criticisms that led MacCormick to develop his own theory (the best example of which is his Institutions of Law, 2007). Other important critiques include those of Ronald Dworkin, John Finnis, and Joseph Raz. In recent years, debates on the nature of law have become increasingly fine-grained. One important debate is within legal positivism. One school is sometimes called "exclusive legal positivism" and is associated with the view that the legal validity of a norm can never depend on its moral correctness. A second school is labeled "inclusive legal positivism", a major proponent of which is Wil Waluchow, and is associated with the view that moral considerations {{em|may}}, but do not necessarily, determine the legal validity of a norm. Joseph Raz{{Main|Joseph Raz}}Some philosophers used to contend that positivism was the theory that held that there was "no necessary connection" between law and morality; but influential contemporary positivists—including Joseph Raz, John Gardner, and Leslie Green—reject that view. As Raz points out, it is a necessary truth that there are vices that a legal system cannot possibly have (for example, it cannot commit rape or murder). Joseph Raz defends the positivist outlook, but criticised Hart's "soft social thesis" approach in The Authority of Law.[31] Raz argues that law is authority, identifiable purely through social sources, without reference to moral reasoning. Any categorisation of rules beyond their role as authority is better left to sociology than to jurisprudence.[32] Legal realism{{Main|Legal realism}}Legal realism was a view popular with some Scandinavian and American writers. Skeptical in tone, it held that the law should be understood as, and would be determined by, the actual practices of courts, law offices, and police stations, rather than as the rules and doctrines set forth in statutes or learned treatises. Legal realism had some affinities with the sociology of law and sociological jurisprudence. The essential tenet of legal realism is that all law is made by human beings and, thus, is subject to human foibles, frailties, and imperfections. It has become common today to identify Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., as the main precursor of American Legal Realism (other influences include Roscoe Pound, Karl Llewellyn, and Justice Benjamin Cardozo). Karl Llewellyn, another founder of the U.S. legal realism movement, similarly believed that the law is little more than putty in the hands of judges who are able to shape the outcome of cases based on their personal values or policy choices.[33] Many consider the chief inspiration for Scandinavian legal realism to be the works of Axel Hägerström. Despite its decline in popularity, legal realism continues to influence a wide spectrum of jurisprudential schools today, including critical legal studies, feminist legal theory, critical race theory, sociology of law, and law and economics.[34] Critical legal studiesCritical legal studies are a new theory of jurisprudence that has developed since the 1970s. The theory can generally be traced to American legal realism and is considered "the first movement in legal theory and legal scholarship in the United States to have espoused a committed Left political stance and perspective".[35] It holds that the law is largely contradictory, and can be best analyzed as an expression of the policy goals of a dominant social group.[36]Critical rationalismKarl Popper originated the theory of critical rationalism. According to Reinhold Zippelius many advances in law and jurisprudence take place by operations of critical rationalism. He writes, "daß die Suche nach dem Begriff des Rechts, nach seinen Bezügen zur Wirklichkeit und nach der Gerechtigkeit experimentierend voranschreitet, indem wir Problemlösungen versuchsweise entwerfen, überprüfen und verbessern" (that we empirically search for solutions to problems, which harmonise fairly with reality, by projecting, testing and improving the solutions).[37]Legal interpretivism{{Main|Interpretivism (legal)}}Contemporary philosopher of law Ronald Dworkin has advocated a more constructivist theory of jurisprudence that can be characterized as a middle path between natural law theories and positivist theories of general jurisprudence.[38] In his book Law's Empire,[39] Dworkin attacked Hart and the positivists for their refusal to treat law as a moral issue. He argued that law is an "interpretive" concept that requires barristers to find the best-fitting and most just solution to a legal dispute, given their constitutional traditions. According to him, law is not entirely based on social facts, but includes the best moral justification for the institutional facts and practices that we intuitively regard as legal. It follows from Dworkin's view that one cannot know whether a society has a legal system in force, or what any of its laws are, until one knows some truths about the moral justifications of the social and political practices of that society. It is consistent with Dworkin's view—in contrast with the views of legal positivists or legal realists—that {{em|no-one}} in a society may know what its laws are, because no-one may know the best moral justification for its practices. Interpretation, according to Dworkin's "integrity theory of law", has two dimensions. To count as an interpretation, the reading of a text must meet the criterion of "fit". Of those interpretations that fit, however, Dworkin maintains that the correct interpretation is the one that portrays the practices of the community in their best light, or makes them "the best that they can be". But many writers have doubted whether there {{em|is}} a single best moral justification for the complex practices of any given community, and others have doubted whether, even if there is, it should be counted as part of the law of that community. Therapeutic jurisprudence{{Main|Therapeutic jurisprudence}}Consequences of the operation of legal rules or legal procedures—or of the behavior of legal actors (such as lawyers and judges)—may be either beneficial (therapeutic) or harmful (anti-therapeutic) to people. Therapeutic jurisprudence ("TJ") studies law as a social force (or agent) and uses social science methods and data to study the extent to which a legal rule or practice affects the psychological well-being of the people it impacts.[40] {{Anchor|Normative jurisprudence}}Normative jurisprudence{{Main|Political philosophy}}In addition to the question, "What is law?", legal philosophy is also concerned with normative, or "evaluative" theories of law. What is the goal or purpose of law? What moral or political theories provide a foundation for the law? What is the proper function of law? What sorts of acts should be subject to punishment, and what sorts of punishment should be permitted? What is justice? What rights do we have? Is there a duty to obey the law? What value has the rule of law? Some of the different schools and leading thinkers are discussed below. Virtue jurisprudence{{Main|Virtue jurisprudence}}Aretaic moral theories, such as contemporary virtue ethics, emphasize the role of character in morality. Virtue jurisprudence is the view that the laws should promote the development of virtuous character in citizens. Historically, this approach has been mainly associated with Aristotle or Thomas Aquinas. Contemporary virtue jurisprudence is inspired by philosophical work on virtue ethics. Deontology{{Main|Deontological ethics}}Deontology is the "theory of duty or moral obligation".[41] The philosopher Immanuel Kant formulated one influential deontological theory of law. He argued that any rule we follow must be able to be universally applied, i.e. we must be willing for everyone to follow that rule. A contemporary deontological approach can be found in the work of the legal philosopher Ronald Dworkin. Utilitarianism{{Main|Utilitarianism}}{{See also|Lysander Spooner}}Utilitarianism is the view that the laws should be crafted so as to produce the best consequences for the greatest number of people. Historically, utilitarian thinking about law has been associated with the philosopher Jeremy Bentham. John Stuart Mill was a pupil of Bentham's and was the torch bearer for utilitarian philosophy throughout the late nineteenth century.[42] In contemporary legal theory, the utilitarian approach is frequently championed by scholars who work in the law and economics tradition.[34] John Rawls{{Main|John Rawls|A Theory of Justice}}John Rawls was an American philosopher; a professor of political philosophy at Harvard University; and author of A Theory of Justice (1971), Political Liberalism, A Restatement, and The Law of Peoples. He is widely considered one of the most important English-language political philosophers of the 20th century. His theory of justice uses a method called "original position" to ask us which principles of justice we would choose to regulate the basic institutions of our society if we were behind a "veil of ignorance". Imagine we do not know who we are—our race, sex, wealth, status, class, or any distinguishing feature—so that we would not be biased in our own favour. Rawls argued from this "original position" that we would choose exactly the same political liberties for everyone, like freedom of speech, the right to vote, and so on. Also, we would choose a system where there is only inequality because that produces incentives enough for the economic well-being of all society, especially the poorest. This is Rawls's famous "difference principle". Justice is fairness, in the sense that the fairness of the original position of choice guarantees the fairness of the principles chosen in that position. There are many other normative approaches to the philosophy of law, including critical legal studies and libertarian theories of law. See also
Notes1. ^{{Cite web|url=https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/jurisprudence|title=Jurisprudence|last=Staff|first=LII|date=2007-08-06|website=LII / Legal Information Institute|language=en|access-date=2018-09-22}} 2. ^{{cite book|last=Garner|first=Bryan A.|title=Black's law dictionary|year=2009|publisher=West|location=Saint Paul, Minnesota, USA|isbn=0-314-19949-7|pages=Jurisprudence entry|edition=9th}} 3. ^1 Shiner, "Philosophy of Law", Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy 4. ^Soper, "Legal Positivism", Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy 5. ^Oxford English Dictionary, 2nd edition 1989 6. ^{{Cite web|url=http://www.bhu.ac.in/mmak/resent_article/JusticeKatjusLec.pdf|title=ANCIENT INDIAN JURISPRUDENCE|first=Markandey|last=Katju|year=2010|website=|access-date=}} 7. ^{{Cite book|url=https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/841495455|title=The Blackwell guide to the philosophy of law and legal theory|date=2013|publisher=Blackwell Pub|others=Golding, Martin P. (Martin Philip), 1930-, Edmundson, William A. (William Atkins), 1948-, Credo Reference|isbn=9781782683131|location=Malden, Mass.|oclc=841495455}} 8. ^Shellens, "Aristotle on Natural Law." 9. ^Jaffa, Thomism and Aristotelianism. 10. ^H. Rackham, trans., Nicomachean Ethics, Loeb Classical Library; J. A. K. Thomson, trans. (revised by Hugh Tedennick), Nicomachean Ethics, Penguin Classics. 11. ^Joe Sachs, trans., Nicomachean Ethics, Focus Publishing 12. ^"Nicomachean Ethics" Bk. II ch. 6 13. ^Terrence Irwin, trans. Nicomachean Ethics, 2nd Ed., Hackett Publishing 14. ^1 Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. V, ch. 3 15. ^"Nicomachean Ethics", Bk. V, ch. 1 16. ^Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. V, ch. 7. 17. ^Rhetoric 1373b2–8. 18. ^Shellens, "Aristotle on Natural Law," 75–81 19. ^"Natural Law," International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences. 20. ^Louis Pojman, Ethics (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1995). 21. ^{{cite web|url=http://www.ccel.org/a/aquinas/summa/FS/FS094.html#FSQ94A2THEP1|title=Summa Theologica|publisher=}} 22. ^e.g. James Brown Scott, cited in Cavallar, The Rights of Strangers: theories of international hospitality, the global community, and political justice since Vitoria, p.164 23. ^Koskenniemi: "International Law and raison d'état: Rethinking the Prehistory of International Law", in Kingsbury & Strausmann, The Roman Foundations of the Law of Nations, p. 297–339 24. ^Basically meaning: the people of a society are prepared give up some rights to a government in order to receive social order. 25. ^1 See H L A Hart, 'Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals' (1958) 71 Harv. L. Rev. 593 26. ^David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature (1739) Etext {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20060820100015/http://etext.library.adelaide.edu.au/h/hume/david/h92t/ |date=20 August 2006 }} 27. ^Friedrich Carl von Savigny, On the Vocation of Our Age for Legislation and Jurisprudence (Abraham A. Hayward trans., 1831) 28. ^John Austin, The Providence of Jurisprudence Determined (1831) 29. ^H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law (1961) Oxford University Press, {{ISBN|0-19-876122-8}} 30. ^{{Cite web|url=http://www.law.ed.ac.uk/staff/neilmaccormick_51.aspx|title=The University of Edinburgh|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20060601221401/http://www.law.ed.ac.uk/staff/neilmaccormick_51.aspx|archive-date=1 June 2006|dead-url=yes|access-date=24 May 2006|df=dmy-all}} 31. ^Joseph Raz, The Authority of Law (1979) Oxford University Press 32. ^ch. 2, Joseph Raz, The Authority of Law (1979) 33. ^"Jurisprudence". West's Encyclopedia of American Law. Ed. Jeffrey Lehman, ShirellePhelps. Detroit: Thomson/Gale, 2005. 34. ^1 Kristoffel Grechenig & Martin Gelter, The Transatlantic Divergence in Legal Thought: American Law and Economics vs. German Doctrinalism, Hastings International and Comparative Law Review 2008, vol. 31, p. 295–360. 35. ^Alan Hunt, "The Theory of Critical Legal Studies," Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 6, No. 1 (1986): 1-45, esp. 1, 5. See . DOI, 10.1093/ojls/6.1.1. 36. ^Moore, "Critical Legal Studies", Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy 37. ^Reinhold Zippelius, Rechtsphilosophie, 6. Aufl. 2011 Vorwort. 38. ^Brooks, "Review of Dworkin and His Critics with Replies by Dworkin", Modern Law Review, vol. 69 no. 6 39. ^Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire (1986) Harvard University Press 40. ^{{cite journal |last1=Wexler |first1=David B |author-link1=David B. Wexler |last2=Perlin |first2=Michael L |author-link2=Michael L. Perlin |last3=Vols |first3=Michel |display-authors=etal |title=Editorial: Current Issues in Therapeutic Jurisprudence |url=https://lr.law.qut.edu.au/article/view/692/616 |date=December 2016 |volume=16 |issue=3 |pages=1-3 |journal=QUT Law Review |doi=10.5204/qutlr.v16i3.692 |issn=2201-7275 |access-date=7 January 2019}} 41. ^Webster's New World Dictionary of the American Language, p. 378 (2d Coll. Ed. 1978). 42. ^see, Utilitarianism {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070505231025/http://metalibri.incubadora.fapesp.br/portal/authors/m/john-stuart-mill/utilitarianism/ |date=5 May 2007 }} at Metalibri Digital Library References
Further reading
External links{{wiktionary}}
6 : Academic disciplines|Jurisprudence|Legal ethics|Philosophy of law|Roman law|Social philosophy |
| 随便看 |
|
开放百科全书收录14589846条英语、德语、日语等多语种百科知识，基本涵盖了大多数领域的百科知识，是一部内容自由、开放的电子版国际百科全书。