1. History
     Overview    Indian Wars and Manifest Destiny    New Imperialism and "The White Man's Burden" 

2. American exceptionalism

3. Wilsonian intervention

4. Views of American imperialism
     Empire  

5. U.S. foreign policy debate
     Cultural imperialism  

6. U.S. military bases

7. Benevolent imperialism

8. See also

9. Notes and references

10. Further reading

11. External links

The US is generally agreed to have had a policy of formal imperialism in the late 19th century.^[5] The government of the US does not refer to itself as an empire today, but some commentators refer to it as such, including mainstream Western writers such as Max Boot, Arthur Schlesinger, and Niall Ferguson.^[6]

The United States has also been accused of neocolonialism, sometimes defined as a modern form of hegemony that uses economic rather than military power, and sometimes used as a synonym for contemporary imperialism.

History

Overview

Despite periods of peaceful co-existence, wars with Native Americans resulted in substantial territorial gains for colonists from the United Kingdom. Wars continued intermittently after independence, and an ethnic cleansing campaign known as Indian removal gained for ethnically European settlers more valuable territory on the eastern side of the continent.

George Washington began a tradition of United States non-interventionism which lasted into the 1800s. The United States protected the Americas against European colonial powers under the Monroe Doctrine in 1821, but desire for territorial expansion to the Pacific Ocean was explicit in the doctrine of Manifest Destiny. The giant Louisiana Purchase was peaceful, but the Mexican–American War of 1846 resulted in the annexation of 525,000 square miles of Mexican territory.^[7][8] Elements attempted to expand pro-U.S. republics or U.S. states in Mexico and Central America, the most notable being filibuster William Walker's Republic of Baja California in 1853 and his intervention in Nicaragua in 1855. Senator Sam Houston of Texas even proposed a resolution in the Senate for the "United States to declare and maintain an efficient protectorate over the States of Mexico, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, and San Salvador." The idea of U.S. expansion into Mexico and the Caribbean was popular among politicians of the slave states, and also among some business tycoons in the Nicarauguan Transit (the semi-overland and main trade route connecting the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans before the Panama Canal).

President Ulysses S. Grant attempted to Annex the Dominican Republic in 1870, but failed to get the support of the Senate.

Non-interventionism was wholly abandoned with the Spanish–American War, the United States acquired the remaining island colonies of Spain, with President Theodore Roosevelt defending the permanent acquisition of the Philippines. The U.S. policed Latin America under Roosevelt Corollary, and sometimes using the military to favor American commercial interests (such as intervention in the banana republics and the annexation of Hawaii). Imperialist foreign policy was controversial with the American public, and domestic opposition allowed Cuban independence, though in the early 20th century the U.S. obtained the Panama Canal Zone and occupied Haiti and the Dominican Republic. The United States returned to strong non-interventionist policy after World War I, including with the Good Neighbor policy for Latin America. After fighting World War II, it administered many Pacific islands captured during the fight against Japan. Partly to prevent the militaries of those countries from growing threateningly large, and partly to contain the Soviet Union, the United States has promised to defend Germany (which is also part of NATO) and Japan (through the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between the United States and Japan) which it had formerly defeated in war and which are now independent democracies. It maintains substantial military bases in both. The Cold War reoriented American foreign policy to focus on opposing Soviet communism, and prevailing U.S. foreign policy embraced its role as a nuclear-armed global superpower. Though the Truman Doctrine framed the mission as protecting free peoples against an undemocratic system, under later presidents and the Reagan Doctrine anti-Soviet foreign policy became more coercive and occasionally covert. United States involvement in regime change included overthrowing the democratically elected government of Iran, the Bay of Pigs invasion in Cuba, occupation of Grenada, and interference in various foreign elections.

Many saw the post-Cold War 1990–91 Gulf War as motivated by U.S. oil interests, even though it reversed the hostile invasion of Kuwait and protected treaty ally Saudi Arabia. After the September 11 attacks in 2001, questions of imperialism were raised again as the United States invaded Afghanistan (which harbored the attackers) and Iraq (which the U.S. mostly incorrectly claimed had weapons of mass destruction), and installed friendly governments.

In terms of territorial acquisition, the United States has integrated with full democratic voting rights, all of its acquisitions on the North American continent, including the non-contiguous Alaska. Hawaii has also become a state with equal representation to the mainland, but other island jurisdictions acquired during wartime remain territories, namely Guam, Puerto Rico, the United States Virgin Islands, American Samoa, and the Northern Mariana Islands. The remainder of acquired territories have become independent with varying degrees of cooperation, ranging from three freely associated states which enjoy participation in federal government programs in exchange for military basing rights, to Cuba which became outright hostile during the Cold War. The United States was a strong advocate for European decolonization after World War II, having started a ten-year independence transition for the Philippines in 1934 with the Tydings–McDuffie Act. The United States has also granted citizenship to Native Americans and recognizes some degree of tribal sovereignty.

Indian Wars and Manifest Destiny

A national drive for territorial acquisition across the continent was popularized in the 19th century as the ideology of Manifest Destiny. It came to be realized with the Mexican–American War of 1846, which resulted in the annexation of 525,000 square miles of Mexican territory, stretching up to the Pacific coast.^[7][8]

President James Monroe presented his famous doctrine for the western hemisphere in 1823. Historians have observed that while the Monroe Doctrine contained a commitment to resist colonialism from Europe, it had some aggressive implications for American policy, since there were no limitations on the US's own actions mentioned within it. Scholar Jay Sexton notes that the tactics used to implement the doctrine were "modeled after those employed by British imperialists" in their territorial competition with Spain and France.^[17] Eminent historian William Appleman Williams dryly described it as "imperial anti-colonialism." ^[18]

The Indian Wars against the indigenous population began in the British era. Their escalation under the federal republic allowed the US to dominate North America and carve out the 48 continental states. This is now understood to be an explicitly colonial process, as the Native American nations were usually recognized as sovereign entities prior to annexation. Their sovereignty was systematically undermined by US state policy (usually involving unequal or broken treaties) and white settler-colonialism.^[19] The climax of this process was the California genocide.^[20][21]

New Imperialism and "The White Man's Burden"

A variety of factors converged during the "New Imperialism" of the late 19th century, when the United States and the other great powers rapidly expanded their overseas territorial possessions. Some of these are explained, or used as examples for the various forms of New Imperialism.

• The prevalence of overt racism, notably John Fiske's conception of Anglo-Saxon racial superiority, and Josiah Strong's call to "civilize and Christianize"—all manifestations of a growing Social Darwinism and racism in some schools of American political thought.^[23]
• Early in his career, as Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Theodore Roosevelt was instrumental in preparing the Navy for the Spanish–American War^[24] and was an enthusiastic proponent of testing the U.S. military in battle, at one point stating "I should welcome almost any war, for I think this country needs one".^[25][26][27]

Roosevelt claimed that he rejected imperialism, but he embraced the near-identical doctrine of expansionism. When Rudyard Kipling wrote the imperialist poem "The White Man's Burden" for Roosevelt, the politician told colleagues that it was "rather poor poetry, but good sense from the expansion point of view." ^[28] Roosevelt was so committed to dominating Spain's former colonies that he proclaimed his own corollary to the Monroe Doctrine as justification,^[29] although his ambitions extended even further, into the Far East. Scholars have documented the resemblance and collaboration between US and British military activities in the Pacific at this time.^[30]

Industry and trade are two of the most prevalent motivations of imperialism. American intervention in both Latin America and Hawaii resulted in multiple industrial investments, including the popular industry of Dole bananas. If the United States was able to annex a territory, in turn they were granted access to the trade and capital of those territories. In 1898, Senator Albert Beveridge proclaimed that an expansion of markets was absolutely necessary, "American factories are making more than the American people can use; American soil is producing more than they can consume. Fate has written our policy for us; the trade of the world must and shall be ours."^[31][32]

American rule of ceded Spanish territory was not uncontested. The Philippine Revolution had begun in August 1896 against Spain, and after the defeat of Spain in the Battle of Manila Bay, began again in earnest, culminating in the Philippine Declaration of Independence and the establishment of the First Philippine Republic. The Philippine–American War ensued, with extensive damage and death, ultimately resulting in the defeat of the Philippine Republic.{{sfn|Schirmer|Shalom|1987|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=TXE73VWcsEEC&pg=PA18 18], [https://books.google.com/books?id=TXE73VWcsEEC&pg=PA40-41 40–41]}}^[33][34] According to scholars such as Gavan McCormack and E. San Juan, the American counterinsurgency resulted in genocide.^[35][36]

The maximum geographical extension of American direct political and military control happened in the aftermath of World War II, in the period after the surrender and occupations of Germany and Austria in May and later Japan and Korea in September 1945 and before the independence of the Philippines in July 1946.^[37]

The Philippines is sometimes cited as an example. After Philippine independence, the US continued to direct the country through Central Intelligence Agency operatives like Edward Lansdale. As Raymond Bonner and other historians note, Lansdale controlled the career of President Ramon Magsaysay, going so far as to physically beat him when the Philippine leader attempted to reject a speech the CIA had written for him. American agents also drugged sitting President Elpidio Quirino and prepared to assassinate Senator Claro Recto.^[40][41] Prominent Filipino historian Roland G. Simbulan has called the CIA "US imperialism's clandestine apparatus in the Philippines".^[42]

The U.S. retained dozens of military bases, including a few major ones. In addition, Philippine independence was qualified by legislation passed by the U.S. Congress. For example, the Bell Trade Act provided a mechanism whereby U.S. import quotas might be established on Philippine articles which "are coming, or are likely to come, into substantial competition with like articles the product of the United States". It further required U.S. citizens and corporations be granted equal access to Philippine minerals, forests, and other natural resources.^[43] In hearings before the Senate Committee on Finance, Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs William L. Clayton described the law as "clearly inconsistent with the basic foreign economic policy of this country" and "clearly inconsistent with our promise to grant the Philippines genuine independence".^[44]

American exceptionalism

American exceptionalism is the notion that the United States occupies a special niche among the nations of the world^[45] in terms of its national credo, historical evolution, and political and religious institutions and origins.

Philosopher Douglas Kellner traces the identification of American exceptionalism as a distinct phenomenon back to 19th century French observer Alexis de Tocqueville, who concluded by agreeing that the U.S., uniquely, was "proceeding along a path to which no limit can be perceived".^[46]

President Donald Trump has once said that he does not "like the term" American exceptionalism because he thinks it is "insulting the world". He told tea party activists in Texas that "If you're German, or you're from Japan, or you're from China, you don't want to have people saying that."^[47]

As a Monthly Review editorial opines on the phenomenon, "in Britain, empire was justified as a benevolent 'white man's burden'. And in the United States, empire does not even exist; 'we' are merely protecting the causes of freedom, democracy and justice worldwide."^[48]

Wilsonian intervention

When World War I broke out in Europe, President Woodrow Wilson promised American neutrality throughout the war. This promise was broken when the United States entered the war after the Zimmermann Telegram. This was "a war for empire" to control vast raw materials in Africa and other colonized areas according to the contemporary historian and civil rights leader W. E. B. Du Bois.^[49] More recently historian Howard Zinn argues that Wilson entered the war in order to open international markets to surplus US production. He quotes Wilson's own declaration that

In a memo to Secretary of State Bryan, the president described his aim as "an open door to the world".^[50] Lloyd Gardner notes that Wilson's original avoidance of world war was not motivated by anti-imperialism; his fear was that "white civilization and its domination in the world" were threatened by "the great white nations" destroying each other in endless battle.^[51]

Despite President Wilson's official doctrine of moral diplomacy seeking to "make the world safe for democracy", some of his activities at the time can be viewed as imperialism to stop the advance of democracy in countries such as Haiti.^[52] The United States invaded Haiti in July 1915 after having made landfall eight times previously. American rule in Haiti continued through 1942, but was initiated during World War I. The historian Mary Renda in her book, Taking Haiti, talks about the American invasion of Haiti to bring about political stability through U.S. control. The American government did not believe Haiti was ready for self-government or democracy, according to Renda. In order to bring about political stability in Haiti, the United States secured control and integrated the country into the international capitalist economy, while preventing Haiti from practicing self-governance or democracy. While Haiti had been running their own government for many years before American intervention, the U.S. government regarded Haiti as unfit for self-rule. In order to convince the American public of the justice in intervening, the United States government used paternalist propaganda, depicting the Haitian political process as uncivilized. The Haitian government would come to agree to U.S. terms, including American overseeing of the Haitian economy. This direct supervision of the Haitian economy would reinforce U.S. propaganda and further entrench the perception of Haitians being incompetent of self-governance.^[53]

In World War I, the US, Britain, and Russia had been allies for seven months, from April 1917 until the Bolsheviks seized power in Russia in November. Active distrust surfaced immediately, as even before the October Revolution, British officers had been involved in the Kornilov Affair which sought to crush the Russian anti-war movement and the independent soviets.^[54] Nonetheless, once the Bolsheviks took Moscow, the British began talks to try and keep them in the war effort. British diplomat Bruce Lockhart cultivated a relationship with several Soviet officials, including Leon Trotsky, and the latter approved the initial Allied military mission to secure the Eastern Front, which was collapsing in the revolutionary upheaval. Ultimately, Soviet head of state V.I. Lenin decided the Bolsheviks would settle peacefully with the Central Powers at the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. This separate peace led to Allied disdain for the Soviets, since it left the Western Allies to fight Germany without a strong Eastern partner. The British SIS, supported by US diplomat Dewitt C. Poole, sponsored an attempted coup in Moscow involving Bruce Lockhart and Sidney Reilly, which involved an attempted assassination of Lenin. The Bolsheviks proceeded to shut down the British and US embassies.^[55][56]

Tensions between Russia (including its allies) and the West turned intensely ideological. Horrified by mass executions of White forces, land expropriations, and widespread repression, the Allied military expedition now assisted the anti-Bolshevik Whites in the Russian Civil War, with the British and French giving armed support to the brutal General Alexander Kolchak. Over 30,000 Western troops were deployed in Russia overall.^[57] This was the first event which made Russian–American relations a matter of major, long-term concern to the leaders in each country. Some historians, including William Appleman Williams and Ronald Powaski, trace the origins of the Cold War to this conflict.^[58]

Wilson launched seven armed interventions, more than any other president.^[59] Looking back on the Wilson era, General Smedley Darlington Butler, a leader of the Haiti expedition and the highest-decorated Marine of that time, considered virtually all of the operations to have been economically motivated.^[60] In a 1933 speech he said:{{quote|I was a racketeer, a gangster for capitalism. I suspected I was just part of a racket at the time. Now I am sure of it...I helped make Mexico, especially Tampico, safe for American oil interests in 1914. I helped make Haiti and Cuba a decent place for the National City Bank boys to collect revenues in. I helped in the raping of half a dozen Central American republics for the benefits of Wall Street ... Looking back on it, I feel that I could have given Al Capone a few hints. The best he could do was to operate his racket in three districts. I operated on three continents.^[61] }}

Views of American imperialism

Journalist Ashley Smith divides theories of the U.S. imperialism into 5 broad categories: (1) "liberal" theories, (2) "social-democratic" theories, (3) "Leninist" theories, (4) theories of "super-imperialism", and (5) "Hardt-and-Negri" theories.^[62]{{clarify|date=March 2017}}

There is also a conservative, anti-interventionist view as expressed by American journalist John T. Flynn:

A "social-democratic" theory says that imperialistic U.S. policies are the products of the excessive influence of certain sectors of U.S. business and government—the arms industry in alliance with military and political bureaucracies and sometimes other industries such as oil and finance, a combination often referred to as the "military–industrial complex". The complex is said to benefit from war profiteering and the looting of natural resources, often at the expense of the public interest.^[64] The proposed solution is typically unceasing popular vigilance in order to apply counter-pressure.^[65] Chalmers Johnson holds a version of this view.^[66]

A theory of "super-imperialism" argues that imperialistic U.S. policies are not driven solely by the interests of American businesses, but also by the interests of a larger apparatus of a global alliance among the economic elite in developed countries. The argument asserts that capitalism in the Global North (Europe, the U.S., Japan, among others) has become too entangled to permit military or geopolitical conflict between these countries, and the central conflict in modern imperialism is between the Global North (also referred to as the global core) and the Global South (also referred to as the global periphery) rather than between the imperialist powers.

Empire

Following the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, the idea of American imperialism was reexamined. In November 2001, jubilant marines hoisted an American flag over Kandahar and in a stage display referred to the moment as the third after those on San Juan Hill and Iwo Jima. All moments, writes Neil Smith, express US global ambition. "Labelled a war on terrorism, the new war represents an unprecedented quickening of the American Empire, a third chance at global power."^[69]

On October 15, the cover of William Kristol's Weekly Standard carried the headline, "The Case for American Empire".^[70] Rich Lowry, editor in chief of the National Review, called for "a kind of low-grade colonialism" to topple dangerous regimes beyond Afghanistan.^[71] The columnist Charles Krauthammer declared that, given complete U.S. domination "culturally, economically, technologically and militarily", people were "now coming out of the closet on the word 'empire{{'"}}.^[11] The New York Times Sunday magazine cover for January 5, 2003, read "American Empire: Get Used To It". The phrase "American empire" appeared more than 1000 times in news stories during November 2002 – April 2003.^[72] Two Harvard Historians and their French colleague observed:

Since September 11, 2001 ... if not earlier, the idea of American empire is back ... Now ... for the first time since the early Twentieth century, it has become acceptable to ask whether the United States has become or is becoming an empire in some classic sense."^[73]}}

It used to be that only the critics of American foreign policy referred to the American empire ... In the past three or four years [2001–2004], however, a growing number of commentators have begun to use the term American empire less pejoratively, if still ambivalently, and in some cases with genuine enthusiasm.^[74]}}

US historians have generally considered the late 19th century imperialist urge as an aberration in an otherwise smooth democratic trajectory ... Yet a century later, as the US empire engages in a new period of global expansion, Rome is once more a distant but essential mirror for American elites ... Now, with military mobilisation on an exceptional scale after September 2001, the United States is openly affirming and parading its imperial power. For the first time since the 1890s, the naked display of force is backed by explicitly imperialist discourse.^[75]}}

In the book "Empire", Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri argue that "the decline of Empire has begun".^[76] Hardt says the Iraq War is a classically imperialist war, and is the last gasp of a doomed strategy.^[77] They expand on this, claiming that in the new era of imperialism, the classical imperialists retain a colonizing power of sorts, but the strategy shifts from military occupation of economies based on physical goods to a networked biopower based on an informational and affective economies. They go on to say that the U.S. is central to the development of this new regime of international power and sovereignty, termed "Empire", but that it is decentralized and global, and not ruled by one sovereign state: "the United States does indeed occupy a privileged position in Empire, but this privilege derives not from its similarities to the old European imperialist powers, but from its differences".^[78] Hardt and Negri draw on the theories of Spinoza, Foucault, Deleuze and Italian autonomist Marxists.^[79][80]

Geographer David Harvey says there has emerged a new type of imperialism due to geographical distinctions as well as unequal rates of development.^[81] He says there has emerged three new global economic and political blocs: the United States, the European Union and Asia centered on China and Russia.^[82]{{VN|date=February 2013|reason=The edit at http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=American_imperialism&curid=215140&diff=539849336&oldid=539669263 changed "East Asia centered around China and Japan" to "Asia centered around China and Russia" with no explanatory edit summary. The cited supporting source is not previewable online.}} He says there are tensions between the three major blocs over resources and economic power, citing the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the motive of which, he argues, was to prevent rival blocs from controlling oil.^[83] Furthermore, Harvey argues that there can arise conflict within the major blocs between business interests and the politicians due to their sometimes incongruent economic interests.^[84] Politicians live in geographically fixed locations and are, in the U.S. and Europe,{{VN|date=September 2016|reason=can't see the book so I'm not sure he said this. This is a very 'imperialist' view (only U.S. and Europe democratic) which would appear to be a departure from the rest of his analysis}} accountable to an electorate. The 'new' imperialism, then, has led to an alignment of the interests of capitalists and politicians in order to prevent the rise and expansion of possible economic and political rivals from challenging America's dominance.^[85]

Classics professor and war historian Victor Davis Hanson dismisses the notion of an American Empire altogether, with a mocking comparison to historical empires: "We do not send out proconsuls to reside over client states, which in turn impose taxes on coerced subjects to pay for the legions. Instead, American bases are predicated on contractual obligations — costly to us and profitable to their hosts. We do not see any profits in Korea, but instead accept the risk of losing almost 40,000 of our youth to ensure that Kias can flood our shores and that shaggy students can protest outside our embassy in Seoul."^[86]

The existence of "proconsuls", however, has been recognized by many since the early Cold War. In 1957, French Historian, Amaury de Riencourt, associated the American "proconsul" with "the Roman of our time".^[87] Expert on recent American history, Arthur M. Schlesinger detected several contemporary imperial features, including "proconsuls": Washington does not directly run many parts of the world. Rather, its "informal empire" was one "richly equipped with imperial paraphernalia: troops, ships, planes, bases, proconsuls, local collaborators, all spread wide around the luckless planet."^[88] "The Supreme Allied Commander, always an American, was an appropriate title for the American proconsul whose reputation and influence outweighed those of European premiers, presidents, and chancellors."^[89] US "combatant commanders ... have served as its proconsuls. Their standing in their regions has usually dwarfed that of ambassadors and assistant secretaries of state."^[90] Harvard Historian Niall Ferguson calls the regional combatant commanders, among whom the whole globe is divided, the "pro-consuls" of this "imperium".^[91] Günter Bischof calls them "the all powerful proconsuls of the new American empire. Like the proconsuls of Rome they were supposed to bring order and law to the unruly and anarchical world".^[92] In September 2000, Washington Post reporter Dana Priest published a series of articles whose central premise was Combatant Commanders' inordinate amount of political influence within the countries in their areas of responsibility. They "had evolved into the modern-day equivalent of the Roman Empire's proconsuls—well-funded, semi-autonomous, unconventional centers of US foreign policy".^[93] The Romans often preferred to exercise power through friendly client regimes, rather than direct rule: "until Jay Garner and L. Paul Bremer became US proconsuls in Baghdad, that was the American method too".^[94]

Another distinction of Victor Davis Hanson—that US bases, contrary to the legions, are costly to America and profitable for their hosts—expresses the American view. The hosts express a diametrically opposite view. Japan pays for 25,000 Japanese working on US bases. 20% of those workers provide entertainment: a list drawn up by the Japanese Ministry of Defense included 76 bartenders, 48 vending machine personnel, 47 golf course maintenance personnel, 25 club managers, 20 commercial artists, 9 leisure-boat operators, 6 theater directors, 5 cake decorators, 4 bowling alley clerks, 3 tour guides and 1 animal caretaker. Shu Watanabe of the Democratic Party of Japan asks: "Why does Japan need to pay the costs for US service members' entertainment on their holidays?"^[95] One research on host nations support concludes:

At an alliance-level analysis, case studies of South Korea and Japan present that the necessity of the alliance relationship with the US and their relative capabilities to achieve security purposes lead them to increase the size of direct economic investment to support the US forces stationed in their territories, as well as to facilitate the US global defense posture. In addition, these two countries have increased their political and economic contribution to the US-led military operations beyond the geographic scope of the alliance in the post-Cold War period ... Behavioral changes among the US allies in response to demands for sharing alliance burdens directly indicate the changed nature of unipolar alliances. In order to maintain its power preponderance and primacy, the unipole has imposed greater pressure on its allies to devote much of their resources and energy to contributing to its global defense posture ... [It] is expected that the systemic properties of unipolarity–non-structural threat and a power preponderance of the unipole–gradually increase the political and economic burdens of the allies in need of maintaining alliance relationships with the unipole.^[96]}}

In fact, increasing the "economic burdens of the allies" is one of the major priorities of President Donald Trump.^{[97][98][99][100]} Classicist Eric Adler notes that Hanson earlier had written about the decline of the classical studies in the United States and insufficient attention devoted to the classical experience. "When writing about American foreign policy for a lay audience, however, Hanson himself chose to castigate Roman imperialism in order to portray the modern United States as different from—and superior to—the Roman state."^[101] As a supporter of a hawkish unilateral American foreign policy, Hanson's "distinctly negative view of Roman imperialism is particularly noteworthy, since it demonstrates the importance a contemporary supporter of a hawkish American foreign policy places on criticizing Rome".^[102]

U.S. foreign policy debate

Prior to annexing a territory, the American government still held immense power through the various legislations passed in the late 1800s. The Platt Amendment was utilized to prevent Cuba from entering into any agreements with foreign nations, and also granted the Americans the right to build naval stations on their soil.^[104] Executive officials in the American government began to determine themselves the supreme authority in matters regarding the recognition or restriction of independence.^[104]

When asked on April 28, 2003, on Al Jazeera whether the United States was "empire building", Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld replied, "We don't seek empires, we're not imperialistic. We never have been."^[105]

However, historian Donald W. Meinig says the imperial behavior by the United States dates at least to the Louisiana Purchase, which he describes as an "imperial acquisition—imperial in the sense of the aggressive encroachment of one people upon the territory of another, resulting in the subjugation of that people to alien rule". The U.S. policies towards the Native Americans he said were "designed to remold them into a people more appropriately conformed to imperial desires".^[106]

Writers and academics of the early 20th century, like Charles A. Beard, in support of non-interventionism (sometimes referred to as "isolationism"), discussed American policy as being driven by self-interested expansionism going back as far as the writing of the Constitution. Some politicians today do not agree. Pat Buchanan claims that the modern United States' drive to empire is "far removed from what the Founding Fathers had intended the young Republic to become."^[107]

Andrew Bacevich argues that the U.S. did not fundamentally change its foreign policy after the Cold War, and remains focused on an effort to expand its control across the world.^[108] As the surviving superpower at the end of the Cold War, the U.S. could focus its assets in new directions, the future being "up for grabs" according to former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Paul Wolfowitz in 1991.^[109] Head of the Olin Institute for Strategic Studies at Harvard University, Stephen Peter Rosen, maintains:

A political unit that has overwhelming superiority in military power, and uses that power to influence the internal behavior of other states, is called an empire. Because the United States does not seek to control territory or govern the overseas citizens of the empire, we are an indirect empire, to be sure, but an empire nonetheless. If this is correct, our goal is not combating a rival, but maintaining our imperial position, and maintaining imperial order.^[110]}}

In The Political Economy of the Mass Media, the political activist Noam Chomsky argues that exceptionalism and the denials of imperialism are the result of a systematic strategy of propaganda, to "manufacture opinion" as the process has long been described in other countries.^[111]

Thorton wrote that "[...]imperialism is more often the name of the emotion that reacts to a series of events than a definition of the events themselves. Where colonization finds analysts and analogies, imperialism must contend with crusaders for and against."^[112] Political theorist Michael Walzer argues that the term hegemony is better than empire to describe the US's role in the world;^[113] political scientist Robert Keohane agrees saying, a "balanced and nuanced analysis is not aided ... by the use of the phrase 'empire' to describe United States hegemony, since 'empire' obscures rather than illuminates the differences in form of rule between the United States and other Great Powers, such as Great Britain in the 19th century or the Soviet Union in the twentieth".^[114]

Since 2001,^[115] Emmanuel Todd assumes that USA cannot hold for long the status of mondial hegemonic power due to limited resources. Instead, the USA is going to become just one of the major regional powers along with European Union, China, Russia, etc. Reviewing Todd's After the Empire, G. John Ikenberry found that it had been written in "a fit of French wishful thinking".^[116] The thinking proved to be "wishful" indeed, as the book became a bestseller in France for most of the year 2003.^[117]

Other political scientists, such as Daniel Nexon and Thomas Wright, argue that neither term exclusively describes foreign relations of the United States. The U.S. can be, and has been, simultaneously an empire and a hegemonic power. They claim that the general trend in U.S. foreign relations has been away from imperial modes of control.^[118]

Cultural imperialism

Some critics of imperialism argue that military and cultural imperialism are interdependent. American Edward Said, one of the founders of post-colonial theory, said that,

International relations scholar David Rothkopf disagrees and argues that cultural imperialism is the innocent result of globalization, which allows access to numerous U.S. and Western ideas and products that many non-U.S. and non-Western consumers across the world voluntarily choose to consume.^[120] Matthew Fraser has a similar analysis, but argues further that the global cultural influence of the U.S. is a good thing.^[121]

U.S. military bases

While territories such as Guam, the United States Virgin Islands, the Northern Mariana Islands, American Samoa and Puerto Rico remain under U.S. control, the U.S. allowed many of its overseas territories or occupations to gain independence after World War II. Examples include the Philippines (1946), the Panama canal zone (1979), Palau (1981), the Federated States of Micronesia (1986) and the Marshall Islands (1986). Most of them still have U.S. bases within their territories. In the case of Okinawa, which came under U.S. administration after the Battle of Okinawa during the Second World War, this happened despite local popular opinion.^[127] In 2003, a Department of Defense distribution found the United States had bases in over 36 countries worldwide.^[128]

By 1970,{{update inline|date=May 2018}} the United States had more than 1,000,000 soldiers in 30 countries, was a member of four regional defense alliances and an active participant in a fifth, had mutual defense treaties with 42 nations, was a member of 53 international organizations, and was furnishing military or economic aid to nearly 100 nations across the face of the globe.^[129] In 2015 the Department of Defense reported the number of bases that had any military or civilians stationed or employed was 587. This includes land only (where no facilities are present), facility or facilities only (where there the underlying land is neither owned nor controlled by the government), and land with facilities (where both are present).^[130] Also in 2015, David Vine's book Base Nation, found 800 US military bases located outside of the US, including 174 bases in Germany, 113 in Japan, and 83 in South Korea, the total costs, an estimated $100 billion a year.^[131]

According to The Huffington Post, "The 45 nations and territories with little or no democratic rule represent more than half of the roughly 80 countries now hosting U.S. bases. ... Research by political scientist Kent Calder confirms what's come to be known as the "dictatorship hypothesis": The United States tends to support dictators [and other undemocratic regimes] in nations where it enjoys basing facilities."^[132]

Benevolent imperialism

One of the earliest historians of American Empire, William Appleman Williams, wrote, "The routine lust for land, markets or security became justifications for noble rhetoric about prosperity, liberty and security."^[133]

British historian Niall Ferguson argues that the United States is an empire and believes that this is a good thing: "What is not allowed is to say that the United States is an empire and that this might not be wholly bad."^[137] Ferguson has drawn parallels between the British Empire and the imperial role of the United States in the late 20th and early 21st centuries, though he describes the United States' political and social structures as more like those of the Roman Empire than of the British. Ferguson argues that all of these empires have had both positive and negative aspects, but that the positive aspects of the U.S. empire will, if it learns from history and its mistakes, greatly outweigh its negative aspects.^[138]{{page needed|date=February 2011|reason=page numbers need to be listed; article suffers from excessive OR—what page says this?}}

Another point of view implies that United States expansion overseas has indeed been imperialistic, but that this imperialism is only a temporary phenomenon; a corruption of American ideals or the relic of a past historical era. Historian Samuel Flagg Bemis argues that Spanish–American War expansionism was a short-lived imperialistic impulse and "a great aberration in American history", a very different form of territorial growth than that of earlier American history.^[139] Historian Walter LaFeber sees the Spanish–American War expansionism not as an aberration, but as a culmination of United States expansion westward.^[140]

Historian Victor Davis Hanson argues that the U.S. does not pursue world domination, but maintains worldwide influence by a system of mutually beneficial exchanges.^[141] On the other hand, a Filipino revolutionary General Emilio Aguinaldo felt as though the American involvement in the Philippines was destructive, "the Filipinos fighting for Liberty, the American people fighting them to give them liberty. The two peoples are fighting on parallel lines for the same object."^[142] American influence worldwide and the effects it has on other nations have multiple interpretations according to whose perspective is being taken into account.

International relations scholar Joseph Nye argues that U.S. power is more and more based on "soft power", which comes from cultural hegemony rather than raw military or economic force.^[144] This includes such factors as the widespread desire to emigrate to the United States, the prestige and corresponding high proportion of foreign students at U.S. universities, and the spread of U.S. styles of popular music and cinema. Mass immigration into America may justify this theory, but it is hard to know for sure whether the United States would still maintain its prestige without its military and economic superiority.

See also

• Americanization
• American Century
• Criticism of the United States government
• Indian massacre
• Inverted totalitarianism
• Manifest destiny
• A People's History of American Empire – 2008 book by Howard Zinn, et al.
• Territories of the United States
• Superiority complex
• Washington Consensus
• Neocolonialism
• New Imperialism
• Anti-Americanism
• Anti-imperialism
• Soviet Empire
• Chinese imperialism

{{colend}}

Notes and references

Further reading

• {{cite book|last=Bacevich|first=Andrew|authorlink=Andrew Bacevich|year=2008|title=The Limits of Power: The End of American Exceptionalism|publisher=Macmillan|isbn=0-8050-8815-6}}
• {{cite book|last=Boot|first=Max|authorlink=Max Boot|year=2002|title=The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power|publisher=Basic Books|isbn=0-465-00721-X}}
• {{cite book |last=Brown |first=Seyom |title=Faces of Power: Constancy and Change in United States Foreign Policy from Truman to Clinton |year=1994 |publisher=Columbia University Press |location=New York |isbn=0-231-09669-0 }}
• {{cite book |last=Burton |first=David H. |title=Theodore Roosevelt: Confident Imperialist |year=1968 |publisher=University of Pennsylvania Press |location=Philadelphia |isbn= |asin=B0007GMSSY }}
• {{cite book |last=Callahan |first=Patrick |title=Logics of American Foreign Policy: Theories of America's World Role |year=2003 |publisher=Longman |location=New York |isbn=0-321-08848-4 }}
• {{cite book| last =Card| first =Orson Scott | authorlink =Orson Scott Card| year =2006| title =Empire | publisher=TOR | isbn =0-7653-1611-0}}
• {{cite book |last=Daalder |first=Ivo H. |title=America Unbound: The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy |authorlink=Ivo Daalder |author2=James M. Lindsay |year=2003 |publisher=Brookings Institution |location=Washington, DC |isbn=0-8157-1688-5 }}
• {{cite book| last =Fulbright | first =J. William | authorlink =J. William Fulbright|author2=Seth P. Tillman|year =1989| title =The Price of Empire | publisher=Pantheon Books| isbn=0-394-57224-6}}
• {{cite book |last=Gaddis |first=John Lewis |title=Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy |authorlink=John Lewis Gaddis |year=2005 |edition=2nd |publisher=Oxford University Press |location=New York |isbn=0-19-517447-X }}
• Grandin, Greg, "The Death Cult of Trumpism: In his appeals to a racist and nationalist chauvinism, Trump leverages tribal resentment against an emerging manifest common destiny", The Nation, 29 Jan./5 Feb. 2018, pp. 20–22. "[T]he ongoing effects of the ruinous 2003 war in Iraq and the 2007–8 financial meltdown are... two indicators that the promise of endless growth can no longer help organize people's aspirations... We are entering the second 'lost decade' of what Larry Summers calls 'secular stagnation,' and soon we'll be in the third decade of a war that Senator Lindsey Graham... says will never end. [T]here is a realization that the world is fragile and that we are trapped in an economic system that is well past sustainable or justifiable.... In a nation like the United States, founded on a mythical belief in a kind of species immunity—less an American exceptionalism than exemptionism, an insistence that the nation was exempt from nature, society, history, even death—the realization that it can't go on forever is traumatic." (p. 21.)
• {{cite book |last=Hardt |first=Michael |title=Empire |authorlink=Michael Hardt |author2=Antonio Negri |year=2001 |publisher=Harvard University Press |location=Cambridge, MA |isbn=0-674-00671-2 }} [https://web.archive.org/web/20080409064117/http://www.infoshop.org/texts/empire.pdf online]
• {{cite book |last=Huntington |first=Samuel P. |title=The Clash of Civilizations|authorlink=Samuel P. Huntington |year=1996 |publisher=Simon & Schuster |location=New York |isbn=0-684-81164-2 }}
• {{cite book|last=Immerwahr |first=Daniel |title=How to Hide an Empire: A History of the Greater United States |publisher=Farrar, Straus and Giroux |year=2019 |isbn=978-0-374-17214-5}}
• {{cite book|last=Johnson|first=Chalmers|authorlink=Chalmers Johnson|title= Blowback: The Costs and Consequences of American Empire|year= 2000|isbn= 0-8050-6239-4|publisher=Holt|location=New York}}
• {{cite book|last=Johnson|first=Chalmers|authorlink=Chalmers Johnson|year=2004|title=The Sorrows of Empire: Militarism, Secrecy, and the End of the Republic|isbn= 0-8050-7004-4|publisher=Metropolitan Books|location=New York}}
• {{cite book|last=Johnson|first=Chalmers|authorlink=Chalmers Johnson|year=2007|title=Nemesis: The Last Days of the American Republic|isbn= 0-8050-7911-4|publisher=Metropolitan Books|location=New York, NY}}
• {{cite book |last=Kagan |first=Robert |title=Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order |authorlink=Robert Kagan |year=2003 |publisher=Knopf |location=New York |isbn=1-4000-4093-0 }}
• {{cite book |last=Kerry |first=Richard J. |title=The Star-Spangled Mirror: America's Image of Itself and the World |authorlink= Richard J. Kerry |year=1990 |publisher=Rowman & Littlefield |location=Savage, MD |isbn=0-8476-7649-8 }}
• Lears, Jackson, "Imperial Exceptionalism" (review of Victor Bulmer-Thomas, Empire in Retreat: The Past, Present, and Future of the United States, Yale University Press, 2018, {{ISBN|978-0-300-21000-2}}, 459 pp.; and David C. Hendrickson, Republic in Peril: American Empire and the Liberal Tradition, Oxford University Press, 2017, {{ISBN|978-0190660383}}, 287 pp.), The New York Review of Books, vol. LXVI, no. 2 (February 7, 2019), pp. 8-10. Bulmer-Thomas writes: "Imperial retreat is not the same as national decline, as many other countries can attest. Indeed, imperial retreat can strengthen the nation-state just as imperial expansion can weaken it." (NYRB, cited on p. 10.)
• {{cite book |last=Lundestad |first=Geir |title=Empire by Integration: The United States and European Integration, 1945–1997 |authorlink=Geir Lundestad |year=1998 |publisher=Oxford University Press |location=New York |isbn=0-19-878212-8 }}
• {{cite book |last=Meyer |first=William H. |title=Security, Economics, and Morality in American Foreign Policy: Contemporary Issues in Historical Context |year=2003 |publisher=Prentice Hall |location=Upper Saddle River, NJ |isbn=0-13-086390-4 }}
• {{cite book |last=Nye |first=Joseph S., Jr |title=The Paradox of American Power: Why the World's Only Superpower Can't Go It Alone |authorlink=Joseph Nye |year=2002 |publisher=Oxford University Press |location=New York |isbn=0-19-515088-0 }}
• {{cite book| last=Odom| first=William | authorlink=William Eldridge Odom |author2=Robert Dujarric|year =2004|title=America's Inadvertent Empire|publisher=Yale University Press|isbn =0-300-10069-8}}
• {{cite book |editor-last=Patrick |editor-first=Stewart |editor-last2=Forman |editor-first2=Shepard |title=Multilateralism and U.S. Foreign Policy: Ambivalent Engagement |year=2001 |publisher=Lynne Rienner |location=Boulder, CO |isbn=1-58826-042-9 }}
• {{cite book| last =Perkins| first =John| authorlink =John Perkins (author)| year =2004| title =Confessions of an Economic Hit Man| publisher=Nashr-i Akhtarān| location =Tihrān| isbn =1-57675-301-8}}
• {{cite book |editor-last=Rapkin |editor-first=David P. |title=World Leadership and Hegemony |year=1990 |publisher=Lynne Rienner |location=Boulder, CO |isbn=1-55587-189-5 }}
• {{cite book |editor-last=Ruggie |editor-first=John G. |authorlink=John Ruggie|title=Multilateralism Matters: The Theory and Praxis of an Institutional Form |year=1993 |publisher=Columbia University Press |location=New York |isbn=978-0-231-07980-8}}
• {{cite book |last=Smith |first=Tony |title=America's Mission: The United States and the Worldwide Struggle for Democracy in the Twentieth Century |year=1994 |publisher=Princeton University Press |location=Princeton, NJ |isbn=0-691-03784-1 }}
• {{cite book |last=Tomlinson |first=John |title=Cultural Imperialism: A Critical Introduction |year=1991 |publisher=Johns Hopkins University Press |location=Baltimore, MD |isbn=0-8018-4250-6 }}
• {{cite book |last=Todd |first=Emmanuel |authorlink=Emmanuel Todd |title=After the Empire: The Breakdown of the American Order |publisher=Columbia University Press |location=New York |year=2004 |isbn=978-0-231-13103-2 |url=http://cup.columbia.edu/book/978-0-231-13102-5/after-the-empire}}
• {{cite book| last =Tremblay| first =Rodrigue | authorlink =Rodrigue Tremblay| year =2004| title =The New American Empire | publisher=Infinity Pub| location =Haverford, PA| isbn =0-7414-1887-8}}
• {{cite book| last =Zepezauer| first =Mark| year =2002| title =Boomerang!: How Our Covert Wars Have Created Enemies Across the Middle East and Brought Terror to America| publisher=Common Courage Press| location =Monroe, Maine| isbn =1-56751-222-4}}

External links

• "Imperial America" by Richard Haass, 2000
• [https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2001/08/21/empire-or-not-a-quiet-debate-over-us-role/d57204a6-d3b9-4330-b1ce-44e8bdd5b410/ "Empire or Not? A Quiet Debate Over U.S. Role"] by Thomas E. Ricks, 2001
• "The Answer to Terrorism? Colonialism" by Paul Johnson, 2001
• [https://web.archive.org/web/20160423193808/http://lists.csbs.utah.edu/pipermail/marxism/2001-October/055018.html "The Need for a New Imperialism"] by Martin Wolf, 2001
• "The Case for American Empire" by Max Boot, 2001
• [https://www.nytimes.com/learning/teachers/featured_articles/20020401monday.html "All Roads Lead to D.C."] by Emily Eakin, 2002
• [https://people.ucsc.edu/~rlipsch/migrated/Pol177/Mallaby.html "The Reluctant Imperialist: Terrorism, Failed States, and the Case for American Empire"] by Sebastian Mallaby, 2002
• [https://www.theguardian.com/world/2002/apr/07/1 "The New Liberal Imperialism"] by Robert Cooper, 2002
• "In Praise of American Empire" by Dinesh D'Souza, 2002
• "Empire lite" by Michael Ignatieff, 2003
• [https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/american-empire-not-if-but-what-kind/ "American Empire, Not ‘If’ but ‘What Kind’"] by Ivo H. Daalder and James M. Lindsay, 2003
• "America and The Tragic Limits of Imperialism" by Robert D. Kaplan, 2003
• "An Empire in Denial: The Limits of US Imperialism" by Niall Ferguson, 2003
• "In Defence of Empires" by Deepak Lal, 2003

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