| 词条 | Form of life (philosophy) |
| 释义 |
Form of life ({{lang-de|Lebensform}}) is a technical term used by Ludwig Wittgenstein and others in the continental philosophy and philosophy of science traditions. Wittgenstein himself used the term consistently in his works Philosophical Investigations and On Certainty, but other writers have sometimes used it in very different and often mutually incompatible ways. DescriptionComments about a form of life are not explanations meant to comprehend the concept as a whole. The view that stringing together simple, non-controversial statements of ordinary understanding will illuminate something that is supposedly already understood is, in Wittgenstein's view, quite nonsensical. The concept of 'form of life' itself, for example, is extremely difficult to get right, as is indicated by the widely divergent things that have been said about it since Wittgenstein introduced it in the books cited above. In response to a question from an imagined interlocutor, Wittgenstein notes the following: "So you are saying that human agreement decides what is false and what is true?" – It is what human beings say that is false and true; and they agree in the language they use. That is not agreement in opinions but in form of life. (Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, para. 241 [emphasis not in original]) Ordinarily, humans do not step away from their activities in order to justify how or why they say and do what they say and do. However, their activities, when investigated in an historical way, will be found to reflect a particular form of life. When such questions do arise, a philosophical investigation will involve reminding the questioner of certain things he or she takes for granted and which, when noted, can help dissolve the question. We do what we do because we assume a given form of life, which gives our actions, ourselves, and the world meaning. Form of life is what makes meaning itself possible. Use by AgambenItalian philosopher Giorgio Agamben takes up the intersecting concepts of form-of-life, rule-following and use, but besides attempting to deconstruct what Wittgenstein meant, traces these concepts genealogically, in the manner of Stirner or Rousseau. In The Highest Poverty – Monastic Rules and Form-of-Life, Agamben looks at the emerging genre of written rules starting in the 9th century, and its development into both law and something beyond law in the Franciscan form-of-life, in which the Franciscans replaced the idea that we possess our life (or objects generally) with the concept of 'usus', that is 'use'. Agamben finds earlier versions of form-of-life in monastic rules, developing from 'vita vel regula', 'regula et vita', 'forma vivendi', and 'forma vitae'. Thus Agamben takes Wittgenstein's concepts and applies them to the history of Western monasticism in order to rethink the consequences of these concepts for doing (contemporary) politics — the main goal of his Homo Sacer-project, which started with Sovereign Power and Bare Life and to which The Highest Poverty belongs. See also
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3 : Philosophy of science|Continental philosophy|Ludwig Wittgenstein |
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