“Begging the question”的意思、由来-开放百科全书

Begging the question is an informal fallacy that occurs when an argument's premises assume the truth of the conclusion, instead of supporting it. It is a type of circular reasoning: an argument that requires that the desired conclusion be true. This often occurs in an indirect way such that the fallacy's presence is hidden, or at least not easily apparent.

The phrase begging the question originated in the 16th century as a mistranslation of the Latin {{lang|la|petitio principii}}, which actually translates to "assuming the initial point".^[1] In modern vernacular usage, "begging the question" is often^[1] used to mean "raising the question" or "dodging the question".^[1] In contexts that demand strict adherence to a technical definition of the term, many consider these usages incorrect.^[2]

Examples

Both these arguments are logically valid if one assumes the initial premise is correct, then the [https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/conclusion conclusion] logically follows.

But they are flawed because assuming the initial premise is valid also means assuming the conclusion is as well.

History

The original phrase used by Aristotle from which begging the question descends is: τὸ ἐξ ἀρχῆς (or sometimes ἐν ἀρχῇ) αἰτεῖν, "asking for the initial thing." Aristotle's intended meaning is closely tied to the type of dialectical argument he discusses in his Topics, book VIII: a formalized debate in which the defending party asserts a thesis that the attacking party must attempt to refute by asking yes-or-no questions and deducing some inconsistency between the responses and the original thesis.

In this stylized form of debate, the proposition that the answerer undertakes to defend is called "the initial thing" (τὸ ἐξ ἀρχῆς, τὸ ἐν ἀρχῇ) and one of the rules of the debate is that the questioner cannot simply ask for it (that would be trivial and uninteresting). Aristotle discusses this in Sophistical Refutations and in Prior Analytics book II, (64b, 34–65a 9, for circular reasoning see 57b, 18–59b, 1).

The stylized dialectical exchanges Aristotle discusses in the Topics included rules for scoring the debate, and one important issue was precisely the matter of asking for the initial thing—which included not just making the actual thesis adopted by the answerer into a question, but also making a question out of a sentence that was too close to that thesis (for example, PA II 16).

The term was translated into English from Latin in the 16th century. The Latin version, {{lang|la|petitio principii}}, "asking for the starting point", can be interpreted in different ways. {{lang|la|Petitio}} (from {{lang|la|peto}}), in the post-classical context in which the phrase arose, means assuming or postulating, but in the older classical sense means petition, request or beseeching.^[3]^[4] {{lang|la|Principii}}, genitive of {{lang|la|principium}}, means beginning, basis or premise (of an argument). Literally {{lang|la|petitio principii}} means "assuming the premise" or "assuming the original point".

The Latin phrase comes from the Greek {{lang|grc|τὸ ἐν ἀρχῇ αἰτεῖσθαι}} ({{lang|grc-Latn|to en archei aiteisthai}}, "asking the original point")^[5] in Aristotle's Prior Analytics II xvi 64b28–65a26:

Aristotle's distinction between apodictic science and other forms of non-demonstrative knowledge rests on an epistemology and metaphysics wherein appropriate first principles become apparent to the trained dialectician:

Definition

To "beg the question" is to put forward an argument whose validity requires that its own conclusion is true.

Also called {{lang|la|petitio principii}}, the fallacy is an attempt to support a claim with a premise that itself presupposes the claim.^[7] It is an attempt to prove a proposition while simultaneously taking the proposition for granted.

Given the single variable C (claim), "begging the question" is an attempt to assert that {{nowrap|C → C}}. In two variables, {{nowrap|C (claim)}} and {{nowrap|P (premise)}}, it attempts to pass {{nowrap|(C → P) → C}} as the valid claim {{nowrap|P → C}}.{{cn|date=January 2018}} This is a form of circular reasoning, and may involve any number of variables.

When the fallacy involves only a single variable, it is sometimes called a hysteron proteron^[8]^[9]^[10], as in the statement:

This form of the fallacy may not be immediately obvious. Linguistic variations in syntax, sentence structure and literary device may conceal it, as may other factors involved in an argument's delivery. It may take the form of an unstated premise which is essential but not identical to the conclusion, or is "controversial or questionable for the same reasons that typically might lead someone to question the conclusion":^[12]

For example, one can obscure the fallacy by first making a statement in concrete terms, then attempting to pass off an identical statement, delivered in abstract terms, as evidence for the original.^[11] One could also "bring forth a proposition expressed in words of Saxon origin, and give as a reason for it the very same proposition stated in words of Norman origin",^[14] as here:

When the fallacy of begging the question is committed in more than one step, some authors dub it {{lang|la|circulus in probando}} (reasoning in a circle)^[8]^[16] or, more commonly, circular reasoning.

Begging the question is not considered a formal fallacy (an argument that is defective because it uses an incorrect deductive step). Rather, it is a type of informal fallacy that is logically valid but unpersuasive, in that it fails to prove anything other than what is already assumed.^[17]^[18]^[19]

Related fallacies

Closely connected with begging the question is the fallacy of circular reasoning ({{lang|la|circulus in probando}}), a fallacy in which the reasoner begins with the conclusion.^[20] The individual components of a circular argument can be logically valid because if the premises are true, the conclusion must be true, and does not lack relevance. However, circular reasoning is not persuasive because a listener who doubts the conclusion also doubts the premise that leads to it.^[21]

Begging the question is similar to the complex question (also known as trick question or fallacy of many questions): a question that, to be valid, requires the truth of another question that has not been established. For example, "Which color dress is Mary wearing?" may be fallacious because it presupposes that Mary is wearing a dress. Unless it has previously been established that her outfit is a dress, the question is fallacious because she could be wearing pants instead.^[22]^[23]

Another related fallacy is ignoratio elenchi or irrelevant conclusion: an argument that fails to address the issue in question, but appears to do so. An example might be a situation where A and B are debating whether the law permits A to do something. If A attempts to support his position with an argument that the law ought to allow him to do the thing in question, then he is guilty of {{lang|la|ignoratio elenchi}}.^[24]

Contemporary usage

Many contemporary English speakers use beg the question to mean "raise the question", "invite the question", "bear the question", "suggest the question," "evade the question", or even "ignore the question", and follow that phrase with the question, for example: "I own more skateboards than any other person I know, which begs the question: why haven’t I ever learned to ride one?" For grammatical reasons and because the term has a specific, different meaning in philosophy, logic, and law, some commenters note that such usage is mistaken, or at best, unclear^[25]^[26]^[27]^[28] even as sources such as the Merriam-Webster Dictionary and non-prescriptivist critics acknowledge the usage of the phrase as a synonym for “raises the question” as popularly accepted.^[29]

See also

Notes

1. ^{{Cite web|url=https://afterdeadline.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/09/25/begging-the-question-again/|title=Begging the Question, Again|last=Corbett|first=Philip B.|date= September 25, 2008 |website= After Deadline Blog|access-date=7 June 2017}}
2. ^{{cite news |url=http://afterdeadline.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/09/25/begging-the-question-again/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0 |title=Begging the Question, Again |first=Philip B. |last=Corbett |date=25 September 2008 |newspaper=New York Times}}
3. ^¹²{{cite web|last=Liberman|first=Mark|title='Begging the question': we have answers|url=http://languagelog.ldc.upenn.edu/nll/?p=2290|work=Language Log|accessdate=12 January 2012|authorlink=Mark Liberman|date=29 April 2010}}
4. ^{{cite book |first=N. |last=Kretzmann |first2=E. |last2=Stump |year=1988 |title=Logic and the Philosophy of Language |series=The Cambridge Translations of Medieval Philosophical Texts |volume=Volume 1 |publisher=Cambridge University Press |isbn=978-0521280631 |lccn=87030542 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=oh-vE6T_WIcC&pg=PA374 |page=374 |quote=One sort of {{lang|la|petitio}} is common, and another is dialectical; but common {{lang|la|petitio}} is not relevant here. A dialectical {{lang|la|petitio}} is an expression that insists that in the disputation some act must be performed with regard to the statable thing [at issue]. For example, "I require ({{lang|la|peto}}) you to respond affirmatively to 'God exists,'" and the like. And {{lang|la|petitio}} obligates [the respondent] to perform an action with regard to the {{lang|la|obligatum}}, while {{lang|la|positio}} obligates [him] only to maintain [the {{lang|la|obligatum}}]; and in this way {{lang|la|petitio}} and {{lang|la|positio}} differ.}}
5. ^¹{{cite book |first=S.G. |last=Schreiber |year=2003 |title=Aristotle on False Reasoning: Language and the World in the Sophistical Refutations |series=SUNY Series in Ancient Greek Philosophy |publisher=State University of New York Press |isbn=978-0791456590 |lccn=2002030968 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=AICfsOKXhJIC&pg=PA106 |pages=99, 106, 214 |quote=It hardly needs pointing out that such circular arguments are logically unassailable. The importance of the Prior Analytics introduction to the fallacy is that it places the error in a thoroughly epistemic context. For Aristotle, some reasoning of the form "p because p" is acceptable, namely, in cases where p is self-justifying. In other cases the same (logical) reasoning commits the error of Begging the Question. Distinguishing self-evident from non-self-evident claims is a notorious crux in the history of philosophy. Aristotle's antidote to the subjectivism that threatens always to debilitate such decisions is his belief in a natural order of epistemic justification and the recognition that it takes special (dialectical) training to make that natural order also known to us.}}
6. ^Fowler, Thomas (1887). [https://books.google.com/books?id=WdtLAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA145 The Elements of Deductive Logic, Ninth Edition] (p. 145). Oxford, England: Clarendon Press.
7. ^Welton (1905), 279., "Petitio principii is, therefore, committed when a proposition which requires proof is assumed without proof."
8. ^¹Davies (1915), 572.
9. ^Welton (1905), 280–282.
10. ^In Molière's Le Malade imaginaire, a quack "answers" the question of "Why does opium cause sleep?" with "Because of its soporific power." In the original: Mihi a docto doctore / Demandatur causam et rationem quare / Opium facit dormire. / A quoi respondeo, / Quia est in eo / Vertus dormitiva, / Cujus est natura / Sensus assoupire. Le Malade imaginaire in French Wikisource
11. ^¹Welton (1905), 281.
12. ^Kahane and Cavender (2005), 60.
13. ^Herrick (2000) 248.
14. ^Gibson (1908), 291.
15. ^Richard Whately, Elements of Logic (1826) quoted in Gibson (1908), 291.
16. ^Bradley Dowden, "Fallacies" in Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
17. ^{{cite encyclopedia| encyclopedia=Encyclopædia Britannica |title=Fallacy |url=http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/200836/fallacy#ref1102387 |quote=Strictly speaking, {{lang|la|petitio principii}} is not a fallacy of reasoning but an ineptitude in argumentation: thus the argument from p as a premise to p as conclusion is not deductively invalid but lacks any power of conviction, since no one who questioned the conclusion could concede the premise.}}
18. ^{{cite book |title=Plausible argument in everyday conversation |publisher=SUNY Press |author=Walton, Douglas |year=1992 |pages=206–207 |isbn=978-0791411575 |quote=Wellington is in New Zealand. Therefore, Wellington is in New Zealand.}}
19. ^The reason {{lang|la|petitio principii}} is considered a fallacy is not that the inference is invalid (because any statement is indeed equivalent to itself), but that the argument can be deceptive. A statement cannot prove itself. A premiss{{sic}} must have a different source of reason, ground or evidence for its truth from that of the conclusion: Lander University, "Petitio Principii".
20. ^{{cite web |last=Dowden |first=Bradley |url=http://www.iep.utm.edu/fallacy/#CircularReasoning |title=Fallacies |publisher=Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy |date=27 March 2003 |accessdate=5 April 2012}}
21. ^{{cite book |title=Schaum's Outline of Theory and Problems of Logic |publisher=McGraw-Hill Professional |year=1998 |page=205 |isbn=978-0070466494 |last1=Nolt |first1=John Eric |last2=Rohatyn |first2=Dennis |last3=Varzi |first3=Achille}}
22. ^{{cite book |first=M. |last=Meyer |year=1988 |title=Questions and Questioning |series=Foundations of Communication |publisher=W. de Gruyter |isbn=978-3110106800 |lccn=lc88025603 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=nwo5qXTCJewC&pg=PA198 |pages=198–199}}
23. ^{{cite book |first=D.N. |last=Walton |year=1989 |title=Informal Logic: A Handbook for Critical Argument |publisher=Cambridge University Press |isbn=978-0521379250 |lccn=88030762 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=kswimguc5uYC&pg=PA36 |pages=36–37}}
24. ^H.W. Fowler, A Dictionary of Modern English Usage. Entry for {{lang|la|ignoratio elenchi}}.
25. ^{{cite book |first=B.A. |last=Garner |year=1995 |title=Dictionary of Modern Legal Usage |series=Oxford Dictionary of Modern Legal Usage |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0195142365 |lccn=95003863 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=35dZpfMmxqsC&pg=PA101 |page=101 |quote=begging the question does not mean "evading the issue" or "inviting the obvious questions," as some mistakenly believe. The proper meaning of begging the question is "basing a conclusion on an assumption that is as much in need of proof or demonstration as the conclusion itself." The formal name for this logical fallacy is {{lang|la|petitio principii}}. Following are two classic examples: "Reasonable men are those who think and reason intelligently." Patterson v. Nutter, 7 A. 273, 275 (Me. 1886). (This statement begs the question, "What does it mean to think and reason intelligently?")/ "Life begins at conception! [Fn.: 'Conception is defined as the beginning of life.']" Davis v. Davis, unreported opinion (Cir. Tenn. Eq. 1989). (The "proof"—or the definition—is circular.)}}
26. ^{{cite book |author=Houghton Mifflin Company |year=2005 |title=The American Heritage Guide to Contemporary Usage and Style |isbn=978-0618604999 |lccn=2005016513 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=xb6ie6PqYhwC&pg=PA56 |page=56|quote=Sorting out exactly what beg the question means, however, is not always easy—especially in constructions such as beg the question of whether and beg the question of how, where the door is opened to more than one question. [...] But we can easily substitute evade the question or even raise the question, and the sentence will be perfectly clear, even though it violates the traditional usage rule.}}
27. ^Brians, Common Errors in English Usage: Online Edition (full text of book: 2nd Edition, November 2008, William, James & Company) (accessed 1 July 2011)
28. ^Follett (1966), 228; Kilpatrick (1997); Martin (2002), 71; Safire (1998).
29. ^{{Cite news|url=https://www.merriam-webster.com/words-at-play/beg-the-question|title=Beg the Question|access-date=3 November 2018|language=en}}