| 词条 | Principle of charity |
| 释义 |
In philosophy and rhetoric, the principle of charity or charitable interpretation requires interpreting a speaker's statements in the most rational way possible and, in the case of any argument, considering its best, strongest possible interpretation.[1] In its narrowest sense, the goal of this methodological principle is to avoid attributing irrationality, logical fallacies, or falsehoods to the others' statements, when a coherent, rational interpretation of the statements is available. According to Simon Blackburn[2] "it constrains the interpreter to maximize the truth or rationality in the subject's sayings." ApplicationNeil L. Wilson gave the principle its name in 1958–59. Its main area of application, by his lights, is determining the referent of a proper name: How should we set about discovering the significance which a person attaches to a given name? […] Let us suppose that somebody (whom I am calling "Charles") makes just the following five assertions containing the name "Caesar." […] Willard Van Orman Quine and Donald Davidson[4] provide other formulations of the principle of charity. Davidson sometimes referred to it as the principle of rational accommodation. He summarized it: We make maximum sense of the words and thoughts of others when we interpret in a way that optimises agreement. The principle may be invoked to make sense of a speaker's utterances when one is unsure of their meaning. In particular, Quine's use of the principle gives it this latter, wide domain. Since the time of Quine et al., other philosophers{{Who|date=August 2011}} have formulated at least four versions of the principle of charity. These alternatives may conflict with one another, so which principle to use may depend on the goal of the conversation. The four principles are:
A related principle is the principle of humanity, which states that we must assume that another speaker's beliefs and desires are connected to each other and to reality in some way, and attribute to him or her "the propositional attitudes one supposes one would have oneself in those circumstances" (Daniel Dennett, "Mid-Term Examination," in The Intentional Stance, p. 343). See also
Footnotes1. ^Normand Baillargeon: Intellectual Self-Defense. Seven Stories Press 2007, p. 78 2. ^{{cite book|last=Blackburn |first=Simon|year=1994|title=The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy|location=Oxford|publisher=Oxford University Press|page=62}} 3. ^{{cite journal|author=Neil L. Wilson|title=Substances without Substrata|journal=The Review of Metaphysics|volume=12|issue=4|pages=521–539|date=June 1959|jstor=20123725}} 4. ^{{cite book| first=Donald| last=Davidson| year=1984| origyear=1974| title=Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation| chapter=Ch. 13: On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme| publisher=Clarendon Press| location=Oxford}} External links
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