“Draft:Douglas Haig in 1916”的意思、由来-开放百科全书

Field Marshal Douglas Haig, 1st Earl Haig, KT, GCB, OM, GCVO, KCIE, ADC, (19 June 1861 – 29 January 1928) commanded the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) from 1915 to the end of World War I. He was commander during the Battle of the Somme, the battle with one of the highest casualties in British military history.

Prelude to the Somme

For the first time (2 January) Haig attended church service with George Duncan, who was to have great influence over him. Haig saw himself as God’s servant and was keen to have clergymen sent out whose sermons would remind the men that the war dead were martyrs in a just cause.^[1] Although sometimes criticised nowadays, e.g. by Laffin who called Haig “blasphemous", such views were not uncommon at the time, on either side, and Duncan later rejected the claim that Haig’s religion made him feel infallible, writing that it made him confident and serene but that there was “not the slightest evidence” that it affected military decisions^[2].

Robertson and Kitchener (who thought that a major offensive starting in March could bring decisive victory by August and peace by November^[3]) both wanted to concentrate British efforts on the Western Front, unlike many in the Cabinet who would have preferred more effort at Salonika or in Mesopotamia. The War Committee (28 December 1915) had only agreed with some reluctance to make preparations for the Somme Offensive, after doubts from Lloyd George and Balfour (who would have preferred operations against the Turks whilst the Germans exhausted themselves in futile attacks), after Kitchener had stressed the need to cooperate with Britain’s allies. Bonar Law backed Robertson at this meeting and again on 13 January 1916, after which Grey also recommended that the Allies attack in the west rather than stand on the defensive.^[4]

Haig and Robertson were aware that Britain would have to take on more of the offensive burden as France was beginning to run out of manpower (and perhaps could not last more than another year at the same level of effort), but thought that the Germans might retreat in the west to shorten their line so they could concentrate on beating the Russians, who unlike France and Britain might accept a compromise peace. Haig thought that the Germans had already had plenty of “wearing out” and that a decisive victory was possible in 1916, and urged Robertson (9 Jan) to recruit more cavalry. Haig's preference was to regain control of the Belgian coast by attacking in Flanders to bring the coast and the naval bases at Bruges, Zeebrugge and Ostend (a view also held by the Cabinet and Admiralty since 1914)^[5] into Allied hands and where the Germans would also suffer great loss if they were reluctant to retreat there.^[3]

Lloyd George visited Haig at GHQ, and afterwards wrote to Haig to say that he had been impressed by his “grip” and by the “trained thought of a great soldier”. Subsequent relations between the two men were not to be so cordial. Haig thought Lloyd George “shifty and unreliable”.^[6]

Haig and Kiggell met Joffre and his chief of staff de Castelnau at Chantilly (14 February). Haig thought that politicians and the public might misunderstand a long period of attrition and thought that only a fortnight of “wearing out”, not three months as Joffre had originally wanted, would be needed before the decisive offensive. Arguments continued over the British taking over a longer section of line from the French.^[7] Haig had thought that the German troops reported near Verdun were a feint prior to an attack on the British - in fact the Verdun Offensive began on 21 February.^[8] GHQ was still drawing up plans for a British attack in Flanders.^[9]

Haig now decided that Verdun had "worn down" the Germans enough and that a decisive victory was possible at once. Rawlinson was more cautious and wanted to seize only the German front line then wait three days, but Haig (who now had more strength than ever before - Griffith, Battle Tactics p53 – the appearance of near success at Neuve Chapelle and Loos if anything held up the development of more sophisticated infantry tactics, as it seemed stronger bombardments and reserves closer to hand were all that was needed) overruled him, demanding he aim to seize the front two German lines and push on towards Combles^[11]. Rawlinson promised to “have it out with (Haig)” but was reluctant to do so^[12]. Travers argued that the BEF got “the worst of both worlds” – strategy that was not tied to tactical realities (i.e. the length and depth of bombardments) and enough meddling to confuse the Army Commanders.^[10] At the Chantilly Conference (December 1915) Foch had tried to tease out Rawlinson’s views but Haig had been suspicious that Foch wanted the British to do more fighting whilst the French took credit for the decisive breakthrough.

After Robertson promised that Haig “would not make a fool of himself” (he told Repington that Haig was “a shrewd Scot who would not do anything rash”), the War Committee finally agreed (7 April) to the Somme Offensive.^[9] The Cabinet were also less optimistic. Kitchener (like Haig’s subordinate Rawlinson) was also somewhat doubtful and would have preferred smaller and purely attritional attacks, but sided with Robertson in telling the Cabinet that the Somme offensive should go ahead. Haig attended a Cabinet meeting in London (15 April) – the politicians were more concerned with the ongoing political crisis over the introduction of conscription, which could potentially have brought down the government – and Haig recorded that Asquith attended the meeting dressed for golf and clearly keen to get away for the weekend.^[11]

The French had already insisted on an Anglo-French attack at the Somme where British and French troops were adjacent to one another, although the French component of the attack was gradually scaled back as reinforcements had to be sent to Verdun^[12]. Haig would have preferred to delay until 15 August to allow for more training and more artillery to be available. When told of this Joffre shouted at Haig that “the French Army would cease to exist” and had to be calmed down with “liberal doses of 1840 brandy”. The British refused to agree to French demands for a joint Anglo-French offensive from the Salonika bridgehead. Eventually – perhaps influenced by reports of French troop disturbances at Verdun – Haig agreed to attack on 29 June (later put back until 1 July). This was just in time, as it later turned out that Petain (commander at Verdun) was warning the French government that the “game was up” unless the British attacked.^[12]

The government – concerned at the volume of shipping space being used for fodder - wanted to cut the number of cavalry divisions. Haig opposed this, believing that cavalry would still be needed to exploit the imminent victory. The Cabinet were in fact mistaken, as most of the fodder was for the horses, donkeys and mules which the BEF still used to move supplies and heavy equipment. Discussing this matter with the King, who thought the war would last until the end of 1917, Haig told him that Germany would collapse by the end of 1916.^[13] This round of planning ended with a sharp exchange of letters with the Cabinet - Haig complained of their interfering in military matters and declared that “I am responsible for the efficiency of the Armies in France”. Lloyd George thought Haig’s letter “perfectly insolent” and that the government “had the right to investigate any matter connected with the war that they pleased”.^[14]

“It seems to me that troops & material are so imbedded in the ground in trench warfare that a general retreat will be most difficult. We ought therefore to be prepared to exploit a success on the lines of 1806” Haig to Robertson (28 May 1916). The tenor of this letter was that his offensive was not directed at breakthrough, only at the possibility of exploiting success, and Robertson told ministers (30 May) that “Haig had no idea of any attempt to break through the German lines. It would only be a move to (rescue) the French”. Robertson was probably not aware of Haig’s insistence, overruling Rawlinson’s earlier plan, on bombarding deeper into the German defences in the hope of “fighting the enemy in the open”.^[15] Frederick Maurice, who worked under Robertson, wrote (29 June) Haig “does not mean to knock his head against a brick wall, and if he finds he is only making a bulge and meeting with heavy opposition he means to stop and consolidate and try somewhere else”.^[16]

The Somme: Opening

From 1 July to 18 November 1916, Haig directed the British portion of a major Anglo-French offensive at the Somme. An attack of seventeen British divisions was planned, with the infantry poorly trained - even if they didn’t advance in the parade ground order of myth (see Prior 2005) Haig and Rawlinson did not impose a uniform standard of tactical training^[11]. Charteris was reporting German morale already damaged and Haig hoped (7 June) to win the war by the end of 1916^[17] - hoping for a breakthrough, he had a small (2 infantry and 3 cavalry divisions) Reserve Army under Gough ready to exploit^[18].

The Somme lines were well-built as the sector had been quiet for some time. Haig wanted a hurricane bombardment but agreed to Rawlinson’s request to shell for a week^[19]. The bombardment consisted of 1.5m shells, but because of the greater width of the attack (20 miles) the British bombardment was only half as intense as the much smaller barrage at Neuve Chapelle over a year earlier^[20] ^[21]. 1,000 field guns and 233 howitzers were used, along with 180 counterbattery guns, which failed to subdue the 598 German field guns and 246 howitzers^[20] or machine guns^[19]. Much of the failure was due to shortcomings in munitions: only 900 tons out of the 12,000 used was High Explosive^[19]. Around a million of the shells were shrapnel, intended to cut barbed wire (testing on the beach at Calais late in 1915 had shown that cutting wire with prolonged shrapnel bombardment needed exactly calibrated cones of fire and good observation; at this stage of the war, High Explosive shells came only with an impact fuse suitable for attacking fixed targets but which if used against wire simply threw it up into the air to land in a heap back in the resulting crater – the 106 graze fuse which enabled HE shells to explode in mid-air and destroy barbed wire (or human bodies) efficiently was not yet available). Around a third of British shells were duds^[20]. Although too much shrapnel was used in the bombardment, Haig was not entirely to blame for this: as early as Jan 1915 Haig had been impressed by evidence of the effectiveness of High Explosive shells and had demanded as many of them as possible from van Donop (Head of Ordnance in the UK).^[22]

The first day saw 57,000 British casualties. North of the Bapaume Road losses were terrible, for negligible gain. The Third Army’s feint at Gommecourt was a total failure^[33]. The 36th (Ulster) Division advanced out into No Mans Land and initially succeeded (although was driven out later) at Thiepval, an area where the bombardment had not worked. The Newfoundlanders lost 91% of their strength, many before they had even reached British front line, let alone crossed No Mans Land. Results were better in the south where the British had the height advantage (allowing them to observe artillery fire) and where the French were able to supply extra artillery support^[23], and it has been suggested that Rawlinson might have captured Trones and Mametz Wood if he had had reserves ready to exploit (Sheffield, Somme 68). Haig initially thought losses were only 40,000^[24] and wrongly blamed some of the failure (eg. on VIII Corps sector) on lack of resolve – it took several days for full reports to reach him^[23].

The Somme: Summer Battles

At a meeting (3 July) Joffre tried to order Haig to renew a major attack attack on Thiepval and Pozieres, but Haig refused, and reminded Joffre that he had no authority to give him orders. Instead, he renewed the attack south of Bapaume Road, where it had been more successful. Rawlinson over-delegated and the result was 46 small attacks and 25,000 casualties over the next fortnight^[25]. Haig, initially sceptical, allowed Rawlinson to conduct a night attack on 14 July on Longueval, Bazentin le Grand and Bazentin le Petit. 1,000 artillery pieces of which 311 were heavy howitzers, were used. The attack was on a 6,000 yards front, down from 20,000 yards on 1 July - and 12,000 yards of support trench, down from 300,000 - so the bombardment was five times more intense. Rawlinson only bombarded for five minutes before 3.25am attack, which seized Trones Wood and Bazentin le Petit, but the cavalry failed at High Wood^[26]. The Germans sent 42 extra divisions to the Somme in July and August, and launched 330 counterattacks. They suspended major operations at Verdun on 11 July, but the French were keen for Haig to keep attacking. On 29 July Haig justified the battle to the British Cabinet largely in terms of attrition^[27]. Instead of calling a halt like previous offensives, this time Haig carried on^[28].

Robertson privately urged caution to to Kiggell (5 July) stressing the need for deliberation and “concentration and not dispersion of artillery fire”, and urging Kiggell “not to show this letter to anyone”. He again wrote to Kiggell (26 July) urging him not let the Germans “beat you in having the better manpower policy”^[29] and Rawlinson (26 July). He had told the Cabinet that the main objective was to relieve the French, not to achieve breakthrough. Henry Wilson thought, probably wrongly, that Robertson was after Haig’s job^[30]. Robertson felt that he was being given insufficient information to give the politicians, especially during July, the month with the highest British casualties of the entire war, at a time when the German Verdun Offensive was already being scaled back. Haig was reluctant to send Robertson full weekly reports and Robertson complained that Haig’s daily telegrams to him contained little more information than the daily press releases. “Not exactly the letter of a CIGS! … He ought to take responsibility also!” was Haig’s comment on one such letter (29 July).^[31]

Charteris predicted that German morale was sagging and that their reserves would be exhausted in six weeks. It has been suggested that Haig was too willing to listen to him^[32].

Haig was criticised by his predecessor Viscount French and in a paper by Winston Churchill, currently out of office, circulated to the Cabinet on 1 August, criticising the high losses and negligible gains of the Somme. Churchill argued that this would leave Germany freer to win victories elsewhere. Churchill’s claim that Allied losses at the Somme exceeded German is now accepted by historians, but at the time Haig attributed Churchill’s views to his “taking drugs” ^[33]. Haig's reply, read to the War Committee on 5 August, stated that the Somme needed to continue into the autumn and that another major offensive would be needed the following year. After the episode of the Churchill memorandum, both Robertson and Esher wrote to Haig reminding him of how Robertson was covering Haig’s back in London, Robertson reminding Haig of the need to give him “the necessary data with which to reply to the swines” (7 and 8 August).^[31]

The period between 15 July to 14 September saw the “forgotten battles”, small attacks around High Wood, Delville Wood, Guillemont, “line straightening” for the benefit of the artillery. Fourth Army suffered 82,000 casualties whilst advancing 1,000 yards over a five mile front – 40% more casualties than on 1 July but gaining less ground^[34].

The Somme: Autumn Battles

Thiepval Ridge was captured (19 August). At this time the Central Powers were being hard pressed by the Brusilov Offensive, and the brief panic caused by the entry of Romania into the war on the Allied side. In the event Romania was quickly crushed with the diversion of only a few German divisions, but not before Falkenhayn had been dismissed as German Chief of Staff (replaced by Hindenburg and Ludendorff, who soon acquired almost dictatorial power in Germany)^[35].

Lloyd George visited GHQ on 11 September. Haig wrote to his wife that he had “no great opinion of Lloyd George as a man or a leader”. Haig felt Lloyd George had lots of ideas but was too quick to change his mind, and was less clear in thought than Asquith. Whilst at GHQ Lloyd George was keen to talk to the press and be filmed for cinema newsreels (Sassoon joked that he had not been able to find a circus elephant for Lloyd George to be filmed riding)^[36].

Lloyd George asked Foch in a private interview why the French had performed relatively better – he criticised other British generals, but not Haig personally. Haig, when told of this by Foch, thought this evidence that Lloyd George was “ungentlemanly” but advised Robertson to let the matter drop rather than confront the War Secretary. Instead Haig and his aide Philip Sassoon encouraged anti-Lloyd George articles in the Northcliffe Press^[37]. Haig cultivated Spender (“Westminster Gazette” – and later Asquith’s biographer), Wickham Steed (“The Times” Foreign Editor) and Gwynne (“Morning Post”). For most of 1917 Haig would enjoy the support of the Northcliffe Press^[38]. Lloyd George sent Viscount French to Joffre’s GQG to inquire about the superiority of French artillery. Haig wrote that “I would not receive Viscount French in my house – I despise him too much personally for that” and was irritated when he learned that Robertson had known in advance of the visit^[39].

Delville Wood started well (3 Sep, brought forward, to Haig’s irritation, at a conference on 27 August), but counterattacks drove the British back. The promised French contribution never materialised, which Haig and Gough blamed on French lack of offensive spirit, but were not overly bothered as they were more focussed on the upcoming 15 September push at Flers-Courcelette^[40]. Haig and Joffre pushed for a major attack on scale of 1 July. Haig overruled Rawlinson and demanded that two lines be taken, so the artillery was half the intensity of 14 July^[41]. 5 cavalry divisions were ready to exploit.

Flers-Courcelette also saw the first use of tanks. Haig was “not the technophobe of popular portrayal” (he also intervened to help develop the Royal Flying Corps, Lewis light machine gun, light and heavy trench mortars) and had ordered 150 tanks (31 July) when he was shown the prototype^[42]. Although Haig had underlined Lt-Col Ernest Swinton’s advice not to use them “in driblets” he felt “I cannot wait any longer for them and it would be folly not to use every means at my disposal in what is likely to be our crowning effort this year” ^[43].

Of the promised 75 tanks, only 49 reached France, 32 of which reached the starting point, whilst further breakdowns meant that only 18 saw action, many becoming stranded in shell-holes and as the artillery had left gaps so as not to break up the ground too much they often faced unshelled German defences. Lloyd George later called the premature use of tanks “a foolish blunder” but it has been pointed out that tanks were not mechanically ready even for what they achieved at Cambrai and Amiens (Sixsmith p96 tank tactics could hardly be developed without combat experience). Many generals were sceptical but Haig (17 September) demanded 1,000 more - more than he would ever actually have at Cambrai or Amiens - and ordered an independent tank organisation to be set up – for which decision he was “far ahead of his time”^[42] ^[43].

However, there was already divergence between MacDonogh and Charteris as to the likelihood of German collapse. Robertson cautioned Kiggell (29 September 1916) not to raise public expectations too much.^[44]

In late September 1916 Haig arranged for research facilities to be set up for the benefit of a Sergeant Scheerer who claimed to have invented a death ray which could kill small animals. By November he had been exposed as a fraud, so Haig had him demoted to private and sent to a busy sector of the front^[45].

The Somme: the End

Haig's tactics in these battles were considered controversial by many, including the then Secretary of State for War Lloyd George, who felt that he incurred unnecessarily large casualties for little tactical gain. However, Lloyd George was unable to intervene in strategy, as General Sir William Robertson, Chief of the Imperial General Staff had been given direct right of access to the Cabinet, in order to bypass Lloyd George's predecessor Kitchener. At the conference at Calais Lloyd George accused Robertson and the War Office of keeping him in the dark. At the War Committee he urged a shift in efforts to the Balkans^[46].

At a War Committee meeting (3 November 1916) without Robertson, Lloyd George complained that the Allies had not achieved any definite success, that the Germans had recovered the initiative, had gained more territory and still had 4m men in reserve. On this occasion Asquith backed him and the committee’s conclusion, which was neither printed nor circulated, was that “The offensive on the Somme, if continued next year, was not likely to lead to decisive results, and that the losses might make too heavy a drain on our resources having regard to the results to be anticipated.” It was agreed to consider offensives in other theatres.^[47]

Throughout the duration of the battle, the French insisted that Haig continue the Somme offensive, even after they went on the offensive at Verdun in October 1916. On 14 November Beaumont Hamel, one of the original targets for the first day, was taken^[48].

The Paris Conference opened on 16 November. (Haig and Joffre had met at Chantilly the previous day and had agreed to resume the Somme offensive in 1917, with the British again playing the major role^[49]). Lloyd George wanted more effort at Salonika but couldn’t get his way.^[50]

The Somme ended on 18 November, having pushed the German front line back {{convert|12|km|mi|abbr=on}} and failed to reach Bapaume, an objective for the first day, and with the BEF having suffered an estimated 420,000 casualties (there were also another 200,000 or so French casualties), almost as many as the average BEF ration strength in 1915. The campaign also resulted in heavy casualties to the German Army that it could ill afford. Charteris estimated German Somme casualties at 680,000 (i.e. exceeding total Allied losses - modern estimates of German losses are lower). Yet the Germans had conquered Romania and by moving to full war mobilisation their Army had increased in size from 169 ½ divisions on 1 June to 197 divisions (of which 70 were in the East, up from 47 ½ on 1 June). Haig claimed (21 November) that 95 German divisions had been defeated on the Somme front, some of them two or three times, that German losses exceeded Allied (sic) and that “an appreciable proportion of the German Army are now practically beaten men, ready to surrender”.^[51]

Charteris' had claimed (13 October) that British divisions inflicted more loss on the Germans than French divisions, and claimed that the Germans, their morale weaker, were fighting less hard than earlier in the year^[52]. By contrast War Office reports in November and December were perfectly clear that the French were suffering much more favourable loss ratios than the British on the Somme, although they attributed better French artillery skills to the French artillery having only increased 2.5 times in size since the start of the war, whereas the British had increased tenfold.^[51]

Haig visited London (22 November) and found the politicians concerned the Lansdowne Memorandum calling for peace as Britain could not continue to fight beyond autumn 1917 - Haig thought Germany would be beaten by then anyway. Haig met with the French generals again at GQG (29 November) and agreed with Joffre and Castlenau that decisive results were possible (Foch thought not)^[50]. He claimed (16 December) that the enemy were “much more ready to surrender” than six months earlier, so the cavalry needed to be kept up to strength^[53]. British artillery had grown more effective, and the Germans were less able to absorb losses than the Allies^[54].

In modern times the Somme has come to be seen as a “national cataclysm” “the tactics of the Stone Age” (the contemporary words of Lovat Fraser as quoted by Laffin). But despite Haig’s many mistakes, including slowness to learn the correct concentration of artillery needed, it is regarded by some historians as costly but important Allied victory – Falkenhayn fell from power, Ludendorff admitted that the retreat to the Hindenburg Line was because Germany did not have the manpower to withstand further “Somme fighting” and Germany was driven to the gamble of unrestricted submarine warfare^[55].

Haig’s preferred option for 1917 was to renew the attack at the Somme, and failing that his long-cherished plan for a Flanders attack^[56]. Asquith (21 November 1916) agreed to an attack towards Ostend and Zeebrugge and in December 1916 Joffre also agreed^[48].

Asquith resigned as Prime Minister (6 December). Haig thought “poor old Squiff” had “more capacity and brainpower than any of the other (politician)s” but welcomed the greater vigour of Lloyd George, who became Prime Minister on 7 December, although he deplored his wish to divert resources to Russia, Palestine or Salonika, concerns which were shared by Robertson and by the King’s adviser Clive Wigram^[57].

References

1. ^Groot 1988, p.218-9
2. ^Wiest 2005, p43
3. ^¹Groot 1988, p. 223-6, p230, p232
4. ^Woodward, 1998, pp38-40
5. ^Terraine, J. The Road to Passchendaele, p. 9.
6. ^Groot 1988, p.226
7. ^Groot 1988, p.228-9
8. ^Groot 1988, p.230
9. ^¹Woodward, 1998, pp40-2
10. ^Travers 1987, pp111, 189
11. ^Groot 1988, p.238-9.
12. ^Groot 1988, p.243-4
13. ^Groot 1988, p.243
14. ^Groot 1988, p.245
15. ^Woodward, 1998, pp42-3
16. ^Woodward, 1998, pp53
17. ^¹²Wiest 2005, p48-50
18. ^¹²Groot 1988, p247-9
19. ^¹²Groot 1988, p250
20. ^¹²Wiest 2005, p50-1
21. ^Prior & Wilson 1996, p.21
22. ^Groot 1988, p.177
23. ^¹²Groot 1988, p252
24. ^Wiest 2005, p54
25. ^Wiest 2005, p54-5
26. ^Wiest 2005, p55-6
27. ^Wiest 2005, p57-8
28. ^Groot 1988, p254
29. ^Woodward, 1998, pp52, 55
30. ^Groot 1988, p256
31. ^¹Woodward, 1998, pp55-7
32. ^Groot 1988, p260
33. ^Groot 1988, p257
34. ^Wiest 2005, p58-9
35. ^Groot 1988, p262
36. ^Groot 1988, p263
37. ^Groot 1988, p260, 264
38. ^Groot 1988, p272
39. ^Groot 1988, p273
40. ^Groot 1988, p265
41. ^Wiest 2005, p59-60
42. ^¹Wiest 2005, p62
43. ^¹Groot 1988, p266
44. ^Woodward, 1998, pp30-3, 55-7
45. ^Groot 1988, p268
46. ^Groot 1988, p273-4
47. ^Woodward, 1998, pp71-2
48. ^¹Wiest 2005, p67
49. ^Groot 1988, p289
50. ^¹Groot 1988, p279-81
51. ^¹Woodward, 1998, pp67-70
52. ^Groot 1988, p270-1
53. ^Groot 1988, p280
54. ^Groot 1988, p275
55. ^Wiest 2005, p63-5
56. ^Prior & Wilson 1996, p.27
57. ^Groot 1988, p281-2

Prelude to the Somme

The Somme: Opening

The Somme: Summer Battles

The Somme: Autumn Battles

The Somme: the End

References

Bibliography

Biographies

Primary sources

External links