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词条 Bootleggers and Baptists
释义

  1. Economic theory

  2. Global warming

  3. Literal example

  4. Other applications

  5. See also

  6. References

  7. External links

{{Original research|date=June 2017}}Bootleggers and Baptists is a concept put forth by regulatory economist Bruce Yandle,[1] derived from the observation that regulations are supported both by groups that want the ostensible purpose of the regulation, and by groups that profit from undermining that purpose.[2]

For much of the 20th century, Baptists and other evangelical Christians were prominent in political activism for Sunday closing laws restricting the sale of alcohol. Bootleggers sold alcohol illegally, and got more business if legal sales were restricted.[1] "Such a coalition makes it easier for politicians to favor both groups. ... [T]he Baptists lower the costs of favor-seeking for the bootleggers, because politicians can pose as being motivated purely by the public interest even while they promote the interests of well-funded businesses. ... [Baptists] take the moral high ground, while the bootleggers persuade the politicians quietly, behind closed doors."[3]

Economic theory

The mainstream economic theory of regulation treats politicians and administrators as brokers among interest groups.[4][5] Bootleggers and Baptists is a specific idea in the subfield of regulatory economics that attempts to predict which interest groups will succeed in obtaining rules they favor. It holds that coalitions of opposing interests that can agree on a common rule will be more successful than one-sided groups.[6]

Baptists do not merely agitate for legislation, they help monitor and enforce it (a law against Sunday alcohol sales without significant public support would likely be ignored, or be evaded through bribery of enforcement officers). Thus bootleggers and Baptists is not just an academic restatement of the common political accusation that shadowy for-profit interests are hiding behind public-interest groups to fund deceptive legislation. It is a rational theory[7] to explain relative success among types of coalitions.[1][8][9]

Another part of the theory is that bootleggers and Baptists produce suboptimal legislation.[10] Although both groups are satisfied with the outcome, broader society would be better off either with no legislation or different legislation.[11] For example, a surtax on Sunday alcohol sales could reduce Sunday alcohol consumption as much as making it illegal. Instead of enriching bootleggers and imposing policing costs, the surtax could raise money to be spent on, say, property tax exemptions for churches and alcoholism treatment programs. Moreover, such a program could be balanced to reflect the religious beliefs and drinking habits of everyone, not just certain groups. From the religious point of the view, the bootleggers have not been cut out of the deal, the government has become the bootlegger.[3]

Although the bootleggers and Baptists story has become a standard idea in regulatory economics,[12] it has not been systematically validated as an empirical proposition. It is a catch-phrase useful in analyzing regulatory coalitions rather than an accepted principle of economics.[13]

Global warming

Legislation and treaties to reduce global warming often command support of both polluting countries and environmentalists. Yandle and Buck argue that a similar phenomenon took place in the battle over the Kyoto Protocol, where the "Baptist" environmental groups provided moral support while "bootlegger" corporations and nations worked in the background to seek economic advantages over their rivals.[3]

Literal example

"Arkansas liquor stores have allied with religious leaders to fight statewide legalization of alcohol sales. The stores in wet counties don’t want to lose customers. The churches don’t want to lose souls. Larry Page, a Southern Baptist pastor and director of the Arkansas Faith and Ethics Council, which traces its roots to the Anti-Saloon League of Arkansas in 1899, [also recalled]...when his group joined with feminists to oppose pornography and cooperated with Mississippi casinos to fight gambling in Arkansas."[14]

Other applications

Bootleggers and Baptists has been invoked to explain nearly every political alliance for regulation in the United States in the last 30 years including the Clean Air Act,[15] interstate trucking,[16] state liquor stores,[17] the Pure Food and Drug Act,[18] environmental policy,[19] regulation of genetically modified organisms,[20] the North American Free Trade Agreement,[21] environmental politics,[22] gambling legislation,[23] blood donation,[24] wine regulation,[25] and the tobacco settlement.[26]

See also

{{Portal|Liquor|Law|Politics}}
  • Crony capitalism
  • Moonshine
  • Regulatory capture
  • Rum-running
{{Clear}}

References

1. ^1 2 {{cite journal | last = Yandle | first = Bruce | author-link = Bruce Yandle | title = Bootleggers and Baptists: the education of a regulatory economist | journal = Regulation | volume = 7 | issue = 3 | pages = 12–16 | date = May–June 1983 | url = http://www.cato.org/regulation/archives | ref = harv }} Pdf.:See also: {{cite journal | last = Yandle | first = Bruce | author-link = Bruce Yandle | title = Bootleggers and Baptists in retrospect | journal = Regulation | volume = 22 | issue = 3 | pages = 5–7 | date = October 1999 | url = http://www.cato.org/regulation/archives | ref = harv }} Pdf. and {{cite book|title=Bootleggers and Baptists: How Economic Forces and Moral Persuasion Interact to Shape Regulatory Politics|date=2014|publisher=Cato Institute|isbn=978-1939709363}}
2. ^{{cite book | last = McChesney | first = Fred S. | title = Money for nothing: politicians, rent extraction, and political extortion | publisher = Harvard University Press | location = Cambridge, Massachusetts | year = 1997 | isbn = 9780674583306 }}
3. ^1 2 {{cite journal | last = Yandle | first = Bruce | last2 = Buck | first2 = Stuart | author-link = Bruce Yandle | title = Bruce, bootleggers, Baptists, and the global warming battle | journal = SSRN | doi = 10.2139/ssrn.279914 | ssrn = 279914 | date = 14 August 2001 | ref = harv }}
4. ^{{cite book | last1 = Baldwin | first1 = Robert | last2 = Cave | first2 = Martin | last3 = Lodge | first3 = Martin | title = The Oxford handbook of regulation | publisher = Oxford University Press | location = Oxford New York | year = 2010 | isbn = 9780199655885 }}
5. ^{{cite book | last = Lasswell | first = Harold | title = Politics: who gets what, when, how? | publisher = McGraw-Hill | location = New York | year = 1950 | origyear = 1936 | oclc = 21939663 }}
6. ^{{cite book | last = Kahn | first = Alfred E. | title = The economics of regulation : principles and institutions | publisher = MIT Press | location = Cambridge, Massachusetts | year = 1988 | isbn = 9780262610520 }}
7. ^{{cite book | last = Bryner | first = Gary | title = Bureaucratic discretion: law and policy in federal regulatory agencies | publisher = Pergamon Press | location = New York | year = 1987 | isbn = 9780080344935 }}
8. ^{{citation | last = Tullock | first = Gordon | contribution = Rent seeking as a negative sum game | editor-last1 = Buchanan | editor-first1 = James M. | editor-last2 = Tollison | editor-first2 = Robert D. | editor-last3 = Tullock | editor-first3 = Gordon | title = Toward a theory of the rent-seeking society | pages = 16–38 | publisher = Texas A & M University | location = College Station | year = 1980 | isbn = 9780890960905 | ref = harv | postscript = .}}
9. ^{{cite journal | last = Wagner | first = Richard E. | title = Reviewed work: The Logic of Collective Action by Mancur Olson, Jr. | journal = Papers on Non-Market Decision Making | volume = 1 | pages = 161–170 | date = December 1966 | jstor = 25122288 | ref = harv }}
10. ^{{citation | last = Buchanan | first = James M. | contribution = Rent seeking and profit seeking | editor-last1 = Buchanan | editor-first1 = James M. | editor-last2 = Tollison | editor-first2 = Robert D. | editor-last3 = Tullock | editor-first3 = Gordon | title = Toward a theory of the rent-seeking society | pages = 3–15 | publisher = Texas A & M University | location = College Station | year = 1980 | isbn = 9780890960905 | ref = harv | postscript = .}}
11. ^{{cite journal | last = Sutter | first = Daniel | title = The democratic efficiency debate and definitions of political equilibrium | journal = The Review of Austrian Economics, Special Issue: Austrian Economics and Public Choice | volume = 15 | issue = 2 | pages = 199–209 | doi = 10.1023/A:1015766621802 | date = June 2002 | ref = harv }}
12. ^{{cite journal | last1 = Schneider | first1 = Mark | last2 = Teske | first2 = Paul | title = Toward a theory of the political entrepreneur: evidence from local government | journal = American Political Science Review | volume = 86 | issue = 3 | pages = 737–747 | doi = 10.2307/1964135 | jstor = 1964135 | date = September 1992 | ref = harv }}
13. ^{{cite book | last = Breyer | first = Stephen | title = Regulation and its reform | publisher = Harvard University Press | location = Cambridge, Massachusetts | year = 1982 | isbn = 9780674753761 }}
14. ^{{cite news | last1 = Deprez | first1 = Esmé E. | last2 = Hogue | first2 = Millie | title = Arkansas liquor stores join churches to save dry counties | url = https://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-10-27/arkansas-liquor-stores-join-churches-to-save-dry-counties.html | work = Bloomberg Politics | publisher = Bloomberg News | date = October 27, 2014 | deadurl = yes | archiveurl = https://web.archive.org/web/20150114075546/http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-10-27/arkansas-liquor-stores-join-churches-to-save-dry-counties.html | archivedate = January 14, 2015 | df = }}
15. ^{{cite book | last1 = Ackerman | first1 = Bruce | last2 = Hassler | first2 = William T. | title = Clean coal/dirty air: or how the Clean air act became a multibillion-dollar bail-out for high-sulfur coal producers and what should be done about it | publisher = Yale University Press | location = New Haven, Connecticut | year = 1981 | isbn = 9780300026436 }}
16. ^{{cite journal | last = Benson | first = Bruce L. | title = Regulatory disequilibrium and inefficiency: the case of interstate trucking | journal = The Review of Austrian Economics | volume = 15 | issue = 2 | pages = 229–255 | doi = 10.1023/A:1015722906781 | date = June 2002 | ref = harv }}
17. ^{{cite journal | last1 = Benson | first1 = Bruce L. | last2 = Rasmussen | first2 = David W. | last3 = Zimmerman | first3 = Paul R. | title = Implicit taxes collected by state liquor monopolies | journal = Public Choice | volume = 115 | issue = 3–4 | pages = 313–331 | doi = 10.1023/A:1024240400780 | jstor = 30025994 | date = June 2003 | ref = harv }}
18. ^{{cite journal | last1 = High | first1 = Jack | last2 = Coppin | first2 = Clayton A. | title = Wiley and the whiskey industry: strategic behavior in the passage of the Pure Food Act | journal = Business History Review | volume = 62 | issue = 2 | pages = 286–309 | doi = 10.2307/3116002 | date = Summer 1988 | ref = harv | jstor = 3116002 }}
19. ^{{cite journal | last = Lyons | first = Michael | title = Political self-interest and U.S. environmental policy | journal = Natural Resources Journal | volume = 39 | issue = 2 | pages = 271–294 | ssrn = 171397 | date = Spring 1999 | url = http://lawschool.unm.edu/NRJ/volumes/39/v39_no2.php | ref = harv }} Pdf.
20. ^{{cite book | last = Meins | first = Erika | title = Politics and public outrage: explaining transatlantic and intra-European diversity of regulations on food irradiation and genetically modified food | publisher = Lit Transaction Publishers | location = Münster Piscataway, New Jersey | year = 2003 | isbn = 9783825867676 }}
21. ^{{cite journal | last = Reynolds | first = Alan | title = The politics of NAFTA | journal = National Review | volume = 45 | issue = 20 | pages = 42–44 | date = 18 October 1993 | url = https://www.unz.org/Pub/NationalRev-1993oct18-00042 | ref = harv }}
22. ^{{cite book | last = Rosenbaum | first = Walter A. | title = Environmental politics and policy | publisher = CQ-Roll Call Group Books | location = Washington, D.C | year = 1995 | edition = 3rd | isbn = 9780871878489 }}
23. ^{{cite news | last = Schmidt | first = Susan | title = Casino bid prompted high-stakes lobbying | url = https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A30274-2005Mar12.html | work = The Washington Post | publisher = Nash Holdings LLC | date = 13 March 2005 }}
24. ^{{cite book | last1 = Thomas | first1 = Diana W. | last2 = Thomas | first2 = Michael D. | title = Efficient regulation? The case of the market for blood | location = Logan | publisher = Department of Economics and Finance, Utah State University | year = 2010 }} Working paper.:See also: {{cite journal | last1 = Thomas | first1 = Diana W. | last2 = Simmons | first2 = Randy T. | last3 = Yonk | first3 = Ryan M. | title = Bootleggers, Baptists, and political entrepreneurs: key players in the rational game and morality play of regulatory politics | journal = The Independent Review | volume = 15 | issue = 3 | pages = 367–381 | date = Winter 2011 | url = http://www.independent.org/publications/tir/article.asp?a=816 | ref = harv }} Pdf.
25. ^{{cite journal | last1 = Wiseman | first1 = Alan. E. | last2 = Ellig | first2 = Jerry | title = The politics of wine: trade barriers, interest groups, and the commerce class | journal = The Journal of Politics | volume = 69 | issue = 3 | pages = 859–875 | doi = 10.1111/j.1468-2508.2007.00580.x | jstor = 10.1111 | date = August 2007 | ref = harv | citeseerx = 10.1.1.517.6921 }}
26. ^{{cite journal | last1 = Yandle | first1 = Bruce | last2 = Rotondi | first2 = Joseph A. | last3 = Morriss | first3 = Andrew P. | last4 = Dorchak | first4 = Andrew | author-link = Bruce Yandle | title = Bootleggers, Baptists & Televangelists: regulating tobacco by litigation | journal = University of Illinois College of Law: Law and Economics Working Papers | volume = 82 | pages = 1225–1284 | ssrn = 1010695 | date = 2007 | url = http://law.bepress.com/uiuclwps/art82/ | ref = harv }} Pdf.

External links

  • {{cite journal | last = Yandle | first = Bruce | author-link = Bruce Yandle | title = Bootleggers and Baptists in retrospect | journal = Regulation | volume = 22 | issue = 3 | pages = 5–7 | date = October 1999 | url = http://www.cato.org/regulation/archives | ref = harv }} Pdf.
  • Podcast. Yandle discusses the story with Russ Roberts at EconTalk.
{{DEFAULTSORT:Bootleggers And Baptists}}

3 : Alcohol law in the United States|Public choice theory|Regulation
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