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词条 China–Venezuela relations
释义

  1. Hugo Chávez and China

  2. Trade and investments since Chávez (1999-present)

  3. Maduro era and presidential crisis

  4. See also

  5. Sources

{{Short description|1=Diplomatic relations between the People's Republic of China and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela}}{{Update|date=September 2018}}{{Infobox Bilateral relations|China–Venezuela|China|Venezuela|filetype=svg}}

China–Venezuela relations are the international relations between the People’s Republic of China and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. Formal diplomatic relations between both countries were not established until 1974, and before 1999 only one sitting president, Luis Herrera Campins, had visited China[1]. Cooperation began growing significantly during the Presidency of Hugo Chávez of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and the tenure of Hu Jintao as the leader of the People's Republic of China. Sino-Venezuelan trade was less than $500m per year before 1999, and reached $7.5bn in 2009, making China Venezuela's second-largest trade partner,[2] and Venezuela is China's biggest investment destination in Latin America. Various bilateral deals have seen China invest billions in Venezuela, and Venezuela increase exports of oil and other resources to China. In 2016, Sino-Venezuelan trade amounted to $7.42 billion dollars, with $4.9 billion dollars coming from Venezuelan exports and $2.52 billion coming from Chinese exports[3].

Hugo Chávez and China

Formal diplomatic relations between the Chinese and Venezuelan governments were not established until 1974. Before 1999, only one sitting Venezuelan president had visited the People’s Republic of China: Luis Herrera Campins, who visited in 1981.[1] As a result, up until 1999 there had only been 19 formal agreements between China and Venezuela, and only two of these would be ratified by both sides[4]. The nature of Sino-Venezuelan relations completely changed once Hugo Chávez won the 1999 Venezuelan Presidential elections.

From the outset of his presidency, Hugo Chávez sought to distance himself from the United States and court other allies that could help him find alternative sources of trade, diplomatic and military relations. During the first year of his presidency, he visited China and would accumulate the greatest number of visits to China out of any other Latin-American leader during the same period (1999-2012).[5] While giving a speech at Beijing University, Chávez is reported to have stated that “the Bolivarian Revolution is rooted in the ideology of Communist China’s founder, Mao Zedong”. During that same visit, Chávez also proclaimed that Simon Bolivar was a “soul mate of Mao Zedong”[6].

While Sino-Venezuelan relations were not strong at the time of Hugo Chavez’s 1999 election, by his third term in 2012 the alliance between these socialist regimes were stronger than ever before. In terms of their diplomatic ties, Venezuela became a supporter of China on issues relating to Iran and North Korea and they also publicly supported the creation of an international currency, which is a position that China favored.[7] Their military relations also improved under Chávez. During Chavez's administration, China started selling various military products, such as radars and aircraft, and also began performing bilateral military training activities in Venezuela.[1]

Trade and investments since Chávez (1999-present)

Although Venezuela has the greatest amount of oil reserves outside of the Middle East, the type of oil it produces, it’s geographical location, and its relationship with the US inhibited Hugo Chavez's administration's ability to expand the exportation of its oil to China.

The biggest obstacle Chávez faced in exporting Venezuelan oil to China was due to the fact that during the early 2000’s, China did not have the machinery in their refineries capable of processing the highly sulfurous Venezuelan oil.[8] This meant that the only oil that China was interested in importing was a specific type of low-grade oil called “orimulsion” which was mainly used to make asphalt.[9] Another factor that constrained Venezuela’s ability to export its oil to China was the size of Venezuela's oil shipment tankers. The tankers were simply too big to fit through the Panama Canal and would have to take a longer route that traversed around southern Africa[10]. The final obstacle to the exportation of oil was a diplomatic one. Since about 60 percent of Venezuela’s oil exports were going to the United States, Chinese officials were worried that by buying more oil that they would become involved in the disputes between Chavez’s anti-US regime and the Bush administration.[11] Because of these factors, in 2005, Venezuela was only exporting 140,000 barrels of crude orimulsion per day. In addition, Venezuela made up only 2 percent of China’s imports and exports in 2003.[12]

From 2003 until 2012 Sino-Venezuelan economic ties grew exponentially stronger. The amount of bilateral trade between China and Venezuela expanded about 24-fold from $742,417,000 in 2003 to $20,000,000,000 in 2012. Moreover, during this same time period, Venezuela became China’s fourth largest supplier of oil.[13]

In September 2008, Venezuela signed a series of energy co-operation deals with China with Hugo Chávez stating that oil exports could rise threefold by 2012, to {{convert|1|Moilbbl/d|m3/d}}.[14] However, by 2012, underinvestment in the oil sector meant that only 640,000 barrels of oil a day were exported to China and 200,000 of those simply went to service Venezuela's huge debts to China.[15] During the first quarter of 2018, only 381,300 barrels of oil were being exported.[16]

Further trade agreements worth $12bn were signed in February 2009, and Venezuela's first cell phone factory, built with Chinese support, was inaugurated.[17] In February 2009 Venezuela and China agreed to double their joint investment fund to $12 billion and signed agreements to boost co-operation which include increasing oil exports from Venezuela, China's fourth biggest oil provider. An oil refinery is planned be built in China to handle Venezuelan heavy crude from the Orinoco basin. "It is part of a strategic alliance" Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez said, after meeting the visiting Chinese Vice President Xi Jinping who stated that "our co-operation is highly beneficial".[18]

In 2009, China entered into a partnership with Venezuela to launch a railway company in Venezuela which will be 40% controlled by the China Railways Engineering Corporation (CREC) and the remainder by Venezuela. Venezuela outlined the role of the venture as one which would link Venezuela's oil producing regions and agricultural farming areas.[19] In September 2009 Venezuela announced a new $16bn deal with China to drill for oil in a joint venture with PDVSA to produce {{convert|450000|oilbbl/d|m3/d}} of extra heavy crude. Hugo Chavez stated that "In addition, there will be a flood of technology into the country, with China going to build drilling platforms, oil rigs, railroads, houses.".[20] In September 2013, China decided to lend $50bn over 5 years to finance 201 housing projects in Venezuela.[21]

Maduro era and presidential crisis

Hugo Chávez died in March 2013. A special presidential election was held in April, which was won by Chávez's Vice President, Nicolás Maduro. Maduro was reelected for a second term in May 2018, but the result was denouced as fradulent by most neighboring countries and the United States; China, however, recognized the elections.[22]

In January 2019, the opposition-controlled National Assembly declared that Maduro's reelection was invalid and declared its president, Juan Guaidó, to be acting president of the Venezuela. The United States, Canada, Brazil and several Latin American countries recognized Guaidó as interim president. China, however, expressed support for Maduro.[23] In February 2019, China along with Russia vetoed a United Nations Security Council resolution calling for new presidential elections in Venezuela.[24]

See also

  • Venesat-1
  • VIT, C.A.
  • Vergatario
  • Fatherland Card

Sources

1. ^Ríos, Xulio. “China and Venezuela: Ambitions and Complexities of an Improving Relationship.” East Asia, vol. 30, no. 1, 6 Jan. 2013, p. 53., doi:10.1007/s12140-012-9185-0.
2. ^Venezuelanalysis.com, 3 August 2010, Latest Venezuela-China Deals: Orinoco Agriculture, Civil Aviation, Steel, and $5 Billion Credit Line
3. ^Simoes, Alexander. “What Does China Export to Venezuela.” The Observatory of Economic Complexity, MIT Media Lab, 2010, atlas.media.mit.edu/en/visualize/tree_map/hs92/export/chn/ven/show/2016/.
4. ^Ríos, Xulio. “China and Venezuela: Ambitions and Complexities of an Improving Relationship.” East Asia, vol. 30, no. 1, 6 Jan. 2013, p. 59., doi:10.1007/s12140-012-9185-0.
5. ^Dominguez, Jorge I. “China’s Relations With Latin America: Shared Gains, Asymmetric Hopes.” Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, 1 June 2006, p. 41 wcfia.harvard.edu/publications/chinas-relations-latin-america-shared-gains-asymmetric-hopes.
6. ^Dominguez, Jorge I. “China’s Relations With Latin America: Shared Gains, Asymmetric Hopes.” Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, 1 June 2006, p. 44 wcfia.harvard.edu/publications/chinas-relations-latin-america-shared-gains-asymmetric-hopes.
7. ^  Ríos, Xulio. “China and Venezuela: Ambitions and Complexities of an Improving Relationship.” East Asia, vol. 30, no. 1, 6 Jan. 2013, p. 59., doi:10.1007/s12140-012-9185-0.
8. ^Ratliff, William. “Beijing's Pragmatism Meets Hugo Chavez.” The Brown Journal of World Affairs, vol. 12, no. 2, 2006, p. 78., www.jstor.org/stable/24590620?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents.
9. ^Ratliff, William. “Beijing's Pragmatism Meets Hugo Chavez.” The Brown Journal of World Affairs, vol. 12, no. 2, 2006, p. 79., www.jstor.org/stable/24590620?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents.
10. ^Ratliff, William. “Beijing's Pragmatism Meets Hugo Chavez.” The Brown Journal of World Affairs, vol. 12, no. 2, 2006, p. 79., www.jstor.org/stable/24590620?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents.
11. ^Ratliff, William. “Beijing's Pragmatism Meets Hugo Chavez.” The Brown Journal of World Affairs, vol. 12, no. 2, 2006, p. 80., www.jstor.org/stable/24590620?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents.
12. ^Ratliff, William. “Beijing's Pragmatism Meets Hugo Chavez.” The Brown Journal of World Affairs, vol. 12, no. 2, 2006, pp. 79., www.jstor.org/stable/24590620?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents.
13. ^   Ríos, Xulio. “China and Venezuela: Ambitions and Complexities of an Improving Relationship.” East Asia, vol. 30, no. 1, 6 Jan. 2013, p. 59., doi:10.1007/s12140-012-9185-0.
14. ^{{cite news| url=http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/7634871.stm | work=BBC News | title=Venezuela signs Chinese oil deal | date=25 September 2008 | accessdate=2 May 2010}}
15. ^[https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-20795781 "Hugo Chavez leaves Venezuela in economic muddle."]
16. ^Aizhu, Chen, and Florence Tan. “Venezuela Oil Exports to China Slump, May Hit Lowest in Nearly 8 Years: Sources, Data.” Reuters, 15 June 2018, www.reuters.com/article/us-china-venezuela-oil/venezuela-oil-exports-to-china-slump-may-hit-lowest-in-nearly-8-years-sources-data-idUSKBN1JB0YI.
17. ^Venezuelanalysis.com, 18 February 2009, China, Venezuela Boost Economic Cooperation with US$ 12 Billion Fund
18. ^{{cite news| url=http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/7898809.stm | work=BBC News | title=China and Venezuela boost links | date=19 February 2009 | accessdate=2 May 2010}}
19. ^{{cite news |url=http://www.caribbeannetnews.com/news-17995--12-12--.html |title=China and Venezuela sign $7.5 billion railway deal |accessdate=31 July 2009 |first=Reuters |last=Reuters |authorlink= |coauthors= |date=31 July 2009 |work=CaribbeanNetNews.com |pages= |archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20110611172412/http://www.caribbeannetnews.com/news%2D17995%2D%2D12%2D12%2D%2D.html|archivedate=2011-06-11|dead-url=yes |quote= }}
20. ^Al Jazeera, 17 September 2009, Venezuela-China sign $16bn oil deal
21. ^http://japanese.ruvr.ru/2013_12_29/126622103/
22. ^{{cite web |title=Venezuela election: Fourteen ambassadors recalled after Maduro win |url=https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-44204632 |website=bbc.com |date=22 May 2018 |language=en |accessdate=15 March 2019}}
23. ^{{cite news|url=https://www.cnbc.com/2019/01/24/reuters-america-guaido-vs-maduro-who-backs-venezuelas-two-presidents.html|title=Guaido vs Maduro: Who backs Venezuela’s two presidents?|date=24 January 2019|work=CNBC|accessdate=15 March 2019}}
24. ^{{cite news |last1=Wainer |first1=David |title=Russia, China Veto UN Resolution Seeking Venezuela Elections |url=https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-02-28/russia-china-veto-un-resolution-seeking-venezuela-elections |accessdate=2 March 2019 |work=Bloomberg |date=28 February 2019}}
{{Foreign relations of China}}{{Foreign relations of Venezuela}}{{DEFAULTSORT:China-Venezuela relations}}

3 : China–Venezuela relations|Bilateral relations of China|Bilateral relations of Venezuela

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