- See also
- References
- Bibliography
The Jagiellonian compromise is an electoral system for two-tier voting bodies originally proposed in 2004{{sfn|Słomczyński|Życzkowski|2004}} for the Council of the European Union as a way of achieving "one person, one vote" within the Union.
The compromise was analysed by various authors{{sfnm |1a1=Kirsch |1y=2010 |2a1=Pukelsheim |2y=2010 |3a1=Ratzer |3y=2006}} and received attention in the popular press.[1] The system is based on the square root law of Penrose, which implies that a priori voting power defined by the Penrose–Banzhaf index of a member of a voting body is inversely proportional to the square root of its size. Hence the number of votes obtained by a representative of a state 
with population
is proportional to 
.
Jagiellonian Compromise is based on a single criterion only. Decision of the Council of the Union of 
Member States is taken if the sum of the weights of States voting in favour of a given proposal exceeds the qualified majority quota 
equal to
For a generic distribution of population among States of the Union, the optimal threshold 
decreases with as 
.{{sfn|Życzkowski|Słomczyński|2012}}
See also
{{Portal|Mathematics|Political science}}- List of countries and dependencies by population
- Penrose method
References
Bibliography
{{refbegin|35em|indent=yes}}{{cite book
|last=Kirsch
|first=Werner
|year=2010
|chapter=The Distribution of Power in the Council of Ministers of the European Union
|editor1-last=Cichocki
|editor1-first=Marek A.
|editor1-link=Marek Cichocki
|editor2-last=Życzkowski
|editor2-first=Karol
|editor2-link=Karol Życzkowski
|title=Institutional Design and Voting Power in the European Union
|location=Farnham, England
|publisher=Ashgate Publishing
|pages=93ff
|isbn=978-1-4094-9995-4
|ref=harv
}}
{{cite book
|last=Pukelsheim
|first=Friedrich
|year=2010
|chapter=Putting Citizens First: Representation and Power in the European Union
|editor1-last=Cichocki
|editor1-first=Marek A.
|editor1-link=Marek Cichocki
|editor2-last=Życzkowski
|editor2-first=Karol
|editor2-link=Karol Życzkowski
|title=Institutional Design and Voting Power in the European Union
|location=Farnham, England
|publisher=Ashgate Publishing
|pages=235–254
|isbn=978-1-4094-9995-4
|ref=harv
}}
{{cite journal
|last=Ratzer
|first=Edward
|year=2006
|title=On the 'Jagiellonian Compromise': Voting in the European Union
|url=http://www.inference.phy.cam.ac.uk/ear23/voting/voting.pdf
|location=Cambridge, England
|publisher=University of Cambridge
|access-date=30 August 2017
|ref=harv
}}
{{cite arXiv
|last1=Słomczyński
|first1=Wojciech
|last2=Życzkowski
|first2=Karol
|author2-link=Karol Życzkowski
|year=2004
|title=Voting in the European Union: The Square Root System of Penrose and a Critical Point
|eprint=cond-mat/0405396
|ref=harv
}}
{{cite arXiv
|last1=Życzkowski
|first1=Karol
|author1-link=Karol Życzkowski
|last2=Słomczyński
|first2=Wojciech
|year=2012
|title=Square Root Voting System, Optimal Threshold and π
|arxiv=1104.5213
|ref=harv
}}{{refend}}{{Europe-election-stub}}
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