“Dysrationalia”的意思、由来-开放百科全书

Dysrationalia is defined as the inability to think and behave rationally despite adequate intelligence.^[1] It is a concept in educational psychology and is not a clinical disorder such as a thought disorder. Dysrationalia can be a resource to help explain why smart people fall for Ponzi schemes and other fraudulent encounters.

History

The concept of dysrationalia was first proposed by psychologist Keith Stanovich in the early 1990s. Stanovich originally classified dysrationalia as a learning disability and characterized it as a difficulty in belief formation, in assessing belief consistency, or in the determination of action to achieve one's goals.^[2] However, special education researcher Kenneth Kavale noted that dysrationalia may be more aptly categorized as a thinking disorder, rather than a learning disability, because it does not have a direct impact upon academic performance.^[3]

Psychologist Robert Sternberg argued that the construct of dysrationalia needed to be better conceptualized since it lacked a theoretical framework (explaining why people are dysrational and how they become this way) and operationalization (how dysrationalia could be measured).^[4] Sternberg also noted that the concept had the potential for misuse, as one may label another as dysrational simply because he or she does not agree with the other person's view. Stanovich then replied to both Kavale^[5] and Sternberg.^[6] Stanovich and his colleagues further developed the dysrationalia concept in later books.

In 2002 Sternberg edited a book, Why Smart People Can Be So Stupid, in which the dysrationalia concept was extensively discussed.^[7] In his 2009 book What Intelligence Tests Miss, Stanovich provided the detailed conceptualization that Sternberg called for in his earlier critique.^[8] In that book, Stanovich showed that variation in rational thinking skills is surprisingly independent of intelligence. One implication of this finding is that dysrationalia should not be rare.

Stanovitch proposed two concepts related to dysrationalia: mindware gap and contaminated mindware.^[9]

Examples

One example that can be related to dysrationalia centers on two former Illinois schoolteachers who pulled their children from the local public school in the area because discussions of the Holocaust are a part of the history curriculum.^[1] These parents, who are presumably competent due to their college education, believe that the Holocaust is a myth and should not be taught to their children. This is an example of a problem in belief formation regardless of intelligence.

A survey was given to Canadian Mensa club members on the topic of paranormal belief. Mensa members are provided membership strictly because of their high-IQ scores. The survey results show that 44% of the members believed in astrology, 51% believed in biorhythms, and 56% believed in the existence of extraterrestrial visitors. All these beliefs have no valid evidence.^[1]

There are many examples of people who are famous because of their intelligence, but often display irrational behavior. Martin Heidegger, a renowned philosopher, was also a Nazi apologist and used the most fallacious arguments to justify his beliefs.^[1] William Crookes, a famous scientist who discovered the element thallium and a Fellow of the Royal Society, was continually duped by spiritual mediums yet never gave up his spiritualist beliefs.^[1] Kary Mullis, an American biochemist and 1993 Nobel Prize winner, is also an astrology supporter and a global warming and HIV/AIDS denier.

Further reading

{{cite book |last=Croskerry |first=Pat |date=2015 |chapter=Clinical decision making |editor1-last=Barach |editor1-first=Paul R. |editor2-last=Jacobs |editor2-first=Jeffery P. |editor3-last=Lipshultz |editor3-first=Steven E. |editor4-last=Laussen |editor4-first=Peter C. |title=Pediatric and congenital cardiac care: quality improvement and patient safety |volume=2 |location=London; New York |publisher=Springer Verlag |pages=397–409 |isbn=9781447165651 |oclc=900507959 |doi=10.1007/978-1-4471-6566-8_33}}

{{cite book |last1=Facione |first1=Peter A. |last2=Gittens |first2=Carol Ann |date=2016 |origyear=2011 |title=Think critically |edition=3rd |location=Boston |publisher=Pearson Education |isbn=9780133909661 |oclc=893099404}}

{{cite book |last1=Forsythe |first1=Chris |last2=Liao |first2=Huafei |last3=Trumbo |first3=Michael |last4=Cardona-Rivera |first4=Rogelio E. |date=2015 |title=Cognitive neuroscience of human systems: work and everyday life |series=Advances in human factors and ergonomics series |location=Boca Raton, FL |publisher=CRC Press/Taylor & Francis |isbn=9781466570573 |oclc=796750072}}

{{cite book |editor1-last=Holyoak |editor1-first=Keith J. |editor1-link=Keith Holyoak |editor2-last=Morrison |editor2-first=Robert G. |date=2012 |title=The Oxford handbook of thinking and reasoning |series=Oxford library of psychology |location=Oxford; New York |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=9780199734689 |oclc=773023517 |doi=10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199734689.001.0001}}

{{cite book |last=Kahneman |first=Daniel |authorlink=Daniel Kahneman |date=2011 |title=Thinking, fast and slow |location=New York |publisher=Farrar, Straus, and Giroux |isbn=9780374275631 |oclc=706020998}}

{{cite book |last=Moshman |first=David |date=2011 |origyear=1999 |title=Adolescent rationality and development: cognition, morality, and identity |edition=3rd |location=New York |publisher=Psychology Press |isbn=9781848728608 |oclc=644680695}}

{{cite journal |last=Moshman |first=David |date=October 2000 |title=Diversity in reasoning and rationality: metacognitive and developmental considerations |journal=Behavioral and Brain Sciences |volume=23 |issue=5 |pages=689–690 |url=http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/edpsychpapers/46/}}

{{cite book |last=Moshman |first=David |date=2015 |title=Epistemic cognition and development: the psychology of justification and truth |location=New York |publisher=Psychology Press |isbn=9781848725133 |oclc=883648773}}

{{cite book |last=Nisbett |first=Richard E. |authorlink=Richard E. Nisbett |date=2015 |title=Mindware: tools for smart thinking |location=New York |publisher=Farrar, Straus, and Giroux |isbn=9780374112677 |oclc=889164994}}

{{cite journal |last=Over |first=David |date=February 2010 |title=Dysrationalia: intelligence without rationality |journal=Trends in Cognitive Sciences |volume=14 |issue=2 |pages=55–56 |doi=10.1016/j.tics.2009.11.006}}

{{cite book |editor1-last=Preiss |editor1-first=David |editor2-last=Sternberg |editor2-first=Robert J. |editor2-link=Robert Sternberg |date=2010 |title=Innovations in educational psychology: perspectives on learning, teaching, and human development |location=New York |publisher=Springer Publishing |isbn=9780826121622 |oclc=316035759}}

{{cite book |last=Stanovich |first=Keith E. |authorlink=Keith Stanovich |date=2010 |chapter=Metarationality: good decision-making strategies are self-correcting |title=Decision making and rationality in the modern world |series=Fundamentals of cognition series |location=Oxford; New York |publisher=Oxford University Press |pages=143–162 |isbn=9780195328127 |oclc=318716093}}

{{cite journal |last=Stanovich |first=Keith E. |authorlink=Keith Stanovich |date=November 2009 |title=Rational and irrational thought: the thinking that IQ tests miss |journal=Scientific American Mind |volume=20 |issue=6 |pages=34–39 |doi=10.1038/scientificamericanmind1109-34 |url=http://www.keithstanovich.com/Site/Research_on_Reasoning_files/Stanovich_IQ-Tests-Miss_SAM09.pdf}}

{{cite book |last=Stanovich |first=Keith E. |authorlink=Keith Stanovich |date=2011 |title=Rationality and the reflective mind |location=New York |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=9780195341140 |oclc=648932780 |doi=10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195341140.001.0001}}

{{cite book |last=Stanovich |first=Keith E. |authorlink1=Keith Stanovich |date=2009 |title=What intelligence tests miss: the psychology of rational thought |location=New Haven |publisher=Yale University Press |isbn=9780300123852 |oclc=216936066 |laysummary=http://psychcentral.com/lib/what-intelligence-tests-miss/0005083}}

{{cite journal |last=Stanovich |first=Keith E. |authorlink1=Keith Stanovich |date=January 2016 |title=The Comprehensive Assessment of Rational Thinking |journal=Educational Psychologist |volume=51 |issue=1 |pages=23–34 |doi=10.1080/00461520.2015.1125787 |url=http://www.keithstanovich.com/Site/Research_on_Reasoning_files/Stanovich_EdPsy_2016.pdf}}

{{cite book |last1=Stanovich |first1=Keith E. |authorlink1=Keith Stanovich |last2=West |first2=Richard F. |last3=Toplak |first3=Maggie E. |date=2016 |title=The rationality quotient: toward a test of rational thinking |location=Cambridge, MA |publisher=MIT Press |isbn=9780262034845 |oclc=946254542}}

{{cite journal |last=Walton |first=Douglas N. |authorlink=Doug Walton |date=2010 |title=Why fallacies appear to be better arguments than they are |journal=Informal Logic |volume=30 |issue=2 |pages=159–184 |url=http://ojs.uwindsor.ca/ojs/leddy/index.php/informal_logic/article/view/2868}}

History

Examples

See also

Notes

Further reading

External links